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The important topic of loyalist privateering during the American
Revolution has remained unaddressed. The intention of this study is to
examine the activity's developmental period between 1775-1778. Relying
predominantly on primary source materials such as newspapers, admiralty court records, shipsf papers, correspondence, memorials, diaries, journals, and minute, account, and log books, this work analyzes
the participants and assesses their role in the war.
There are three key focuses. The first is on the activities of
loyalist mariners during the war's first half, prior to official recognition of privateering by the British. Loyalist service on various
types of vessels is examined to view the growth of maritime involvement, analyze crews and vessels, and ascertain levels of success. Also
discussed are the obstacles imposed by the British which loyalist privateers were forced to overcome to gain acceptance. To explain the developing situation within the scope of the North Atlantic world, related events in East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and the West Indies are also examined. Ultimately, the study shows that privateering

was strongly supported loyalists, and their activities at sea during
the early part of the conflict resulted in significant contributions
to the British war effort.
The second focus is on the development of the participants,
themselves, as loyalists and privateers. Individuals from different
maritime regions are identified and profiled according to social, economic, occupational, ethnic, and racial backgrounds, experiences, and
motivating factors. The regional groups are then compared to discern
similarities and differences. The third key theme is closely associated. Considerable attention is paid to the situation and activities
of one family, the Goodriches, who became leaders in the privateering
enterprise. Interrelated is the issue of how British trade restrictions negatively affected loyalists, prompting them to become privateers. The work shows that loyalist Americans involved in privateering, though dominated by the merchant/mariner classes, reflected a
cross-section of the populace, were generally motivated by legitimate,
honorable factors, and constituted a previously unrecognized, significant, highly unified sub-community within the loyalist community.
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INTRODUCTION

Historians have generated a fair amount of literature concerning
the loyalists of the American Revolution. Much has also been written
about the numerous naval and maritime aspects of the war. Yet, a key
element of both the loyalist community and the conflict at sea has
been ignored: the loyalist privateersmen. If one finds a reference to
these individuals in the secondary literature, it is usually only a
passing acknowledgment of their existence. Rare indeed are accounts
offering much substance, and when encountered, they are usually brief,
relative asides in a broader study where the real emphasis lies elsewhere. As long ago as 1942, no less a historian than Robert Greenhalgh
Albion remarked on the lack of a study on these people. 1 In 1948, Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker called loyalist privateering "the most important activity of New York," but he devoted less than three pages to
the topic.2 In the lengthy interim since then, no one has seen fit to
pursue the matter. Several factors may account for this lack of attention. As an unaddresed topic, historians may simply have failed to
recognize the significance of loyalist privateering. Various biases
may have played a part. Traditionally, land campaigns have been viewed
as more important than those conducted at sea. Also, a bias against
loyalists in general, often perceived as the enemy, may account, in
part for the neglect. Bias against naval and military studies, which
has prevailed in the historical community until recently, may also
have precluded tackling such a study. Simple research logistical problems were undoubtedly a factor for anyone who may have attempted work
on this topic. Pertinent material is widely scattered in numerous ar-

chives around the North Atlantic rim. Finally, the state of loyalist
literature has only just progressed enough to establish a data base of
information and ideas to allow researchers to advance and investigate
more specific topics in depth. The Provincial Corps and the loyalist
militia system also await detailed examinations. Given this lack of
historical treatment, it is of primary importance to ascertain not
only just what these individuals accomplished, but simply who they
were.
The loyalist privateering enterprise was ultimately popular,
widespread, and conducted on a large scale. The story of this activity
can be divided neatly into two consecutive periods. The first, the developmental stage, lasted until October, 1778, when the British government finally granted authorization to loyalists for general privateering operations.3 With acceptance, the second period began, entailing extensive unrestricted activity and continuing until the end
of the war. A key historical objective found in secondary loyalist
literature involves ascertaining the various roles of loyalists in the
British war effort and assessing their significance. Although the
first era did not witness privateering on the same level as the second, loyalist activity at sea during the earlier phase was still significant, and examining the evolutionary phase is key to our understanding the whole story. Only by doing this can we become aware of
why the participants opted for this means of involving themselves in
the conflict, and why the British, who were initially opposed to the
activity, ultimately decided to recognize it and rely on it as a major
part of their war effort. More importantly, during this time, loyalist
mariners, though acting in a limited capacity under major restraints,
nevertheless, continued to push for and develop privateering, significantly aiding the British war effort as they did so. These mariners
not only caused considerable disruption and losses to rebel trade,

they provided other important services, acting as naval auxiliaries,
performing convoy duty, gathering intelligence, and supplying beleaguered areas with much needed provisions and materials. At the same
time, these loyalists negatively affected the focus of rebel war aims
by forcing the revolutionaries to acknowledge their threat and take
considerable steps to counter it. Consequently, examining the role
played by loyalists at sea and assessing the results they achieved
during this first period constitute the primary goal of this study,
and consequently, this is largely a study of a series of maritime campaigns.
Three additional objectives have been germane to loyalist studies. Two simply entail identifying who the loyalists were and defining
their unique experience. In turn, collective analysis of established
identities and experiences has resulted in achieving the remaining
goal, creating group profiles based on background, degree of involvement, and motivation. In terms of background, the overall loyalist
composition (used here synonymously with profile) reflected a crosssection of colonial social class, occupation, economic status, ethnicity, race, gender, and region. At the same time, however, regional
variations in the general profile existed. Levels of involvement for
loyalists as a whole ranged from neutral to equivocal to extremely active. A variety of motivational factors prompted their decision to
side with the crown. In general, loyalists were a varied and complex
group.4
Coinciding with and integral to the development of loyalist privateering as an activity was the evolution of the participants, themselves, first as loyalists, then as privateersmen. A second, parallel
objective for this study, is to profile loyalist privateers with the
intention of determining who they were and why they became what they
did. As a ground-breaking work, simply identifying individuals is of

primary importance. This will not only tell us who was involved, it
will also help convey the widespread level of participation. Of
course, not everyone can be identified and included, but the sample
presented in the course of this paper, consisting of 265 men and
women, is representative of the much larger group. While fitting the
broader, inter-colonial profile, loyalist mariners also alter it by
adding a previously unacknowledged, but numerically, and thus socially, significant element to the intricate composition of the loyalist community. In fact, they formed a large, distinct maritime subcommunity. Using the broader, established historical view as a point
of reference, profiling will also allow regional differences in composition to be discerned among privateers. More importantly, the examination of the background and experience of this whole group of loyalists allows their general collective character to be assessed; we then
can arrive at an understanding of why these individuals chose the
course they did. This is essential, because rebel contemporaries often
viewed loyalist privateersmen as little better than ruthless, plundering pirates, and this view has sometimes carried over into the secondary literature on those rare instances when historians have acknowledged the existence of these people.5 In reality, for the most part,
loyalist privateers, with merchants and mariners serving as a large
core element, were simply everyday, moderate, responsible, respectable
people, motivated by generally acceptable, honorable reasons, who
acted, or more appropriately, reacted, as consciences and circumstances dictated. Forced on the defensive, these Americans were transformed into extremely aggressive participants in the war against their
once fellow countrymen.
Of course certain loyalists stand out as exemplary or significant for various reasons. As such, they warrant greater attention. In
the annals of loyalist privateering, one name, Goodrich, stands out

above all others. The activities of this Virginia family, consisting
of a father, five sons, and a son-in-law, were integral to the developmental period of loyalist privateering, during which they established themselves as without peers in the activity. Furthermore, the
experiences which caused them to become loyalists in the first place,
though clearly extreme, never-the-less involved many elements reflective of other loyalists' situations. Much of the story of the early
period focuses on the Goodriches.
It is necessary at this point to elaborate on an aspect of motivation which is pertinent to establishing the collective character of
loyalist privateersmen and will be a major sub-theme in this work. As
noted, motivation is a key profile element that historians have worked
hard to isolate and define because it is essential to our understanding the loyalist stance. As varied as loyalist backgrounds were their
reasons for casting their lot with the British. Often cited and emphasized by historians, in what is tantamount to a stock in trade discussion in loyalist studies, is one specific motivating factor. Loyalists, in particular the merchant class, are perceived as having been
opportunistic and self-interested, and so, chose the side they did for
reasons of personal gain. 6 At the same time, almost all privateering
studies address the issue of personal profit as a motivational factor.
Commonly encountered in the secondary literature on privateersmen, regardless of time period, is the belief that they operated with the
primary intention of enhancing their wealth.7 To illustrate how deeply
this view has permeated the popular perception, on numerous occasions
during the course of preparing this study people would ask what my research involved. When they were told it concerned privateers, the response of those who knew what a privateer was inevitably replied, 'Oh!
Legalized piracy." This clearly indicates that a cloud of profit oriented unrespectability has come to shroud the activity in the minds of

many. Because these negative views are so prevalent with historians
working in both fields, and because loyalist privateering revolved
around the merchant/mariner class, it is doubly important to explore
this issue in the course of this study. If left unaddressed, the
reader might conclude that merchant/mariners, if motivated by reasons
of personal enhancement to become loyalists in the first place, would
logically pursue privateering as a matter of course to attain their
goals. This would have the affect of casting an even greater pall over
the participants, making them appear truly disreputable

.

On the other hand, in addressing the issue of self-interest in a
couple of recent studies on privateering, writers have displayed a
more enlightened understanding of the activity with regards to profitability. They have effectively shown that not only were privateersmen
generally patriotic, but also, while acknowledging that money was a
consideration, within the context of eighteenth century mercantile beliefs, that waging war while attempting to fill one's coffers was completely acceptable behavior. 8 To paraphrase Carl E. Swanson, what today
would be considered "private viceN was then equated with "public virt u e . ~Consequently,
~
the negative view that privateersmen, at least,
were prompted by the lure of filthy lucre becomes moot. Other studies
have taken a different tack by showing that the merchant/mariner class
often entered into the activity because they had little alternative.
With their normal trade regimen disrupted by war, privateering offered
the only logical and viable alternative venture allowing the continuation of some form of business. 10

A key purpose of this study, which is part and parcel to explaining the development of the enterprise and incorporates the two
views just outlined is to show that in the first place, that these
loyalists were motivated by a high level of their own brand of public
virtue. In turn, their degree of commitment carried over prompting

them to become privateersmen. While the motivation of many can, in a
limited, qualified degree, be defined as self-interested, it was justifiably so and free of negative implications. Specifically, the decisions of these individuals to become either loyalists or privateersmen, were not governed by speculative dreams of personal financial enhancement. The situation was simply not conducive to this.
Belying self-interest and prompting involvement in privateering
was the extremely disrupted trade situation that loyalist mechant/
mariners found themselves in. This was brought on not only by the war
itself, but by the trade restrictions imposed by the British that
negatively affected loyalists as well as rebels. Discussion of this
topic, constituting another major sub-theme, will crop up throughout
the study. Disruption of trade was a key factor in turning many to
privateering.
Another topic supports the generally honorable character of
these men. For many, privateering was not the only means of showing
their commitment. A significant number served in other military or naval capacities, often as unpaid volunteers. Others acted as public officials and performed civic and humanitarian roles. For many privateering was only one way of showing their commitment.
Examination of loyalist experience has led some historians to
assert that in most cases the effects of the war on loyalists was generally mild and that even accounts of their persecution have been
over-stated. While they acknowledge that selected individuals and even
certain populations in specific locales did suffer serious abuse, the
treatment of most loyalists is said to have been quite lenient.11 As a
group, a comparatively high proportion of loyalist privateers suffered
severely in one way or another for their stance. Persecution was both
a motivating and reinforcing agent for involvement.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the developmental phase
concerns the place of loyalist privateers in early British policy and
strategy. Simply put, officially, it had none. Loyalist privateersmen
were persona non grata. Despite the fact that they were increasingly
eager, as the war progressed, to act in the capacity of privateersmen,
there was considerable opposition to the idea of their doing so. Their
efforts to attain the official sanction necessary to conduct legitimate operations at sea met with a very negative response from factions
holding sway in the British Government and the Royal Navy. In an effort to maintain control of a deteriorating situation, these two
groups, for diplomatic, legal, professional, and personal reasons, in
conjunction with their implementation and enforcement of restrictive
legislative acts and general policy, refused to acknowledge the activity and seriously retarded its development. In general, members of
government and the navy held loyalist privateers to be a potentially
serious liability for a number of reasons. In addition, in Bermuda,
loyalist privateersmen met with severe resistance from a civil populace. Despite the lack of official recognition and support, the activity continued to evolve. Proponents of privateering persevered in
their efforts for acceptance, often conducting operations without the
necessary proper authority. As the situation required, loyalist privateersmen learned to circumvent and even openly defy the restraints in
the shadow of which they functioned. Still, gaining acceptance was a
long and sometimes difficult process with expanding levels of qualified recognition achieved in sporadic stages. By 1778, however, coinciding with France entering the fray and the resulting necessity on
the part of the British to reassess their war aims and the roles loyalists would play in them, loyalists had proven themselves effective
privateersmen and thus, important assets to the British war effort. In
the face of opposition, loyalist mariners had achieved a significant

record of success. They could no longer be ignored, and they got what
they desired, official widespread sanction to independently wage war
at sea with the freedom normally accorded privateers. Loyalist response to the news that the British would finally officially allow
them to go privateering was incredibly enthusiastic, constituting an
uncommon feverish rage.
During the course of previous imperialistic struggles in the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, warfare at sea had come to
be equated with mercantile trade war, and consequently, privateering
fit in well with the scheme of things. The nature of the conflict during the early stages of the American Revolution, however, was new and
different. Despite the efforts of the British to bring the rebels into
line by imposing severe trade restrictions, as witnessed with the Restraining and Prohibitory Acts of 1775 and 1776, this was not a trade
war like previous colonial conflicts. In trying to put down the rebellion, the British were not attempting to acquire and control new territories, markets, and resources, but rather to maintain a grip on existing ones by hitting the rebels where it would hurt most. The target
was the same, but the object and the means of achieving it were different. In light of this situation, British resistance to legitimizing
privatizing reflected valid concerns. Employing commissioned vessels
was not really appropriate at this early stage, and if allowed, the
activity could backfire and prove an embarrassing liability.
Despite privateering's popularity, some individuals feared that
men, waging war independently, free from the controls and discipline
of established military and naval forces, would act without regard to
the rules of civilized warfare, commit heinous atrocities, and so, become little better than, if not actually, pirates. When these beliefs
were applied to the specific situation in North America, there was
fear that rather than aid the war effort, privateers would only serve

to make a bad situation worse. Prior to 1779, while the British were
actively fighting the rebels, they also strove for reconciliation with
them. Unleashing privateers of any sort, be it loyalist or British,
would have had the effect of creating a civil war with all the real
and potential horrors inherent to such a conflict. Privateers would
only serve to anger and alienate the rebels further, and so, negatively affect the negotiations for a peaceful settlement.
There was a second major reason for Britain's reluctance in
authorizing privateering.

The activity was governed by international

laws and conducted between established, legitimate nations. To sanction privateering against the rebels would have been tantamount to acknowledging them as independent.12
Britons who opposed privateering harbored yet another legitimate
fear. In accordance with the Prohibitory Act leveled against the rebels on December 2, 1775, foreign vessels found carrying supplies to
them were subject to seizure by the Royal Navy. Were the British to
sanction privateers, the same foreign bottoms would become fair game
for them as well. Again, in light of the opinion that held privateers
to be an uncontrollable entity, there was serious concern they would
be less scrupulous then the navy in their selection of prizes, and so,
they might provoke an international incident drawing another opponent
into the war. Needless to say, this was something the British hoped to
avoid at all costs. With France's entry into the war and the collapse
of the peace negotiations, the nature of the conflict and views on employing loyalist privateers changed radically.
The Royal Navy maintained other self-serving and less justifiable reasons for opposing privateers. The primary concern of that
august body was that privateering would prove such an attractive alternative to naval service, it would not only make it even more difficult to acquire crews, it would also cause desertions and deplete ex-

isting ones. Even less legitimate was the fear on the part of some naval officers that privateering would negatively affect the opportunity
for prize money. Prize money was the traditional means by which impoverished officers achieved wealth, and they guarded the perquisite
against interlopers who might diminish opportunities for reward.
Lest the reader think that loyalist privateersmen were singled
out for repressive treatment by the British, it need be noted the
British response to them was in keeping with a broader policy towards
loyalists in general. The British simply did not want to rely on them.
Paralleling the development of loyalist privateering was the evolution
of the loyalist Provincial Corps within the Army. Early in the war as
stopgap measures to meet immediate crises, the Crown had resorted to
using loyalist soldiers as well as mariners, and just as there would
be an outcry for the recognition of privateering, there was one for
allowing the formation of provincial military units. In fact, initially, the clamor for such commands seems to have greatly surpassed
that for letters of marque, and the British responded to a degree.
Provincial battalions were formed. As troops, however, they came under
direct British military command, and so, a great deal of control could
be exerted over them. This led to problems. Use of provincial troops
was limited and the nature of the service was not what the loyalists
had in mind. Often, these units, comprised of men who volunteered to
ardently do their part, were deemed as second rate and not trusted by
British superiors. As a result, they were generally relegated to performing menial, inferior, less than glamorous duties. In part, this
less than enthusiastic response to the employment of loyalist troops
was a result of the peace effort. The British feared that their use
would also create the ugly situation of civil war and so, jeopardize
hopes for reconciliation. In any case, the loyalists became disheartened with their lot, and enthusiasm for raising and joining provincial

commands waned to the point that by the time the policy was reversed
in 1778 and a major effort was made to enlist loyalist support, the
British were sadly disappointed in the response. Loyalists were tired
and fed up with what they felt was unappreciative neglect and illusage and they were disillusioned by what they deemed the halfhearted, irresolute manner in which the British had prosecuted the war
to date. Potential troops had grown somewhat wary of the British and
appeasement was too late.13
The course of loyalist privateering was just the opposite of
that of the Provincial Corps. While the initial demands for letters of
marque seem to have been much less than for military commands, as will
be seen, the outcry for them grew and continued to grow steadily, despite opposition, until the restrictions on their issue were removed.
At that point, in September and October, 1778, there was a considerable outpouring of support for the activity.
Not all British officials and naval officers held the idea of
loyalist privateering in such low regard. At the senior government
level, no less a figure than Lord George Germain, Viscount Sackville,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, and his Under-Secretary, William
Knox, strongly advocated the activity. In the navy, Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot was certainly not averse to the idea, and lesser officers of distinction, such as Captain Andrew Snape Hammond, actually
declared their support of it. A number of colonial officials were
quick to assess the situation and realize the value of relying on loyalist mariners, sometimes taking matters into their own hands and
transcending the limits of their authority. Such included Governors
John Murray, Earl Dunmore, of Virginia, Josiah Martin of North Carolina, William Campbell of South Carolina, Patrick Tonyn of East Florida, William Tryon of New York, and Lieutenant Governor Thomas Oliver
of Massachusetts.

A final technical problem confronting evolving loyalist privateers was that in order for the undertaking to be conducted efficiently, effectively, successfully, and most importantly, legally,
certain administrative and legal machinery, in the form of the powers
granted colonial governors and vice admiralty courts, needed to be in
place. They were not. Earlier, colonial governors had been granted the
courtesy title of vice-admiral and empowered with the considerable
rights accorded such. A significant aspect of their role was the
right, when sanctioned (as it always had been in the past) to authorize letters of marque for individuals desirous of becoming privateersmen. The governors also supervised the vice admiralty courts which had
been authorized in 1696 and had existed in most colonies. These courts
served three main functions. They mediated in such matters as disputes
between captains and crews, they enforced the navigation acts, and
most significantly with regard to this study, in time of war, they
heard prize cases. Also, while it was the governors who authorized
letters of marque, it was the court that actually issued them. Although the court's judges were subject to Royal approval, they were
selected by the governors, thus giving them effective control over the
system. Of course, for reasons too obvious and numerous to mention,
the presence of an admiralty court in a colony was lucrative for all
associated. More importantly, however, a governor's ability to issue
letters of marque and the immediate presence of a vice-admiralty court
were essential for effective, efficient, and successful privateering.
Without them, there was no place conveniently close to acquire
authorization to cruise or to send prizes to be libeled and condemned.l 4
At the end of the Seven Years War there were eleven vice adrniralty courts in North America. In 1764, however, the system was radically altered. The governors lost their right to grant commissions,

and the courts were restructured to include only four, strategically
located at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charlestown. A fifth
court was established at St. Augustine, East Florida, in 1771. Of
course, for most if not all of the period in question, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charlestown were under rebel control, leaving only remote, inconveniently located Halifax and St. Augustine as the only legitimate, officially recognized vice-admiralty courts on the continent. This proved problematic not only for privateers, but for the
Royal Navy as well. The problem lay primarily in the fact that for
every vessel seized, a detachment of experienced sailors from the captor had to be detached to sail the prize to the nearest port with a
vice-admiralty court. The negative results were two-fold with one compounding the other. First, the potential efficiency and effectiveness
of the captor was steadily reduced through the loss of manpower every
time a capture was made. In fact, this was simply the nature of the
business and acceptable. It became increasingly problematic, however,
the further away the court. The farther the distance, the longer the
men would be away and the greater the inconvenience in retrieving
them. Other factors, to be discussed later, appear to have negatively
affected the viability of using the St. Augustine court even more.
Yet, despite these issues, the British resisted efforts to reinstate
the prerogatives of the governors and establish new courts. In fact,
the Prohibitory Act directly addressed the prize court situation, declaring that captured rebel vessels could not be brought into any of
the thirteen rebellious colonies for court proceedings. As such, the
act had a negative effect on loyalists. A decree of this nature was
hardly conducive to pursuing privateering. The issue of the court system plays an important part in this story.15
Another sub-theme reoccurring throughout the work concerns the
examination of the types of vessels employed, their ordnance, and

crews. The intent is to show the continued increase in the size of
privateers, their armaments, and compliments. This, in turn, will reflect the escalating degree of commitment and participation.
A

final, highly significant theme concerns the geographic scope

of this study. The intention is to view the early period of loyalist
privateering comprehensively within the context of the North Atlantic
world. Consequently, in addition to viewing the activities of the
mainland loyalists from the thirteen rebellious colonies, the situation and operations in East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, the Bahamas, the West Indies, and Britain will also be examined. Of course,
the Bahamas are part of the West Indies, but they were somewhat of a
fringe element, and in terms of privateering and their place in the
colonial/revolutionary world, they constitute a separate entity to be
discussed apart from the rest.
This "big picture" view was necessitated by the nature of the
historical situation dictating an all or nothing approach. The issues,
events, and personalities of one region were often closely tied with
those elsewhere, with affairs in one locale often affecting those in
another. Therefore, to fully explain matters in one area, it is often
necessary to discuss related events in other regions. Also, privateering was an extremely dynamic activity unrestricted by artificial territorial boundaries. Vessels based in one port often conducted operations in other remote areas inter-mingling with craft from other
ports. The majority of loyalists, themselves, were dispossessed refugees who relocated to far-flung locales coming into contact with others in the same situation and establishing new affiliations as they
did so. This makes it impossible to effectively isolate the participants from a given colony or even region and focus specifically on
them and their activities. Adopting this broader scope serves to enhance the over-all meaningfulness to the topic. It will place person-

alities, issues, and events separated by time and space in context
with each other, while at the same time showing the homogeneity of the
enterprise. It will also allow a better assessment of operations and
their significance. This, in turn, will further enhance our understanding of the significance of the war at sea during the revolution
and its affects on other aspects of the conflict.
During the pre-war era, the same merchant/mariners who would instigate privateering conducted business amid an intricate intercolonial trade network encompassing the North Atlantic world. Effective business required an intimate knowledge of commodities, tides,
winds, weather conditions, navigational hazards, and the economics of
remote areas, and was reliant on a complex infra-structure of established routes, ports, supply and repair facilities, and personal connections. This knowledge and infra-structure was easily adapted and
essential to privateering and served as the foundation for operations
in that enterprise. In essence, as merchant/mariners and consequently,
privateers, these individuals functioned in a much larger and more
complex world than other loyalists. This sets them apart as distinctive. The means they chose to wage war was a logical extension of
their peacetime occupation, based on a specific knowledge of that
larger world which they used to their advantage.
In establishing this North Atlantic scope a somewhat contradictory fact becomes apparent. Despite the regional expanse, the world of
the loyalist privateersman was really a small one.

A

number of these

men were already known to each other through pre-war business ventures. More would come into contact with each other as a result of the
conflict and be further linked by privateering. As such, the loyalist
maritime community was reinforced and unified to an even greater degree. They possessed a level of inter-colonial cohesiveness setting
them apart from other segments of the loyalist population.

To summarize, there are three main objectives to this study, the
third of which is closely related to the second. First, the work will
strive to explain the development of loyalist privateering, examine
loyalist maritime operations during the early period, show the affect
of activities, and establish their significance. In assessing effectiveness much will be achieved by employing the time-honored naval
history method of simply relying on numbers. The number of prizes and
cargoes seized in conjunction with estimates of tonnage will be established and presented in relation to the number of loyalist vessels and
their losses. Additional assessments of effectiveness will be based on
the significance of captured cargoes, their value, and the measures
the rebels were forced to take in response to the situation.
The second objective is to identify the participants and analyze
their backgrounds, experiences, and motivations collectively to explain who was involved, their character, and why they were involved as
both loyalists and as privateersmen. Going hand-in-hand with this will
be a detailed discourse on the rise of the Goodrich family as the
leading element in the loyalist privateering world. It needs to be
noted that not all of the individuals discussed were actually involved
in the early phase. They are introduced here, because they reflect,
and so help establish, the overall composition of the loyalist privateering community.
There is a reason for adopting this three-focus coverage. While
each topic could be dealt with individually and stand on its own
merit, it is better to discuss them in association, because the examination of any one would still require delving into the other two to a
considerable degree. In essence, they are closely related, so a complete exploration of all three in combination is warranted. This will
result in a more complete coverage of the story, making it more meaningful.

Interrelated with the above topics are several important subthemes. Discussion of the trade situation, British opposition to privateering, and the vice-admiralty court situation are essential to our
understanding the development of the activity. Another theme involves
analyzing vessel, armament, and crew size with an eye to explaining
the related technology and showing scale in development. Finally, all
of these topics will be explored within the context of the North Atlantic world.
There are certain topics that the reader might expect to be addressed in a study of this nature which are not. For instance, apart
from the occasional passing reference, no effort will be made to compare these loyalists with others such back-country groups or the Provincial Corps. As to privateers, there is not detailed coverage of
topics like life at sea, crew organization, investment structure, vice
admiralty court procedures, or whether or not the activity was profitable. All these topics await further work.
As to general organization, the method effectively employed by
N. A. M. Rogers in his The Safequard of the Sea was adopted. This in-

volves an over-all chronological approach with lateral excursions to
explore key issues as they arise. Generally, chapters dealing with
personalities and specific topics are interspersed among those discussing operations. Due to necessity, however, there is an occasional
intermingling of the two in a given chapter. Within this framework,
the materials are organized by maritime region.
In those chapters in which participants are identified and examined in terms of composition and experience, the traditional approach
used in loyalist studies involving discussion by individual colony has
been modified. This structure was considered too unwieldy and for reasons about to be discussed, inappropriate. Instead, loyalist mariners
are examined in accordance with six maritime regions, the upper and

lower New England regions, the Delaware Bay and New Jersey coast region, the Chesapeake Bay region, the southern coastal region, and New
York. The traditional regional divisions of New England, the Middle
Colonies, and the South, while still valid, will only serve to define
the broad parameters of the more defined regions within them. Of
course, it could easily be argued that New York should be included
with New Jersey, but for several reasons, it stands apart and needs to
be viewed separately. It was actually located directly between two of
the other regions, and as a port, it serviced its own large, specific
hinterland. Furthermore, because it became the primary refuge for loyalists, the center for their privateering operations, and the bastion
of British presence in North America, it needs to be viewed as a distinct entity.
This format has been adopted for the following reasons. Because
maritime trade was dynamic, it was not confined by provincial borders.
Each region was defined by a key port serving the entire area's commerce. The merchants and mariners of a given region operated in accordance with a number of shared affinities linking them together, creating a common identity, and establishing a sense of unity. Of course,
they shared the same occupation, life-style, and socio-economic background. More specifically, the men of a particular region functioned
under the same meteorological and navigational conditions, dealt in
regionally specific trade commodities, conducted transactions with
specific markets, and were associated with each other through their
business dealings. This required a degree of specialization in vessels, sailing skills, and business knowledge. Also, this format, is
more in keeping with the broader, inter-colonial North Atlantic scope
of the study.
Chapter 1 offers background information on privateering in general plus material on rebel privateering activities so that informa-

tion supplied later on loyalists can be viewed in context. Chapter 2
consists first of a general historiographical overview of loyalist
background, experience, stance, and motivation, and then of an indepth discussion of opportunism and self-interest as a motivating factor. Chapters 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 serve to identify various loyalists by
region,, establish their composite, relate their early experiences,
define their character, and examine their early war maritime activities. Chapter 4 deals almost exclusively with the Goodrich family's
situation early in the conflict, although there are references to related activities by other loyalist mariners. In Chapters 5, 10, 11,
and 13, operations in different regions are discussed. Chapters 12 and
14

explore the privateering and trade situation in New York during

1778. Chapter 14 also presents information on specific operations during September and October, 1778.
Before continuing, it is necessary to define privateer and other
synonymous or related terms. Basically, a privateer was a privately
owned warship granted a written commission, or Letter of Marque and
Reprisal, by a government authorizing it to attack and capture, or destroy, the shipping of a specific enemy country in time of war. Possession of such a document gave the aggressive action legal sanction
and distinguished it from piracy. Depending on circumstances and the
abilities and tenacity of the opponent's officers and crew, seizing a
prize could involve a lengthy chase in which the sailing skills of
both parties were tested, and occasionally an engagement of varying
degrees of intensity once the pursuer closed with the quarry. Upon
seizure, a prize crew under the command of a prize master was delegated to sail the captured vessel to a port with an admiralty or vice
admiralty court. There, after a review of the prize's paperwork, the
taking of depositions, and allowing time for anyone to come forward to
contest the matter, the court ruled on the legitimacy of the capture.

If the prize was judged righteous, then the vessel and cargo would be
sold at public vendue. After deducting various expenses, such as court
costs, auction fees, and the overhead for the voyage, the proceeds
from the sale were divided among the owners, officers, and crew of the
captor according to a preestablished schedule of percentage based
shares. The immediate purpose was two-fold and mutually gratifying for
the parties involved. The privateersman aided his country's war effort
by at least disrupting, if not destroying, enemy trade, and if fortune
smiled, he made a profit, occasionally a handsome one.
In fact, there were two distinct types of commissioned vessel,
and the terms distinguishing them have often been used without discretion, causing some confusion. The main difference was in purpose.
First, there were vessels specifically called letters of marque. These
were commissioned, armed merchantmen whose primary function was to
carry cargo between predetermined ports of call. Technically, such a
vessel was not allowed to deviate from her designated route to search
for enemy vessels. If, however, one should appear during the course of
her planned voyage, she possessed the authority to attack and attempt
to seize it. The second type was the privateer. Although she carried a
virtually identical commission (differing only in statement of intent), unlike the letter of marque, she did not carry cargo, nor were
her activities confined to a specific route. A privateer's primary
purpose was to attack and capture or destroy enemy shipping, and she
was free to go wherever it was thought the hunting would be best. Reflecting the basic difference between the two types is the fact that
crews on letters of marque received regular pay while those on privateers served without. (For illustrations of specific vessel types,
ordnance, and weapons, please see Appendices A and B.)
Throughout this study, the term letter of marque will be used
specifically to refer to the first type of vessel or the commissions

carried by both types. The term privateer will specifically denote a
vessel of the second category. In fact, until the very end of the period covered in this study, letters of marque were the only officially
sanctioned commissioned vessels. There were, however, some letters of
marque that circumvented or ignored the restrictions governing their
activity and operated more in the manner of true privateers. Other
vessels acted in the same capacity under the authority of commissions
granted without official approval or simply without commissions at
all. Because of the nature of their conduct, these will be called privateers as well. The same word will be employed as a general term when
referring to both types of vessel collectively. The term privateering,
denoting the activity, will also be used to describe the actions of
both types of vessel. Finally, in an effort to avoid the awkward term
privateersmen in reference to owners and crews, when suitable for conveying the correct meaning without confusion, the term privateer will
also denote individuals involved in the activity as well as their vessels.
There was another type of privateer employed by loyalists that
departed somewhat from the norm. These were the vessels operated by a
group known as the Associated Loyalists. Although the establishment of
this organization post-dates the period covered here, it will be referenced occasionally because a number of the individuals to be discussed joined it. Consequently, some explanation is in order. Raised
in New York, the Associators were a combined force employing both
troops and ships to launch attacks on the Connecticut and New Jersey
coasts, distress rebel trade, and help defend the city. Governed by a
Board of Directors, the organization of this independent force was
said to be "a kind of corporation or body politic." Although independent, they were to receive their ordnance, small arms, ammunition, equipage, provisions when conducting operations, and even their vessels

from the British. There were, however, problems procuring vessels in
the prescribed manner, and so, they resorted to other means as yet not
fully researched. Regardless, the structural organization of the Associators combined with British assistance means that technically, their
vessels were not the result of private investment like other privateers. Still, they were commissioned and the Associators were entitled
to the proceeds from prizes they took. Furthermore, contemporaries
considered them to be privateers. 16
Other terms can also cause confusion. Frequently, cruiser and
armed vessel, or variations of the latter, such as armed sloop and
armed schooner, were applied to private, commissioned warships. In the
case of cruiser, while it was frequently used to mean a privateer, it
could also indicate a small, patrolling Royal Navy vessel. For the
purpose of this study, the term cruiser will specifically indicate a
privateer unless otherwise stated.
The term armed vessel is even more confusing. It was often used
to refer to privateers, letters of marque, small Royal Navy warships,
transports in government service carrying cannon, and simply any armed
merchantman, which, of course, a great many merchantmen were in time
of war. For the purpose of this study, unless otherwise noted, the
term armed vessel will only be used to refer to letters of marque and
privateers. Even then, it will only be employed when a synonym is required for the more usual terms, privateer or letter of marque.
Tenders constitute another type of vessel to discuss. These were
small, armed auxiliary craft that generally acted in consort with
specified naval men-of-war. As such, they were not privateers. They
were, however, often privately owned and frequently manned with loyalist personnel. Furthermore, as vessels of war sanctioned by the Navy
or a colonial governor, they were justified in attacking and seizing

rebel shipping. This they did, sometimes while acting quite independently of their parent naval vessel. Tender crews were also entitled to
shares of the prize money. Consequently, in a qualified sense, their
conduct could be considered similar to that of a true privateer. Loyalist tender activity in conjunction with the Royal Navy was important
to the development of loyalist privateering. A number of key participants began their careers serving aboard this type of vessel. Then
again, later in the period, there were actually privateer tenders,
some of which were independently commissioned, that sailed in consort
with larger privateers to assist them.
Finally, there were provincial vessels. These were warships fitted out in the colonies, manned with local personnel, and taken into
government service, usually on the authority of a colonial governor.
Their primary purpose was local defense, and as did tenders, they often acted as naval auxiliaries.
The terms l o y a l i s t and l o y a l i s t privateer also require definition. As to what constituted a loyalist, historians have offered various polarized opinions ranging from the very broad and all-encompassing to the narrower and more restrictive. Of course there is a myriad
of qualified levels in between. 17 For the purpose of this study, a
rather basic definition will suffice. A loyalist was any individual
who was, by birth or residency, affiliated with the thirteen rebellious colonies, and who, for whatever reason, supported the king
during the revolution.
It is possible to argue, however, on a certain qualified level,
that the pro-British residents of East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda,
and the Bahamas, can also be considered loyalists. These were people
who produced their own share of privateers, as well. In the case of
East Florida and Nova Scotia, both were contiguous to colonies in a
state of rebellion. Their close proximity at either end of the line of

troublesome colonies, their shared social, cultural, and economic affinities with those areas, and the fact that a considerable number of
residents in both were directly involved in the war and active against
their neighbors to the north and south, respectively, justifies viewing the populaces as loyalist even though neither colony was in revolt. strengthening this view is the fact that in Nova Scotia there
was a faction, although relatively subdued in nature, sympathetic to
the rebels. Furthermore, there are those who consider Nova Scotian
privateers to be loyalist. At the same time, historically, because of
the influx of refugees, East Florida is often considered a loyalist
domain, regardless.18
With Bermuda and the Bahamas, again, there existed strong social
and economic ties to the North American continent. In their case, however, the association was not just with the mainland in general but
specifically with the rebels themselves. Furthermore, though not in
open rebellion, both colonies, especially Bermuda, suffered their own
political and social unrest, relative to the situation on the mainland, with opposing factions identifying with and supporting the rebels or the Crown.19
Due to the unique situation in these four colonies, their proBritish residents might be defined as peripheral loyalists. Regardless
of classification, because the activities of these people were integral to the development of loyalist privateering, they will be examined in some depth. At the same time, however, these people were removed from mainstream loyalism, and so, the nature of their experience
and reasons for their involvement were different. Consequently, this
study will not profile them.
Next, there is the question of what constituted a loyalist privateer. A definition involving certain specific criteria is necessary
so loyalist privateers can be distinguished as such from British and

other colonial privateers and categorized accordingly. Logically, the
nature of such a vessel is defined by affiliations. So, in a perfect
world, the ideal definition for such would be any vessel which received its letter of marque, was registered, and was based in a British-held port in one of the thirteen colonies, and whose owners, officers,

and

crew emanated from the same. Unfortunately, this characteri-

zation is unrealistic and limiting. The nature of the historical
situation and the activity does not allow such a tight and tidy definition.
As noted, a large number of the loyalists in question were dispossessed. Most of these refugees ultimately came to be associated
with the port of New York, but a fair number based themselves in Bermuda, and others worked out of East Florida, Nova Scotia, the Bahamas,
the West Indies, and even Britain itself. Reflecting the dynamics of
the activity, a fair number of vessels, owned and manned by true mainland loyalists, were fitted out, commissioned, and based in various
far flung ports to cruise in yet other far removed areas. Also, loyalist activities constituted only a part of the whole of British privateering operations. In addition to loyalist craft, other British colonial privateers and purely British ones, as well, operated from the
same bases and worked the same sea lanes. As a result, the activities
of one group of privateers was sometimes closely intertwined with
those of another. More significantly, the regional backgrounds of the
personnel associated with any given privateer could be mixed.
All this could result in a variety of interesting scenarios. For
instance, some vessels owned in New York were sent to Antigua to be
fitted out.20 Other New York craft went to St. Augustine for their commissions.2 1 Privateers fitted out, manned and commissioned in Britain
were owned by loyalists residing there who sent them to the Western
Hemisphere to cruise.22 An Irishman was captain and part owner of a

privateer fitted out, manned, commissioned and otherwise owned in New
~ork.'~Yet another privateer, in all other ways associated with New
York and loyalists, picked up a large part of her crew at a West Indian island which served as her base of operations.24 Other vessels,
commissioned in New York, were owned in London or the islands.25 Theoretically, it was possible for a privateer to be owned by loyalist
refugees in London, be commissioned in New York, have a Scottish captain, and receive a large part of her crew while conducting extended
operations in the West Indies. In essence, the affiliations of any
given privateer could be varied and complex comprising elements of the
entire North Atlantic world. As such, many vessels with solid loyalist
ties, that would escape notice if the more stringent defining criteria
were applied.
For the reasons just outlined, a more realistic, less restrictive definition is necessary. Vessels will be defined as loyalist if
they meet any one of four criteria. In fact, these are the same criteria already discussed. They are simply applied separately rather than
collectively. As to the first three, any vessel owned, commanded, OR
in large part manned by individuals from the thirteen colonies in rebellion, regardless of her port of registry, base of operations, and
place commissioned will merit classification as loyalist. As controlling factors, owners and captains, in particular, define the nature of
vessels. A few vessels, though owned and commanded by British individuals and fitted out and commissioned there as well, will nevertheless be considered loyalist on the premise that significant portions
of their crews were undoubtedly colonials. The vessels in question,
despite their pedigree, spent lengthy periods associated with North
American bases of operation. Consequently, it stands to reason that
locals signed on as replacement and additional crew members in those
ports, and as will be seen, there is evidence of this occurring. The

fourth criteria is that any privateer for which the background of the
owners, commander, or crew can not be established, but which is known
to have received its commission and have been registered or based in a
British held port in the thirteen colonies, East Florida, Nova Scotia,
Bermuda, or the Bahamas, will be considered a loyalist vessel as well.
Granted, this last criteria is not absolutely fool-proof. Still, with
regard to New York, Newport, and later, Charlestown, Savannah, and the
Penobscot, because the vast majority of privateers associated with
these ports can be identified as loyalist, it stands to reason that in
all probability, the occasional vessel failing to meet the other criteria was loyalist as well. In the case of East Florida, Nova Scotia,
Bermuda, and the Bahamas, given the number of true loyalist privateersmen operating from those colonies, and the fact that confirmed
vessels are known to have had personnel of mixed backgrounds, there is
a very good chance the odd, unidentified vessel from those colonies
had at least some loyalist association. Even if not, because the local
privateersmen, themselves, can be viewed as loyalist in a sense, their
vessels warrant the same classification.

A final word is in order with regard to terminology. Throughout
this study, the terms loyalist and rebel have been used to distinguish
the opposing factions. These might be interpreted by the reader as
positive and negative terms conveying a degree of bias. Loyalist is,
in fact, a positive term used instead of Tory, which during the period
was considered extremely derogative. While some might view rebel as a
negative term, this is what they were in the eyes of at least many of
their contemporaries. Furthermore, the argument can be made that
Americans past and present revel in the term rebel and flaunt it like
a badge of honor rather than a scarlet letter. Thus, in our usage, it
is positive. At the same time, this study is intended to present the
loyalist perspective, therefore, terminology they would have under-

stood is used, and it is hoped that understanding is not confused with
bias. To put this another way, had this work dealt with the revolutionaries' privateers, the same terminology would have been used.
A few words are also in order on research methodology. The lack
of historical attention this topic has received negated following a
deductive approach. There was simply nothing on which to base any preconceived ideas to test and so focus investigation on a specific
topic. At the same time, there was little indication of what information potential sources might offer. The problem was further compounded
by the widely varied and scattered nature of the materials being
sought. Consequently, research involved a purely inductive approach,
as it logically must be when delving into the complete unknown, and a
very large net was cast to ensnare all potentially relevant sources.
With the aid of hindsight, the end justified the means. Because of the
problems just outlined, a more focused research effort would have been
extremely unrewarding in that relevant materials would have been
missed.
Initial research progressed along five parallel lines. One of
these involved going through the biographical encyclopedias of loyalists compiled by Lorenzo Sabine and Gregory Palmer looking for information on individuals involved in privateering. References found there
would then serve as a springboard for examining the Loyalist Claims
Commission records of the British Public Records Office. While offering some data, this effort was initially disappointing, because direct
references were relatively few. At the same time, believing newspapers
potentially offered a wealth of information, a survey was undertaken
of the many extant loyalists editions, and some key rebel ones as
well, with the intention of identifying participants and vessels. The
newspapers provided a wealth of information allowing the creation of a
data bank of individuals' and privateers' names to be investigated.

Also, all

the pertinent secondary literature on both loyalists and

privateering was read for insights, background, and specific references. Simultaneously, work commenced with the collection of naval and
maritime documents compiled by the Naval History Center, Naval Documents of the Revolution. This proved an invaluable source in many
ways. Finally, numerous archival guides were canvassed for all the major and many minor repositories throughout the United States, Canada,
Great Britain and the West Indies with the intent of locating admiralty court records as well as other relevant collections of personal,
official, and maritime papers. Combined, these five approaches ultimately supplied a considerable amount of information and clues on
which to base further research.
From this point, research consisted of cross-referencing between
the sources already consulted and running down the leads they offered.
For instance, the names acquired from the newspapers allowed a return
to Sabine and Palmer enabling additional information to be obtained on
many individuals, now identified as privateers, who would have otherwise gone unnoticed. In turn, armed with a lengthy list of confirmed
privateersmen, an examination of the voluminous Loyalist Claims Commissions records could be undertaken with the intent of locating even
more information. In many cases, continued research was a matter of
one source shedding light on the possible existence of another to be
sought, resulting in a series of inter-twined chain reactions. Work
followed numerous exploratory paths until they either started to turn
inward on themselves and each other or came to a dead end.
This comprehensive research approach was necessary to acquire
the materials to complete the story as fully as possible. As is apparent from the compound nature of many of the notes, frequently, data
needed to establish even the smallest of facts came from a variety of
documents from widely scattered archival collections. For instance,

the data required to confirm a specific vessel as a privateer, identify her captain, and supply her technical specifics often required
piecing together information from multiple sources such as several articles and advertisements in different newspapers, vice admiralty
court records, and correspondence. The same was also true when confirming that a Virginia captain, John Doe, was the same John Doe who
later commanded a privateer out of New York when more direct links
were not forthcoming.
Perseverance in turning over every research stone led to some
wonderful discoveries that might otherwise have been missed. For instance, brief references in a couple of secondary sources indicated a
significant link between privateering and the New York Chamber of Commerce. This led to a search for existing records from that organization, and two quite obscure, but extremely important volumes of
printed primary material were ultimately uncovered. Another example
concerns the Frederick Rhinelander Letter Book. Rhinelander had already been confirmed as a major investor in privateers, so despite the
fact the catalogue description of the volume said it contained correspondence relating to his import business, it was though best to examine it anyway. While the letter book did contain materials pertaining
to Rhinelander's trade activities, there was also a large number of
letters pertaining to his privateers.
The result of these efforts is that this study is based on a
wide variety of source materials with those of a primary nature dominating. Included and encompassing loyalist, British, and rebel sources
were newspapers, personal and official correspondence and journals,
log, account, receipt, and minute books, diaries, proclamations, official acts of Parliament and Congress, petitions, records of sales,
ships1 papers consisting of commissions, bonds, articles of agreement,
crew rosters, bills of lading, invoices, registers, and clearances,

and vice admiralty court records involving libels, affidavits, depositions, monitions, answers and claims, replications, appeals, answers
and decrees, and registers. All of these sources supplied data on both
participants and activities. Still, despite the amount of material
collected, gaps remain, resulting in sketchy treatment of some individuals, issues, and events. Ultimately, the search for these documents led to inquiries at over seventy archives, libraries, museums,
and other repositories, and work was conducted at or material was acquired from thirty-three.
While all of these materials supplied significant information,
those supplying the most were the newspapers, the vice admiralty court
records, correspondence, and the loyalist memorials. The Rosetta stone
for this study was the series of lists prepared by Governor William
Tryon of New York in 1778 and 1779, notating the principle information
on many privateers such as technical data, name, captain, owners, and
dates. These lists served as lynch pins establishing the connections
between references in numerous other sources. It is impossible to determine how much correspondence was read in preparing this study. As
to newspapers, every extant copy from the ten loyalist presses was
read from cover to cover. In addition, every extant copy of nine major
rebel papers from key ports were read as well. In total, over 2,500
newspapers were examined. Over three-hundred loyalist memorials and
their supporting paperwork were relied on. Finally, all the available
materials relating to over 1,500 loyalist, Royal Navy, and rebel vice
admiralty court cases were read in depth.
The necessity of relying on multiple sources to establish even
the simplest of facts combined with efforts to keep this lengthy study
as short as possible, seriously affected much of the writing style.
Simply put, the reader might find it wordy. This is the result of frequent efforts to compress data from several sources while conveying

their specific meanings in an effort to save space. Doing this severely limited options for basic phrasing, sentence structure, and
even word choice.
Readers may balk at the number of names of individuals and vessels and other specific details presented throughout. They are certainly not expected to remember them all. There are, however, several
reasons for their inclusion. As stated, as an introductory study it is
simply essential to establish who the participants and their vessels
were, thus confirming their existence either as privateers or prizes.
In turn, these identifications should help any future researchers who
might chose to pursue the topic further. When the identifications are
viewed in combination, their numbers will reflect levels of involvement and the significance of activities. Most significantly, however,
because the primary intent of this work is to relate and analyze a series of loyalist campaigns within the framework of a large regional
scope, it is essential to establish who was where at what time and doing what to whom. The reader might feel that this type of data would
have been better placed in a table, but to do so would negate being
able show the movement and interaction through time and space of multiple individuals and vessels which is essential to establishing the
North Atlantic scope of the loyalist privateering. Tables would also
have the effect of dehumanizing the events discussed. In addition, the
data they would convey is too sketchy in many cases to correlate in a
table format. Finally, the presentation of such details is in keeping
with the current trends in naval and maritime history. For instance,
in recent battle studies in which four, five and even six-hundred
pages are devoted to events sometimes encompassing only a single day,
the reader becomes acquainted with not only the senior commanders, but
a host of company grade officers and numerous enlisted men as well.
Their movements over the hours are traced with such precision that the

reader becomes familiar with every field, wood lot, fence-line, farm
lane, ditch, rivulet, and structure encountered during the action. Naval and Military studies generally involve a large cast of players
representing many levels of involvement. To ignore the lesser people
and their experience would be to deny them their moment in history.
This type of detail is what the readership has come to expect and demand.
As indicated, prior to October, 1778, the scale of loyalist privateering operations did not approach the level it did later. Yet,
loyalist mariners, serving on tenders, letters of marque, and privateers, proved their value by aiding the war effort in a number of capacities. Of course the most obvious way in which they helped was as
commerce raiders. In that role, they caused considerable damage to the
enemy merchant fleet, disrupting their commerce, and thus their economy. In fact, in certain areas they were integral in bringing rebel
trade to occasional standstills. Such activity deprived the rebels of
much needed supplies, provisions, and materials, which, in turn, were
often redistributed to beleaguered, needy regions of the empire. Loyalist presence at sea also served to tie up rebel troops, ships and
materials that could have been better used elsewhere, and forced the
enemy to spend considerable time, effort, and money in efforts to suppress them. Also, they assisted the Royal Navy, not only by taking
some of the pressure off them and freeing them for other duties, but
also by acting as auxiliaries and guides. Another important function
loyalists performed involved acting as intelligence gatherers and carrying dispatches. By combating rebel and French warships and privateers, loyalists did their part in the defense of British trade. They
also showed they could and would fight.
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CHAPTER 1

PRIVATEERING: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Although privateering dates from at least the thirteenth century, and was practiced in variant forms with regularity over the ensuing years, it was not until the late seventeenth century with the
accumulation of colonial empires and the emergence of mercantile theory that the activity really began to develop as a major means of waging war. From that time to the eve of the Revolution, privateering
grew in popularity in the colonies to such a degree that it was £requently said there was a rage or fever for it. The increase in the
number of privateers at New York during the eighteenth century illustrates this. There, between 1703 and 1712, during The War of the Spanish Succession, or Queen Anne's War, eighteen privateers were fitted
out. 1 During the War of the Austrian Succession, or King George's War,
thirty-three called New York their home port. 2 During the Seven Years,
or French and Indian War, at least eighty-three cruisers operated from
New York, making it the privateering capitol of the North American
colonies. Newport, Rhode Island, also emerged as a major privateering
center and for the period of 1739-1744, more cruisers sailed out of
that port than any other in the colonies.4 The activity was also undertaken with regularity in Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston, and
during the last two Anglo-French conflicts the Chesapeake Bay area
witnessed its own development of privateering. 5
Privateering was popular because it was advantageous to all involved. For the government, privateers constituted an additional mari-

time force acting as auxiliaries to over-extended naval resources in
defense of trade. At the same time, the activity was without risk or
cost to the Crown. Of course, merchants were equally happy to have additional security for their commerce.
For owners and crews, there was the chance of making a profit.
Still, while the prospect of making money was undoubtedly a key attraction motivating individuals to engage in privateering, there were
other reasons for becoming involved. Most importantly, given that a
large part of eighteenth-century warfare focused on matters of trade,
merchants and mariners frequently found themselves in the forefront of
the conflict facing the threat of serious physical and financial loss.
Thus, involved as they already were, in light of their background as
merchants and mariners, they found privateering to be the perfect and
logical venue by which to participate and express their patriotism. In
so doing they acted in support of their country as well as in defense
of their own trade.
As to making a profit, for many merchants in time of war, privateering was not simply an opportunity to make additional money. It
might be the only means. With trading vessels often confined to port
because of blockade or fear of their loss to the enemy while negotiating the sea lanes, commerce was often greatly reduced if not brought
to a standstill. Privateering offered an alternative form of business
opportunity that allowed one to keep some form of operation going. The
activity also provided a means of keeping ships employed which otherwise would have sat idle, rotting at their moorings. Of course, ships
b

require crews which meant employment opportunities for excess officers
and men whose only other options, service in the navy or inactivity,
were far less attractive.6
Furthermore, the nature of the employment held its appeals. On a
personal level, it allowed a greater sense of freedom and independence

of action, a wider latitude of discretion, and perhaps, a somewhat
less rigid and harsh lifestyle than would be found in service with the
army or navy. A privateer's captain and crew were generally not under
government orders, and even in those instances in which they were, it
was usually voluntary. For the most part, a captain and crew were only
responsible to the owners' directives, and could do pretty much as
they pleased within the limits of the prescribed rules and regulations.
The activity also served the good of the community by stimulating a port's economy in two ways. Support businesses certainly received a boost, with victualers, ship chandlers, smiths, auctioneers,
lawyers, and shipbuilders all acquiring income for their services. At
the same time, the influx of prize goods and occasional specie certainly brought economic benefits to the community in general. Prize
foodstuffs could also help sustain a community whose normal trade was
negatively affected by the war. Historian James Lydon has done an admirable job of showing how privateering in the eighteenth century was
a significant factor in the development of New York as a major port.
Liverpool, England, was another port for which privateering generated
great rewards prompting growth.7
With regard to economic growth in the broader terms of the empire, as historian Carl E. Swanson has effectively argued, privateering, as a method of waging war, dovetailed perfectly with the predominant economic theory of the age, mercantilism. This further accounts for the activity's popularity with both populace and government. There were four basic tenets to mercantile theory, the first
three of which were as follows. The controllable wealth in the world
was finite, therefore it was necessary for a country to maintain a favorable balance of trade, and the accumulation of precious metals was
imperative. The idea was that a country should export more than it im-

ported (so more money came in than went out), control as much of the
world's finite wealth as possible, and amass all the gold, silver and
specie it could. The belief was that a country which adhered to these
principles could not help but enhance its economic status, and thus,
its power, prestige, and position among European nations.8
Keeping in mind that the main purpose of privateering was to
seize or destroy enemy shipping and so disrupt an opponent's commerce,
the potential existed for the activity to be extremely beneficial in
achieving mercantile goals. Privateering could assist in establishing
or enhancing a favorable balance of trade, and greater control over
more of the world's finite wealth could be achieved through the capture or destruction of enemy vessels and cargoes. The possibility also
existed that the contents of both private and national coffers would
be increased with precious metals in one form or another. While privateering produced such positive results for a country, its effect on an
opponent would be exactly the opposite. The bottom line is that privateering offered a means of enlarging a country's wealth while decreasing, and thus hurting, that of an opponent.9
The intents and goals of privateering place it in a rather
unique light in the annals of warfare. The basic idea was to seize an
opponent's property intact. On the theoretical level, at least, it was
not meant to evoke bloodshed or destruction in the manner of armies
and navies. As such, privateering might be viewed, oxymoronic as it
may sound, as the most civilized form of warfare devised by western
man. In reality, matters could get quite nasty.
The fourth basic tenet of mercantile theory was that a government should do all it could to help advance its trade. Because privateering helped trade, governments, in terms of keeping with the tenet,
promoted privateering. Although there was little incentive to go privateering at the end of the seventeenth century, throughout the eight-

eenth, the British government instigated a number of changes in the
system. For instance, from 1708, court costs were cut and regulated,
bonuses were instigated, customs duties on prize goods were reduced,
the Crown waved its right to the Royal Droit, and to a degree, crews
were exempt from impressment. At the same time, the rules of privateering were continually being refined. These changes served to increase government control over the activity while making it more lucrative for the participants. As privateering became potentially more
profitable, so it became more popular. James Lydon has done an admirable job of showing this progression in his study of the activity.10
In accordance with the original plan for this study, a detailed
comparison was to be made between the numbers of rebel privateers,
crewmen, losses, and prizes and those of their loyalist counterparts
in an effort to better ascertain the relative strength and effectiveness of the latter. Unfortunately, after considerable effort, given
the state of the secondary historical material on rebel privateering,
attempting such correlations proved to be a true study in futility.
Simply put, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, there
is little reliable information on these aspects of rebel privateering
on which to base comparisons. There is considerable debate on the
topic, and historical assertions as to rebel numbers are incredibly
varied to the point of being irreconcilable. Furthermore, the figures
given often reflect poor or insufficient research and faulty interpretation. Of course, this renders the proffered estimates suspect and
so, valueless. Still some comments are warranted with the hope that at
least a generalized comparison, in terms of basic scale, can be made
later and loyalist activities can be seen in some degree of perspective with regards to the levels of activity.
With the commencement of hostilities in 1775, the rebels, lacking a naval force, made early preparations for a war at sea. In addi-

tion to promoting state navies which were beginning to be organized by
the end of the year, in keeping with the times, the rebels were also
quick to realize the importance of employing privateers. On November
1, 1775, Massachusetts authorized the issue of letters of marque on
the state level, and New Hampshire followed suit in January, 1776. On
March 23, 1776, the Continental Congress enacted legislation authorizing the issue of commissions. With this system, Congress sent out
signed, blank commissions to the various states which were authorized
to issue them at that level. By May, Connecticut rebels began to privateer. Marylanders started soon after in June, and the remaining
colonies followed.l1
As to the number of rebel privateers in operation during the
war, a commonly quoted figure is about 2,000 plus. 12 This estimate,
however is bracketed by a wide spread of other calculations. One belief is that there were as few as 792 rebel privateers.13 Another calculates there were between 1,500 and 2,000.1 4

A

third speculates there

may have been as many as 3,000. 15 Yet another offers the phenomenal
figure of over 3,500.16 Finally, evidence has been presented that Massachusetts alone issued 1,554 letters of marque.17 All of these figures, however, reflect problems in calculation.
Most are based on lists of commissions issued and bonds posted
during the war. As such they reflect the number of commissions granted
and the number of bonds given rather than the actual number of ships
involved. With every change of ownership or command, and with the completion of every cruise for a true letter of marque, a new commission
was required. The result is that over the course of an eight year war,
numerous vessels received two if not more commissions and are therefore at least duplicated in the lists. At the same time, however, the
lists are known to be incomplete. A list compiled by Charles Henry
Lincoln in 1906 records 1,697 commissions issued, but there are no

vessels included from North Carolina, and only one from South Carolina
is mentioned. In the same compilation, only 626 are recorded for Massachusetts, most of which date from August, 1780. The bottom line is
that the various estimates are too low, too vague, or especially, too
high. Even accepting an incredible output from rebel shipyards and the
possibility that the vast majority of rebel vessels carried letters of
marque, figures of 3,000 or more simply seem too great. 18
As to the number of men who served on Continental privateers,

again, the figures are irreconcilable with each other and the facts,
and they are clearly way too high. The most commonly quoted estimate
is that there were about 70,000 rebel privateersmen. 19 Another calculation is that there were over 58,400.~' Like the number of privateers,
the number of associated personnel is tallied from the number of bonds
and commissions.21 Consequently, just as the vessels themselves are
counted more than once, so are the crews. Furthermore, there is the
implication in these calculations that every rebel privateer that put
to sea had its own specific crew completely different from any other
vessel at any point in the war. In fact, vessels were not all in commission and at sea at the same time. They came and went, and at any
given point in the war only a fraction of the total were active. So,
many crew members on a vessel completing a cruise undoubtedly selected
berths on another about to put out, making it likely that many privateersmen served on at least two different vessels in the course of any
year. When this calculation is extrapolated for the period of the entire war, a professional rebel privateersmen undoubtedly served on a
number of different craft during the conflict. Of course, the result
is that not only do historical estimates reflect duplications, they
show multiple representations for the same individual.
Most writers agree that the Continental privateers aided the rebel war effort. The degree of aid, however, is seriously debated. Some

would have us believe that rebel privateers saved the cause and won
the war single-handedly.22 Others argue they certainly did serious damage to the British merchant fleet and trade.23 Offering a worst case
scenario are those who view the Continental privateers as only a major
nuisance to the British, but still nuisance enough to force them to
allocate considerable time, money, effort, manpower, and materials in
efforts to suppress them.24
Of course the logical way to assess the effectiveness of rebel
privateers would be to examine the number of prizes they took, but the
existing estimates are again problematic. Some writers maintain as few
as 600 prizes were taken by rebel cruisers, while others offer the poA more focused regional study estilarized figure of about 3,000.~~
mates they sent 2,106 prizes into the New England and middle colonies
during the war, and another claims 1,200 seizures were made by Massachusetts privateers alone. 26 Two separate groups of figures that are
somewhat solid as far they go have been compiled from Lloyd's data.
Again, however, there are discrepancies between them. According to one
set complied by the secretary of Lloyd's for historian William Laird
Clowes, a total of 3,087 British merchantmen and eighty-nine privateers were captured during the war. Of those, 879 merchantmen and
fourteen privateers were recaptured, resulting in an actual loss of
2,283 vessels. The second set of figures, based on the New Lloyd2
List shows 3,386 vessels seized, with 495 recaptured and 507 ransomed
for a total actual loss of 2,384. Unfortunately, the figures do not
represent a true picture of rebel privateer activity. On the one hand,
it seems likely that both tallies are incomplete.

At

the same time,

however, although one writer asserts the tally of 3,087 represents
prizes taken by rebel privateers alone, it actually includes prizes
taken by the Continental and various state navies as well as the

French, Spanish, and Dutch. For instance, in 1780, the Spanish Navy
captured fifty-five British merchantmen out of a single convoy.27
Despite the fact that reliable figures are unavailable, several
things are clear.

A

large number of rebel privateers and privateersmen

were at sea during the war. Furthermore, they were fairly effective.
As will be seen, they were certainly viewed as a serious threat by
various elements within the empire, and though delayed, Britain's ultimate response was to fight fire with fire with privateers of her
own. Loyalist privateering was, to a degree, a product of the British
reply, and the loyalist desire to become involved in the activity was,
in part, to counter those rebels engaged in the same pursuit. The
British authorities, however, were not as enthusiastic about the idea
and far less quick than the rebels to recognize any advantages to employing privateers of any kind, loyalist, British, or British colonial. When loyalist privateers were finally unleashed, the British reversed their views and fostered the very situation they had initially
tried to avoid, civil war at sea. Members of the same society would
confront each other in the same sanctioned, organized form of conflict
governed by the same basic rules, established and controlled by a central authority.28
With the commencement of hostilities in North America, the Royal
Navy found itself facing a serious problem, a severe shortage of vessels. As late as September 29, 1775, after five months of conflict,
there were only thirty vessels on the North American coast, inclusive
of those in Canadian waters. Only ten of these were rated vessels, and
most of these were of the sixth or smallest rate. The remaining majority were primarily sloops and schooners with sixteen guns or less. At
that time, only fourteen additional warships were en route from England.29

As if the immediate naval demand for these vessels was not
enough, Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves had begun receiving requests from
the loyalists of various regions for naval vessels to protect them,
their possessions, and their interests from rebel threats even before
hostilities erupted.30 To meet demands, Graves started hiring additional local craft from colonists. 31 The owners were most certainly
loyal to the Crown, and with their efforts, the first step towards
loyalist involvement in the war at sea was witnessed. Along the coast,
a need for ships forced other colonial officials to follow precedent
and not only employ loyalist vessels, but crews as well, creating ad
hoc, stop-gap forces to supplement the weak naval presence. With such

actions, a number of future loyalist privateersmen smelled their first
powder of the conflict. It is to the participants that we must now
turn.
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CHAPTER 2

'INFLUENCED

BY MOTIVES OF LOYALTY, ZEALOUS FOR THE GOOD OF HIS

MAJESTY'S SERVICE, AND ACTUATED BY THE ELDEST LAW OF NATURE,
WE APPREHEND OURSELVES FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE LAWS OF
GOD AND MAN:" AN OVERVIEW OF LOYALIST

BACKGROUNDS AND MOTIVATIONS'

As stated, in accordance with trends in loyalist studies, a goal
of this work is to establish identities, examine experiences, and then
create profiles for loyalist privateers. In other words, an attempt
will be made to determine who these people were and how and why they
became what they did. Loyalist privateers generally comply with the
historical image created for loyalists as a whole, but they also ad to
it and occasionally challenge it. In addition, regional differences in
their composition existed. Of course, demonstrating this requires reviewing the established loyalist composite image to create a point of
departure for making comparisons. In association, a general overview,
outlining loyalist privateers' backgrounds, positions, and experiences, will be presented. These topics will be developed more fully in
later chapters. At the same time, however, motivational elements will
be discussed in depth at this point. Their all-encompassing applicability to all loyalists, regardless of region, makes it more appropriate and convenient to deal with this issue separately. In particular,
the argument will be made that among loyalists in general and loyalist
privateers, specifically, negative forms of opportunism and self-

interest, especially with the intent to profit, were not factors
prompting them to follow the courses they did, but public virtue was.
Identity in loyalist studies is synonymous with background and
is created by distinguishing a combination of characteristics. These
include such things as social class, economic status, occupation, nationality, race, gender, age, religion, political stance, place of
birth, and residence. Some loyalist studies, when read in isolation
from others, convey the distinct impression that loyalism was a middle
and upper class phenomenon.2 The society was one of leaders without
rank and file. In fairness, this impression generally seems to be unintentional and is primarily due to the nature of the source materials, the vast majority of which were generated by middle and upper
class people. When loyalist studies are read in association, however,
the various conclusions in combination support William H. Nelson's assertion that loyalists were socially, economically, and culturally diverse with participants reflecting a wide cross-section of identity
defining

trait^.^

The social fabric of loyalism in general was a com-

plex and varied weave. That of loyalist privateers, specifically, was
no different. In terms of socio-economic background, privateers covered the spectrum from well-to-do public officials, through rich merchants and sea captains, lawyers, doctors, teachers, middle class
shopkeepers, artisans, common seamen, and farmers, to slaves. Regarding ethnicity and race, they were comprised of men of English, Scots,
Irish, German, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and African extraction.
Also, in this traditionally male activity, women were occasionally involved. As to place of birth, there were both native and foreign-born
participants. As to residence, while some colonies produced more privateersmen than others, all had men sailing for the king. 4 In a broader
regional sense, loyalism was more prevalent in urban coastal areas and
remote back country locales.5 Needless to say, back country residents

did not dominate the ranks of privateers, but there was at least some
involvement. On the other hand, logically, coastal urban areas were
heavily represented. It was from such locales that the two social elements absolutely essential for privateering, merchants and mariners,
came. Again, quite logically, the fact that loyalists as a group were
adverse to radical change marks them as politically, socially, and
economically conservative. In light of the diversity evident in other
loyalist traits, it seems safe to say that loyalism in general attracted people of all ages. Unfortunately, data is insufficient to ascertain if the ages of loyalist privateers conformed to the presumed
norm. This leaves the issue of religion as an element of loyalism.

A

number of writers have attempted to establish a link between loyalist
political stance and religious affiliation. In the end, they are
forced to admit that any such ties that might have existed were tenuous at best. Others state no correlation can be detected at all. In
any case, the issue is really moot given that information on the religious affiliations of privateers is virtually non-existent.7
Analysis of these various identity factors has resulted in two
additional general assertions about the nature of loyalism. First, not
only was the character of the movement multi-faceted in any given
area, it could vary from one locale to another.' This tendency is evident as well between privateersmen from different areas. For example,
as will be shown, while New England privateers tended to be native
born, in southern locales, first generation immigrants were more in
evidence.
The second assertion is that loyalism was a movement of minorities. 9 While privateersmen did not constitute a minority themselves,
minority elements were certainly present in their midst. Most noteworthy was the large number of blacks, both slave and free who served on
loyalist vessels. In addition, European ethnic backgrounds were repre-

sented by the occasional Portuguese and Frenchman in association with
a somewhat greater number of individuals of German and Dutch heritage.
Of course, women among privateers constituted a minority presence as
well.
Despite a wealth of diversity among loyalist privateers, two
groups of men (not mutually exclusive), merchants and mariners, logically dominated the activity, forming an essential core element around
which all others gravitated. Between these two groups, all the elements required for successful privateering were brought to the table.
The merchants supplied both venture and fixed capital, as well as
business savvy. Both groups clearly possessed a knowledge of maritime
affairs, and the mariners had the expertise to translate that knowledge into physical action at sea.
As to non-merchants associated with privateering and those lacking seafaring experience, the wealthier were generally involved as investors. Those of more modest means serving aboard vessels signed articles as landsmen or acted in the capacity of marines. Necessary specialists such as medical men and certain artisan types could transplant their practices to aboard ship.
Because of their function, privateers usually put to sea with
larger crews than were necessary to sail the vessel under normal circumstances. Extra men were needed to help fight the vessel and provide
crews for prizes. Many of the additional berths were filled with inexperienced personnel rated as landsmen, marines, or boys. Five extant
crew rosters offer complete breakdowns of the ratings on specific privateers, allowing the ratio of skilled to unskilled men to be established. There were, of course, differences between vessels. One in
particular, a barge, offered the seemingly disproportionate ratio of
nine landsmen to six seamen. Given her nature, however, this might be
expected. As a small craft propelled primarily with oars and intended

for use close inshore, she would not have required a crew with the experience to handle a larger, more complex, blue-water sailing vessel.
As to the other four examples, two had crews in which the landsmen,
marines, and boys made up about one-third of the compliment. On the
remaining two, such crewmen represented only about one-quarter of the
total. Regardless of their actual rating, these men and boys still
constituted privateersmen, and as such, they warrant classification as
mariners. Many who started their privateering careers at these lower
levels undoubtedly advanced themselves with time and experience to the
rating of seaman. It should be noted that none of the rosters examined
designated between ordinary and able seamen.10
With acknowledgment of the merchants and mariners, the traditional composite view of loyalists is altered, not by contradicting
the picture already established, but by adding to it. The merchant
class has often been a focus of loyalist studies, but such works fail
to take note of the very active role these people played in privateering. Consequently, with acknowledgment of their involvement, another
facet is added to the view of loyalist participation in the war.
Perhaps more important are the loyalist mariners, both officers
and seamen, who have not been previously acknowledged to any significant degree and have remained unincorporated as an element in existing
loyalist profiles. In fact, historians generally maintain that the
vast majority of colonial mariners supported the rebels and comparatively few sided with the British. This premise is based on several
arguments. Because colonial seamen held a strong antipathy for the
Royal Navy, and thus the British, due to the employment of press
gangs, and then were often involved in prewar mob disturbances arising
from the political issues of the day, some historians believe these
mariners were politically involved in support of the revolutionaries
and remained so when war broke out.11

While a large number of colonial seamen certainly did support
the rebel movement, citing their disorderly conduct as evidence of
their commitment is tenuous. By nature, Jack Tar was an adventurous
rough and tumble sort of fellow. As such, it can be surmised that for
many, participation in social disturbances was really only a matter of
looking for and finding what they deemed fun while in port. Furthermore, the existing historical view is based on the assumption that all
mariners in a port were American. In fact, at any given time, a considerable number of local seamen would be away on a voyage, while a
large number of seafarers from other areas of the empire were visiting. Also, participation in prewar incidents does not mean an individual was firmly ensconced with the rebels. As will be seen, a number
of loyalist privateersmen actively supported the prewar opposition to
Britain before ultimately deciding to remain loyal.
Historian Richard B. Morris acknowledged Jack's tough, undisciplined nature as a factor for his involvement in civil disturbances.
He saw it, however, as only one part of the equation leading to participation rather than a reason in and of itself. This aspect of
Jack's character surfaced when prompted by deep resentments against
royal authority, and in turn, this tendency was recognized and exploited by revolutionary leaders.12
Another argument presented to show that American mariners predominantly sided with the rebels is the fact so few claims for losses
were filed by loyalist seamen after the war. 13 In fact, there are very
few claims of this nature, but on the other hand, there is no reason
to expect an abundance of them. Life as a mariner was transient with
minimal personal possessions limited to what would fit in a sea chest.
In other words, there was not much to lose, and if a loss was incurred, it was probably viewed as just part of the inherent risks of
seafaring. In turn, preparing a claim for so minimal a loss was simply

not worth the time or effort. Given the transient nature of the occupation, many were undoubtedly not in a position to file. Finally, it
must be asked just how many common seamen possessed the educational
background to prepare the written claim? Of the 145 men listed on
seven articles of agreement which the individuals signed themselves,
fifty-three, or over one-third, were unable to write so much as their
names. 1 4
In any case, as the figures to be presented later will attest, a
considerable number of American seamen were loyal to the Crown, and
with the acknowledgment of their having been a large and significant
part of the loyalist populace, the group's historical composite social
image receives a new face, that of loyalist Jack Tar. Compounding this
lack of acknowledgement of loyalist mariners, but adding to the interest of their makeup, is the fact that, as noted, a significant number
were black.
The loyalist experience is a subject regularly focused upon by
historians. Collective analysis of experiences has allowed different
types of loyalists to be discerned with regard to the nature and degree of involvement. On the one hand, there were those loyalists who
were neutral or passive. These were people who deep in their hearts
supported the King, but for whatever reason, made an effort to remain
detached from events and factious parties and uphold a middle of the
road, low-profile stance.15
On the other hand, there were active loyalists. These were people who openly made their stance known, vigorously supporting the
British. Open support could take a variety of forms such as holding
public office, performing civic and humanitarian duties, providing
physical labor and logistical services, and of course, openly bearing
arms in one capacity or another.16

In between these two extremes were equivocal loyalists; those
who displayed a marked degree of undecidedness. Equivocal loyalists
can, in turn, be divided into three basic groups. First, there were
those who really had no political ideology and simply went in whatever
direction the wind was blowing at the time. Such individuals could as
easily be called equivocal rebels and do not concern us here. Next,
and pertinent, were those people who initially may have been truly
confused and undecided on a course of action, but ultimately made the
decision to side with the British. The third type of equivocal loyalist, also pertinent, was certainly the most interesting. These were
individuals who began the conflict in active support of the rebels and
then, openly switched their allegiance to the British. This group can,
in turn, be subdivided yet again into two groups. There were those who
sincerely supported the rebel cause at first. Then, there were those
who feigned rebel allegiance to avoid trouble until such a time when
it was prudent to make their true beliefs known.17
As with most loyalist categorizations, these groupings were not
always mutually exclusive. While a great many loyalist privateersmen
were open and active in their support of the King from the beginning,
others obviously were not. Instead, they made the progression from
passive and equivocal to active, in which capacity, given the nature
of their commitment as privateers, they remained. It was not, however,
just privateering that ultimately defined these men as highly dedicated loyalists. A significant number performed other services that
aided the war effort. As such many of these men were at the pinnacle
of loyalist activity.
Another aspect of the loyalist experience focused on by historians is their treatment at the hands of the rebels. In the past, loyalists have been portrayed as victims who were roughly handled by their
opponents. More recently, however, there has been a trend towards ar-

guing that loyalists were not as oppressed and abused as was once
maintained.''

Perhaps this was the case with loyalists in general, es-

pecially when those of a passive or equivocal nature who avoided confrontation are factored into the whole. Contrary to this, however,
within the ranks of loyalist privateers as a group, there was a relatively high concentration of individuals who were severely ill-treated
for their beliefs. Suffering took a variety of forms including loss of
personal property, land, and business, imprisonment, exile, the disruption of families, and blatant physical abuse. This degree of suffering in relation to the level of dedication and activity of these
individuals reflects the fact that loyalist privateers experienced an
elevated and intensified level of involvement.
Why did people chose to remain or become loyal subjects? Motivation is a profile element historians have spent considerable time and
effort trying to isolate and identify. Just as loyalists reflected a
variety of backgrounds, the stance they adopted was undoubtedly
prompted by a variety of factors. Motivation, however, with its many
facets is an extremely elusive element, because primarily, as historians are forced to admit, loyalist statements accounting for their decisions are truly rare. 19 Problematic though this is, it should really
not come as any great surprise. Why should people who sincerely believed they did nothing wrong, and so felt no guilt, be expected as a
matter of course to offer explanations for their innocent behavior?
There was simply no reason for them to do so. In fact, the dearth of
such accounts strongly supports that the vast number of loyalists
maintained very clear consciences about their decisions and actions.
Still, this is small consolation to anyone interested in establishing
just what their motives were, and those who are so inclined must seek
alternative means of doing so.

Simple logic relative to basic human nature can be employed to
determine a number of motivational factors. Others can be defined
through the collective analysis of identities and experiences. With
the latter approach, certain shared affinities common to large segments of the loyalist community can be detected creating a degree of
pattern upon which to isolate motivational elements. Of course, the
results of such a method are nowhere near as conclusive and satisfying
as if the participants themselves had succinctly outlined the reasons
for their behavior.
A number of valid reasons for being a loyalist have been sug-

gested, and these are evident among loyalist privateers, as well.
These can be divided into tangible or physical, ideological, and emotional. In turn, some of these can be subdivided further into positive, or acceptable, and negative. Of course, as usual, these classifications are not mutually exclusive.
As to positive tangible reasons, kinship ties were a deciding
factor as were business associations, both within the colonies and
with Britain. Also, many public officials naturally supported the
Crown which they represented. Such personal bonds were logically persuasive and difficult to break. Nationality and place of origin aided
in many decisions. For instance, many of Scottish extraction cast
their lot with the King, and many of them, as well as many of English
extraction, were fairly recent first generation immigrants. Needless
to say, such individuals had yet to acculturate, and were, in fact,
still more British than colonial. Also, region was a factor as indicated by the concentration of loyalists along the coast and in the
back country. The coastal areas were those with the most direct links
to the mother country. The remote interior locales were those with the
least ties, but perhaps needed and relied on them the most for their
well being. A final physical reason was the immediate presence of

British troops. With the army or navy close at hand, many loyalists
felt more secure about openly declaring themselves with the belief
they could and would receive support and protection.20
Next, there were the positive ideological reasons. Religion
falls into this category, but as noted, no significant information on
the religious affiliations of loyalist privateers has been forthcoming. Historians have shown that basic morality, however, was undoubtedly an element in that resistance to established authority, especially violent resistance, was considered unacceptable behavior by
many. There is also the fact these people, as viewed by historians,
were socially and politically conservative and as such, simply did not
favor change.21
Most importantly, though some historians seem loath to accept
it, or convey an inability to understand it if they do, ideologically,
loyalists undoubtedly maintained a level of their own brand of public
virtue.22 They sincerely believed in the King and the existing political system and would act in support of it. While not constituting a
direct explanation for their actions, virtually all post-war loyalist
claims contain a statement of the petitioner's fidelity to King and
country. While it could be argued that such declarations were simply
politic and had to be made because of the position the memorialists
found themselves in, their actions corroborated by the testimony of
others support their sincerity.
Then there were the emotional factors, both positive and negative. Of course, closely tied to ideological belief in King and country was someone's love of the same. Fear of guilt and shame as a result of not doing one's part may have played a role as well.
Other emotional factors emerged due to direct contact with the
rebels. Rebel abuse of loyalists, suspected and real, resulted in
feelings that were certainly involved in the decision making process.

A scenario could play out as follows.

A

passive or equivocal loyalist

would be the recipient of a personal affront from the rebels resulting
in at least anger and sometimes the less than acceptable desire for
revenge. Logically, smoldering loyalist sentiments were enflamed, the
injured party disassociated himself from his abusers, and he declared
for the king. Sometimes persecution was severe enough that an individual was left with no choice but to throw in with the British. For
open, avowed loyalists who had already taken an active stand, such
ill-treatment certainly served to strengthen their resolve. Some historians, however, convey a subtle implication that the victims were
overreacting and not justified in the degree of their response to the
situation.23
That revenge was a motivating factor for some loyalist privateersmen is evident from the names of their vessels. Lists of New York
privateers dating between the Fall of 1778 and the Summer of 1779 include the Tory',s Revenqe, the Norf01 k Revgnge, the Refuqee ' s Revenue,
the Venqeance, and the Retaliation. In addition, there were three vessels simply called the Revenqe.24
Ill-treatment produced another emotion, simple fear. For the
abused party, there was logically a dread he would eventually be the
recipient of additional and even greater physical or material harm unless he sought the protection and safety of the British. Fear was undoubtedly a factor even for those who did not directly suffer abuse,
After witnessing the sufferings of others, they must certainly have
entertained the notion that the same could happen to them. So, they
responded accordingly by also seeking British security. Fear was a
factor in a broader sense as well. Accepting the inherent conservative
nature of loyalists as a whole, there was undoubtedly a strong fear of
general political, economic, and social change if not outright upheaval. 25

In the case of those equivocal loyalists who started the conflict in sincere active support of the rebels another factor clearly
played a role in their ultimately becoming loyalists. For some reason,
they became disillusioned with the rebel cause, or that movement simply evolved to a point or moved in a direction they could no longer
accept in good conscience. So, they felt the need to disassociate
themselves. Of all the loyalist documents read for this study, in only
a very few do the writers offer succinct reasons for their behavior.
Interestingly, in two of these instances, the reasons were identical,
and there is evidence for a third in the same vein. After each party
had supported the rebels, neither could accept the idea of independence from Britain when affairs turned in that direction. Inability to
accept a break from Britain is cited by some historians as a fairly
common reason behind loyalist decisions.
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Regarding negative motivation, revenge has already been mentioned. Historians have also viewed loyalists as opportunistic people
prompted by self-interest. A number of studies, even sympathetic ones,
convey the distinct impression that while many loyalists acted as they
did for understandable, even acceptable reasons, those reasons were
less noble than the lofty ideals motivating the rebels and certainly
not sufficient to fully justify actions. The rebels were motivated by
republican concepts essential to which was the idea of public virtue.
A

virtuous citizen was selfless, subordinating personal interests to

meet civic obligations for the common good. In contrast, individuals
acting in a self-interested manner were deemed corrupt and morally inferior. Also, while most studies pay lip service to the idea that some
loyalists may actually have been sincerely devoted to the crown, the
feeling is still conveyed that in light of their options, such a misguided stance is difficult to imagine. Consequently, there is often
the implication, if not outright assertion, with an extremely negative

spin, that loyalists took advantage of the situation, maintained selfserving agendas, and conducted themselves accordingly. Their association with what was considered a self-interested, corrupt government is
seen to support this. By implication, loyalists were incapable of
self-sacrifice and so, corrupt themselves. They lacked the "For King
and Country" British equivalent of public virtue. While there is little doubt revenge was a motivational element for some, it is unlikely

a negative form of self-interest prompted many loyalists to take the
road they did. 27
This historical outlook pertaining to self-interest is certainly
problematic from a philosophical point of view. The line between selfinterest and patriotism is often very thin, if it exists at all. An
individual only supports a government because he or she believes in
and identifies with it, and doing so serves a purpose, either spiritually or materially. In other words, a government must first have something worthwhile to offer that will support and enhance the people's
well being and chosen lifestyle before those people validate it with
their support. When a government ceases to give the people what they
want, it is time to reassess, and when it is found that nothing more
is forthcoming in support of the people's desired way of life, then,
possibly, it is time for something new. Upon reflection, when push
came to shove, loyalists decided they were basically content with
British rule. Those who became rebels clearly were not. By definition,
a revolution involves change. If an individual supports a revolution,
it indicates a desire for change. Why? The answer is to create a
situation in which one will be allowed to better one's self and lead
an improved life. Thus, support of a revolution is certainly selfserving. Furthermore, pursuing such a course of action is usually done
at the expense of others through violent imposition, which is certainly indicative of severe unfeeling selfishness. The bottom line is

there would not have been a revolution if people did not hope to gain
something from it, and so, in conjunction, statements to the effect
that loyalists suffered from self-interest hold little weight if for
no other reason than the extreme double standard they reflect.
Three maxims that always need to be kept in mind when dealing
with loyalists is that they did not want the war, they did not start
the war, and many were given little choice about their participation
in the war. Loyalist involvement was merely a defensive response, and
as such, in accordance with the prevailing eighteenth century views on
civilized conflict, theirs was a truly just war, as much theirs as
Britain's. 28 Loyalist privateer George Leonard, quoted in the chapter
title, was certainly of this opinion. His statement, "we apprehend
ourselves fully justified by the laws of God and man," continued, "in
making retaliations and reprisals.~~~
As a group, loyalists were a people who saw no need for drastic change. They did not want something
more, better, or different. On the contrary they were basically content with what they had and were attempting to maintain it. In other
words, loyalist activity stemmed from the basic need of self-preservation created by circumstances brought about by others. A large part
of self-preservation on this level involves support of a government
that allows one to exist in the manner desired. To preserve yourself,
you help preserve the power that protects and so insures the way of
life you feel is best. The whole thing is a give and take symbiotic
relationship. Consequently, self-preservation and survival should not
be confused with opportunistic self-interest. Where is the problem in
desiring to maintain the status quo? As matters stand, historically,
the rebel's desire for change resulting in self-improvement is positive and not indicative of self-interest, whereas the loyalist desire
to maintain the status quo is negative and reflective of self-serving
interests. This is really rather illogical.

To examine this issue on another basic level, a maxim for inspiring patriotism is the bottom line need to defend home and family.
Defense of these entities is a fundamental element in defense of country. Loyalists were certainly trying to do this. Everything they had
worked for and possessed was suddenly threatened. In fact, many found
themselves in a situation more dire. Having already lost heavily in
terms of property, possessions, and business to the rebels, and with
families sometimes split up, they were doing more than defending and
maintaining. They were attempting to simply survive and regain what
had been lost.
Supporting the argument that a strong element of sincere selflessness motivated loyalists is the simple fact that so many voluntarily put themselves in harmls way, actively bearing arms for the King.
Historians estimate between 10,000 and 50,000 adult males served in
the Provincial Corps and militia units at different times during the
war. 30 They might have avoided involvement and let the British resolve
matters for them. This is especially significant where first generation immigrants of British origin are concerned, especially the more
recent arrivals. They would seem the most logical candidates to simply
pack up, disassociate themselves, and return home. Yet, a great many
did not. Viewing the war as much theirs as Britain's, numerous loyalists did not shirk their duty, but rather elected to do their part and
see matters brought to a favorable conclusion. Of the few men who offered their reasons for being active loyalists, George Leonard, who
will be quoted at the end of the chapter, conveyed this sentiment.31
In addition, as will be seen, a number of loyalists had made
their position clear before the commencement of hostilities, so they
certainly were not acting on the belief that war would be beneficial
to them. Also, there is the fact that a considerable number of the
loyalists in question met with substantial abuse from the rebels from

the beginning, indicating they maintained strong, well established
views from early on. It is unlikely shifty, self-serving opportunists
would leave themselves open to such ill-treatment by publicly expounding in favor of issues that obviously did not matter to them. Furthermore, the experience of rebel abuse must certainly have conveyed
to many that open support of the British might not be easy or pleasant, even if they believed the British would quickly resolve matters
in their favor. Finally, as will also be shown, a number of these men
suffered what can only be defined as serious injustices at the hands
of the British, the very people they supported. Yet, their allegiance
did not waver despite such incidents.
Opportunistic, self-interested behavior is often ascribed to
three key elements of the loyalist community. First, black loyalists,
in particular, slaves, are often viewed by historians in this light.32
Free blacks were, theoretically, in a position to make the same
choices for the same reasons as whites. Slaves, however, acted in accordance with a different set of circumstances. In fact, loyalist
slaves can be further subdivided into two groups, those still in bondage to loyalist masters and those who had run away from rebel owners.
Regarding the former, their motivation, if it can be called that, was
obvious. They acted in accordance with the dictates of their owners.
Logically, at least some were not at all happy with their situation.
Two slaves, each named Ned and owned by North Carolina loyalist John
Hamilton, jumped ship from the privateer brig Britaniq in which Hamilton was part owner.33
As for runaways, escaping their situation as slaves with hopes
of gaining the freedom held up as a reward by the British is the reason most often cited by historians for these blacks having become loyalists. This was undoubtedly a very real and widespread motivating
factor. Slaves prompted by this incentive, however, are generally

viewed historically as being merely opportunistic. The reasons for
their actions were distinct from and without regards to the broad,
mainstream issues and the various traditional ties to Britain prompting white loyalists. Runaway slaves simply took advantage of the situation. While no historian can be accused of begrudging slaves their
attempts at freedom, these views on motivation seem to cast a slight,
negative pall, perhaps unintentionally, over the participation of
black loyalists. Accordingly, relative to white participants, slave
motivation becomes less pure. There is the unstated implication that
their involvement lacked some degree of integrity, because for their

own benefit, they opportunistically selected the side generally perceived as the enemy with whom they shared no affinity. This outlook
has led to the refusal of at least one historian to accept blacks as
true loyalists, and it has caused others to qualify and temper their
classification.34
In reality, this is rather demeaning with the implication that
slaves could not be politically aware and make their decisions accordingly. As Sylvia Frey has argued, the slave community was undoubtedly
quite knowledgeable of events, issues, and their significance. The
very fact slaves were aware that the British were offering freedom to
runaways supports this. By running away and joining the loyalist
ranks, tens of thousands of slaves made a conscious personal decision,
exhibiting an awareness of the situation, to select a side and become
active participants.35 They were electing to undergo sacrifices the
same as, if not greater than, white loyalists. Under the circumstances, the numerous slaves who served on privateers should be accorded full status as loyalists.
Public officials constitute the second element of the loyalist
community who are often viewed as self-interested. In essence, there

are assertions that these men remained loyal to the crown because it

was the crown who supplied them with a li~elihood.~~
On a certain
level, there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this, but again,
a very negative spin has been put on what was generally an innocent
situation. The negative view of public officials, however, is quite
weak in that it fails to acknowledge the fact that many of these men
were public officials in the first place because they were civic
minded, believing in what they did and the system they did it for. As
such they naturally followed the already established line of heart and
conscience rather then the lure of pay. Negative self-interest, with
regards to officials, is not applicable as a motivation. Also, if for
no other reason, this opinion is invalidated by the blanket manner in
which it is seemingly applied to all public officials, which simply
defies credibility.
Nowhere is the sentiment that loyalists were opportunistic and
self-serving more apparent than in the historical treatment of the
merchant class. Historians regularly assert that negative selfinterest was that group's primary motive for remaining loyal. More
specifically, continued allegiance to the British would prove the most
financially profitable course to steer. According to the historical
interpretation, the merchants believed they would make a fortune in
trade

.
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Of course, this easily translates into their actions having been
founded on the less than virtuous reason of simple greed. In turn, by
republican standards, this means they were corrupt. There may have
been some merchants who for some reason entertained such notions, just
as some rebel merchants undoubtedly did the same. But, in general, the
prevailing historical view is very difficult to accept if for no other
reason than the vista is so all-encompassing. It is again problematic
from a philosophical standpoint, as well, when examined in light of
the known facts. As to general self-interest, to a degree, a certain

element did exist among loyalist merchants, but it was definitely not
negative. Instead, it manifested itself in a basic desire for simple
self-preservation and survival rather than increased riches. The possibility of financial gain was certainly not a serious factor, if it
was a factor at all, prompting loyalist merchants to remain loyal.
Among loyalists, merchants in particular were conservative individuals, and as such, they were not seeking something new or more.
They had been merchants previously, still were, and would be. Making
money and being successful were key to their existence and happiness.
The existing government and the trade situation it had established
were essential in making the attainment of the merchants' goals possible. For merchants, Britain was the fosterer, nurturer, and protector
of the trade that constituted the basis of their existence. Rather
than attempting financial gain, they were trying to avoid the financial loss that disruption of government, society, and thus, trade
would result in. Their inclination to support Britain merely reflected
a desire to preserve that good existence they believed they had and
maintain a status quo trade situation. Undeniably, this is a rather
natural instinct for which it is difficult to condemn someone. E'urthermore, from the merchant's point of view of the empire, trade was
the major element holding it together. Therefore, support of government for a continuance of the established trade situation was clearly
for the common good.38
If a loyalist were profit oriented, he could view the situation
from two perspectives. First, he could think in terms of more immediate, short term profits that might be gleaned as a direct result of
the war. At the same time, he might view matters in the sense of long
term profits. This would entail looking to the post-war future with a
speculative eye to what the trade situation would be after the British
successfully defeated the rebels. In essence, a merchant might hope

not only for a secure market situation protected by British might, but
an improved one as well. Neither of these views for loyalist motivation, however, stand the test. Why? As will be seen shortly, no serious, immediate market opportunities existed for loyalists. As to long
term, there is nothing to suggest there was anything to speculate on,
or that the postwar era would be any different from that preceding. In
all likelihood it would have been business as usual following the war.
Consequently, any eye to the long term future was undoubtedly for
maintaining or returning to the status quo rather then toward the possibility of even greater financial rewards.
Furthermore, the facts of the matter belie that loyalist merchants, and by association, mariners, acted for opportunistic, profit
oriented reasons. On the contrary, their responsive behavior relative
to events which negatively affected them indicates a high level of
public virtue. Although designed to control and suppress rebel trade,
the Restraining and Prohibitory Acts severely restricted loyalist
maritime commerce as well, making it difficult even for them to make
any money. The first Restraining Act, affecting only the New England
colonies, was passed on March 30, 1775. Individuals there could not
export any domestically grown or manufactured enumerated commodities
to anyplace in the empire. They could not re-export enumerated commodities from other British domains to any place other than Britain
and the West Indies. As to non-enumerated goods, domestic or imported
from elsewhere with the intent to re-export, such could not be shipped
to any point other than Britain, the West Indies, or Ireland. All imports to New England had to first pass through Britain. The only exceptions to these rules concerned the import and export of provisions
for the army and navy, and the import of raw materials and manufactures from the West Indies. In addition, all ships' paperwork had to
be in complete order, and the region's fishing vessels were generally

banned from operating in the North Atlantic. Failure to comply would
result in stiff fines, loss of bond, and seizure of vessel and cargo.39
Almost two weeks later, on April 13, the second Restraining Act
passed. Pertaining to the remaining colonies with the exception of New
York, North Carolina, and Georgia, its mandates were virtually identical to those of the first. The three exempted colonies were granted
consideration on the grounds that they were still believed to be basically loyal, and so, were salvageable. The two acts would go into effect on July 1, and July 20, respectively.4 0
By May 25, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, Commander-in-Chief of the
Royal Navy in North America, had received copies of both acts.4 1 In the
interim, he, too, had issued pertinent orders against colonial trade.
He directed his captains to take possession of any unauthorized vessel
carrying arms or provisions into the colonies.4 2
Of note is the fact that no exceptions were made for friends of
government in any of these acts or orders. On the contrary, the negative, limited trade situation established by them affected loyalists
as well as rebels. As such, affairs were not conducive for loyalists
to believe the atmosphere was ripe for turning major profits from
trade during the war.
In early July, additional directives were sent from London. All
trade between the rebellious middle and southern colonies, including
New York and North Carolina, would cease. More significantly, all New
England vessels became subject to seizure with the notable exception
of those belonging to friends of government. Considerate though this
might initially sound, it could only have been a small consolation to
New England and other loyalist merchants for whom the trade situation
had actually just worsened. In essence, though New England loyalist
merchants could keep their vessels, there was even less they and other
loyalist merchants could do with them. Furthermore, all indications

are the burden of proof as to one's loyalty would be exacting and fall
upon the individual. Consequently, for any loyalist merchant choosing
to pursue any remaining commerce options, operations would still be
potentially risky when conducted under the watchful eye of a zealous
Royal Navy which had authority to stop and search all vessels.43
On September 2, conditions worsened when yet another order was
sent from London updating Graves' instructions. At this point, all
vessels belonging to the twelve colonies already referred to (Georgia
was still exempt) were to be seized unless it was apparent they were
en route directly to or from Britain, Ireland, or the West Indies. In
addition, the crews of colonial vessels could be impressed.44
While the September 2 directives failed to take note of loyalists, they had, in fact been acknowledged two days earlier in a separate dispatch to Graves. By it, loyalist merchants were granted the
opportunity to remove their wares and merchandise to the security of
their vessels, and then, seek naval protection. At that point, they
would be allowed "every Indulgence which the Law will allow." While
this sounds favorable, the law no longer allowed for much. Between
late March and early September, 1775, trade opportunities for loyalist
merchants had gone from bad to worse, diminishing significantly. Of
course, profits undoubtedly diminished accordingly. All this, however,
was really only a prelude of what was to come.45
On December 20, 1775, a bill even more restrictive in nature,
the Prohibitory Act, passed. Replacing the two Restraining Acts and
going into effect in stages between January 1 and August 1, 1776, the
Prohibitory Act declared that all vessels belonging to and all others
trading with the thirteen colonies (Georgia was now considered in a
state of rebellion as well) were to be seized. In effect, all colonial
commerce was to come to a halt. No exceptions were made for loyalists.
The only vessels exempt were those in government service or those pos-

sessing government licenses to carry stores and provisions to the
army, navy, and the civilian populaces of garrisoned areas.4 6
With the advent of this bill, any loyalist who, up to this
point, might have entertained unrealistic hopes of taking advantage of
the situation and turning a profit, must certainly have had those
hopes squashed. For loyalist merchants, whether or not they suffered
the usual wartime problems of blockade and enemy predators was of little consequence, because they still could not get their vessels to sea
and trade freely in the manner they once had.
In conjunction, it was difficult in any case, if not impossible,
for loyalist merchants to export goods for other reasons. Many were or
would be cut off from their sources of trade goods and materials because production regions were in rebel hands. This was compounded by
the fact many were dispossessed with the result that their business
connections were severed. In essence, the situation was very disruptive to trade.
Unable to export and with import opportunities severely limited,
business was curtailed. For loyalist merchants, the situation allowed
only two possible but unattractive options to circumvent restrictions.

An individual could remove himself, his family, and his entire operation to a point outside the thirteen colonies, reregister his vessel(~),and resume business in a new locale. Of course, this is assuming the individual in question still had something to relocate with
and was willing to abandon his home. Furthermore, one historian has
indicated efforts to relocate were problematic, not only because of a
lack of capital, but also because of a lack of business connections in
new locales.47 While, as will be seen, some chose this route, the majority of future privateers chose the alternative to remain in America. For many, however, this still entailed a disrupting relocation to
a British-held port and adapting to new, but very restricted market

situations and business associations. For those remaining in Britishheld colonial ports within the thirteen colonies, all that could be
done was to petition for a license and contract to carry necessary
stores and provisions for the services and civilian population they
protected. While this alternative would at least keep some vessels in
service, keep some seamen employed, and provide some income (perhaps
even a good one), such heavily controlled, limited, and rather menial
employment, if it could be had at all, was hardly the sort of business
venture many of these men were used to. 4 8 Yet many opted for this despite the unfavorable situation. The fact that so many did not give up
and remained under the circumstances says a great deal about their
sincerity of devotion and level of commitment. Of course for loyalist
merchants remaining in rebel held areas, there were no options at all.
Given that these trade restrictions began at an early date and
rapidly increased, few, if any, loyalist merchants could have made
their decision without a knowledge of them. Furthermore, the Prohibitory Act would remain in place, with only a couple of specific concessions being granted, throughout the period covered in this study. Consequently, it is impossible to imagine that any loyalist merchant,
aware of the restrictions as anyone must certainly have been, would
even consider that the war might prove a profitable opportunity. On
the contrary, the situation was such that loyalists could not hope to
make money. They could not hope to gain anything from the war. Those
attempting to maintain the status quo could not even do that for the
time being. In light of this, any loyalist who still might think he
could turn a profit on the war and who acted for strictly self-serving
opportunistic reasons, had to have been on the one hand, either very
naive or stupid, or on the other, an extremely adventurous speculator.
Any individual, however, who was solely profit minded and willing to
gamble to such a degree, would have found the rebels just as attrac-

tive if not more so. With them, there was the opportunity of new markets and avoidance of the British trade restrictions. In fact, on a
certain level it could be argued that the effects of the Acts were
harder on loyalists than they were on the rebels. The latter were at
least in a position to be free to ignore and defy the acts, whereas
the loyalists were not. Yet, in spite of the negative effects of the
Restraining and Prohibitory Acts, the men in question remained loyal.
Ironically, these trade restrictions did have one positive effect. 01timately, unable to conduct their normal business regimen, loyalist
merchants and mariners were forced to seek alternative business opportunities as a matter of survival, and for many, privateering fit the
bill perfectly. As will be seen, however, the Prohibitory Act did little, initially, to promote that course of action either.
The ill-effects of the trade acts did not stop with the merchants. They undoubtedly extended further to disrupt the associated
occupations of others, especially mariners. Logically, a reduction in
trade would result in a lack of employment opportunities for many masters and seamen. Nevertheless, large numbers of these men remained
loyal, supporting the idea that making money was not a serious factor
in their decisions either.
The Prohibitory Act impacted some loyalists' trading activities
to an even greater degree. A number of loyal merchants and mariners
actually lost vessels to the Royal Navy because of it.4 9 Despite such
injustices, these men remained loyal. This particular incurrence of
losses instead of profits says a great amount about the sincerity of
their stance.
The reader need keep in mind that loyalist trade was negatively
affected by factors other than British legislation. Loyalist merchants
were also under the constraints of the Continental Association, the
stipulations of which forbade the import and later, export, of goods

in an effort to force Britain to redress grievances. Being caught in
violation of the Articles could easily result in the loss of cargo and
possibly vessel. As such, loyalist merchants, and mariners as well,
were truly caught in the middle of a less than happy situation.
As stated, most of what can be defined as loyalist motivation is
founded on basic logic and an understanding of human nature, and as a
result, conclusions are primarily speculative. Furthermore, as historians will agree, for any given individual, when the decision was
made, it was likely made for a variety of deeply personal and intertwined reasons.50 Still, in light of loyalist response to influential
events such as the trade acts, there is no reason to doubt the majority of merchants and mariners who turned privateer were sincere in
their convictions and very active support of the Crown. In actuality,
loyalists were really no different from the rebels. In their own way,
they were just as virtuous. Of course, among the good, there was undoubtedly, as always, an element of the bad and the ugly.

Having outlined the basic attractions of privateering and, in
general, discussed the factors prompting men to be loyalists in the
first place, this study will now address the reasons these individuals
became privateers. Before continuing, it need be noted that again, a
general lack of relative source materials results in some speculative
suggestion. For hundreds of owners and officers and thousands of seamen, information pertaining to their background, war-time experience,

or both is sadly lacking. Information that does exist is often sketchy
and episodic at best. As for personal explanations about why men became privateers, they are almost as rare as those outlining why they
were loyalists in the first place. There are, however, some infoma-

tive accounts of their actions and pertinent commentary by peers and
associates that reflect their mindset.
What motivated a large portion of the loyalist community centering on the merchant and mariner classes to enter into privateering?
There were undoubtedly a number of factors in combination prompting
any individual's involvement. If it were accepted that the merchants,
in general, were driven by greed, then there would be a simple answer.
In the same manner that some historians believe opportunistic, profit
oriented self-interest motivated loyalist merchants, other historians
maintain the same incentives were the factors behind anyone becoming a
privateer at any time. 51 If this were the case, quite logically, loyalist merchants could be expected to pursue this course of action. Privateering would offer yet another financial opportunity to cash in on
the war and further enrich their coffers. This was not, however, the
situation. A number of legitimate reasons motivated men to take up
privateering, not the least of which was a high level of public virtue.
While the possibility of making some money was undoubtedly a
strong motivating factor for loyalists to privateer, it was generally
so only in a qualified sense, free of negative implications. Furthermore, money was certainly not the only reason to become involved. In
the annals of privateering, loyalists were rather unique. Privateersmen at other times or places usually had the luxury of operating out
of safe, secure, home ports, and were allowed a greater latitude in
their decisions about whether or not to become privateersmen. Many
loyalist privateers, however, were dispossessed, needy, and desperate.
While men at other times and places resorted to privateering out of
necessity, because their trade was adversely affected by war, those
men still had the option of trying to pursue the normal regimen and
attempt to trade. For loyalist merchants and mariners, because of the

trade acts, even this narrow window of opportunity was shut. Hands
were seriously tied. Privateering offered the only really viable option for many to be able to maintain themselves and their families.
So, financially speaking, the loyalists' desire to become involved
with privateering was not a matter of making more money for money's
sake. It was a matter of making some money to survive. This seems to
have been the case with Roger and Robert Stewart, Virginia mechant/
mariners, who had lost heavily in terms of property and trade. With
their last remaining vessel they took up privateering, and of her they
said, "she cruised with various sucessn and "afforded to them a tolerable but precarious subsistance. n52
For many others of lesser status, the need to acquire a means of
support was particularly crucial. Thousands of refugees flocked to New
York, creating a serious indigent problem. For many in need of income,
serving on a letter of marque or a privateer, if not the only employment opportunity, was certainly an attainable one. So, simply put, and
not to detract from other, more noble motivating factors that acted in
association, for many, privateering offered the prospect of an occupation so they could subsist. To others, it handed up the opportunity to
offer employment to those in need. George Leonard declared this was a
major reason for his fitting out seven armed vessels. 53
One thing can be said with absolute certainty about loyalist
privateersmen. Given the initial opposition to the activity and the
late date of its acceptance, few, if any, merchants or ships1 masters
(those men essential to instigating operations) became loyalists just
in order to go privateering. It was simply not a realistic option at
the time the vast majority of these individuals made their decision.
If nothing else, the trade restrictions imposed by the Prohibitory Act
served to deter such ideas. According to the act's mandates, prize
goods were considered no different than any other trade commodity. As

such, loyalists of New York or Newport could not bring them into port
without a license, and once there, they certainly could not export
them. Of course, initially, this would have negatively affected the
attraction of privateering for any profit-minded individual by reducing potential yield. What was the point of going to all the time and
trouble to privateer when it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to realize a worthwhile return from your investment. Before anyone could privateer freely and effectively in the traditional manner,
trade restrictions governing prize goods needed to be lifted, or a
means of circumventing them needed to be found. Yet, despite these
limiting factors, many still wanted to enter into privateering. 54
Because some historians, and even some contemporaries, have
viewed privateering as an opportunistic, self-serving, profit-minded
activity that amounted to little more than legalized piracy and hurt
war efforts by siphoning off men and materials needed for more crucial
roles, it is considered tainted and distasteful in some circles.55
These views thus convey the implication that men associated with privateering did not have the same level of public virtue as soldiers in
the ranks facing selfless death without the prospect of compensatory
reward. Such writers seem to forget that many a Continental soldier
was induced into the army with promises of high bounties and rather
substantial land grants while naval personnel on both sides were afforded the opportunity of prize money in addition, at least theoretically, to regular pay. While men signing articles on letters of marque
received seamen's pay, those joining privateers did not. Their only
prospect of financial recompense was if prizes were actually taken,
and even then monetary reward was not a certainty.
Most contemporaries did not maintain negative views of privateers. The vast number of accounts appearing in the newspapers indicates the public clamored for news of their activities and viewed the

participants as heroic in stature.56 Furthermore, if there was a real
problem at the time with the virtue of privateersmen, and the idea of
their making money was distasteful, it must be asked why governments
generally went so far to encourage and support the activity. In the
mercantile world, deriving an income at the expense of one's enemies
was exactly what governments wanted and privateers could do. Considering that during the conflicts for empire during the eighteenth century
increased control of trade and the enhancement of economic status were
primary considerations for a country going to war, what greater service could there be than to wage it in a fashion that maintained an eye
to this end? There was no stigma. Making money by appropriating an opponent's wealth was respectable and deemed every bit as important as
seizing his territories and defeating his army and navy. In short, in
accordance with the views of the period, privateering served what was
perceived as the common good. Consequently, even if loyalist privateers acted for reasons of financial gain it was legitimate for them
to do so in the eyes of the western world. George Leonard, when stating in reference to privateering, "profit and honor are inseparably
blended" clearly conveyed this belief .57
While some historians view privateering distastefully, there is
a popular perception that maintains an overly attractive, romantic image of the activity. The life of a privateersmen was glamorous, swashbuckling, and full of adventure with the added prospect of acquiring
wealth. There was freedom from all the harsh and distasteful aspects
of military and naval service.58 Even with this outlook, an air of
self-interest is still implicit in that it conveys there was an unwillingness on the part of privateers to face the harsher rigors of
war.
In reality, privateering was a very serious undertaking, not to
be taken lightly. The investment costs were considerable, the risks

were high, and the chances of turning an exceedingly large profit, if
any, were relatively slim. Concerning the profitability of privateering in general, some historians maintain that in actuality only a very
few individuals amassed any serious wealth from their involvement, and
what returns others realized were not really worthwhile.59 Other historians, however, assert that while most participants did not become
rich, the chance to turn a tidy profit, justifying one's efforts, did
exist, and a fair number realized what were at least worthwhile rewards for their time and trouble.60 Regardless, everything came down to
chance. Involvement entailed a major gamble, and so a major decision.
For investors, the possibility of losing a vessel at sea or backing an
unsuccessful cruise were very real, both resulting in serious financial loss which, for many loyalists, could be ill-afforded. Furthermore, there were the physical risks for crewmen. Daily, at sea, a privateersmen faced a variety of life threatening situations ranging from
the constant hazards of seafaring to intermittent, vicious combat. He
could end up just as dead or permanently maimed as a soldier shouldering a musket in the ranks. Perhaps even worse, he might languish in a
rebel prison such as the infamous Simsbury Mines.
Privateering was well established by the time of the revolution,
and the experienced merchants and mariners who chose to become involved knew what the score was. These men were not starry-eyed fortune
hunters. Privateering required serious commitment and a willingness to
risk the incurrence of serious loss, financial and physical. It was
not for the faint hearted. In light of this, with anyone who pursued
privateering, a motivation other than making money had to have been
present. There had to be a desire to assist in the war effort which,
in association with the risk factors, indicates a willingness to sacrifice and thus, a serious level of public virtue. To look at this
from a different angle, the fact that so many people on both sides be-

came privateers supports the idea that if the activity was selfserving, then, a very large part of society did not hold with the concept of public virtue. If that was, in fact, the case, then there are
certainly no grounds for attaching a stigma to privateering or the
people associated with it. The entire argument becomes moot.
As will be shown, that virtue played a large part in what these
men did is confirmed by their other wartime activities. The lives of
many were far from being solely devoted to privateering.

A

number

served in a military capacity as well. Others acted as indispensable
pilots and guides for the Royal navy. A fair number were quite involved in civic affairs both as office holders and humanitarians.
More specifically related to the war at sea and privateering,
the conduct of a number of these men and women supports the opinion
that virtue was a key element in their behavior. Just as the negative
factor of revenge is apparent in the names of vessels, so is patriotism evident. Again, drawing on the lists of privateers commissioned at
New York between September, 1778 and July, 1779, one encounters references to the Prince of Wales, the Prince William, the Royal Charlotte,
the Queen Charlotte, the =
n
&
,

the St. Andrew, the St. Patrick,

the St. George, the British T s , the Loyal Sub_iect_, and of course,
represented by two each, the Britannia and the King George. In addition, no less than twenty-four other vessels were named after lesser
political, military, naval, and royal personages such as the Germain,
the Dunmore, the Sir Henry C l i m , the Lord Howe, and even the Prince
of Hesse. 61
--George Leonard spent his fortune fitting out seven armed vessels, three transports, and some armed boats, and then, for the good
of the cause, offered their services to the British for less than lucrative convoy, transport, and guide duty. Later, when referring to
the Associated Loyalists, while undoubtedly exaggerating somewhat, he

declared none were motivated by profit. 62 John Macklin, in addition to
serving with the Royal Navy, spending time as a prisoner-of-war, and
being wounded three times, commanded a commissioned vessel for Governor Patrick Tonyn of East Florida, never receiving pay for his service~.
Another
~~
example is found with William Chambers prior to his becoming a privateer captain. A trading venture of his to the Bahamas
coincided with the Continental Navy's attack on the islands in 1776.
Described as the only man willing to risk his life and ship to keep
valuable and much needed gunpowder out of rebel hands, Chambers, at
Governor Montfort Browne's request, immediately threw his cargo overboard to make room for the powder, chartered his vessel to Browne, and
carried the munitions to St. Augustine. 64
Virtue was particularly in evidence with female privateers. The
New York loyalist press heralded the patriotic efforts of Ann Burgess,
Isabella Burton, and Anne McAdam. Following the examples set by the
Marchioness of Granby, Queen Charlotte, herself, and other English
women, and acting as principal owners, these three ladies initiated a
subscription for loyalist women to raise money to fit out the appropriately named privateer sloop Royal Charlotte. Governor Tryon, also
impressed with their commitment, commented on their actions in a dispatch to Germain. 65
Their activity certainly stirred the soul of at least one individual, Exul Virginiensis, prompting him to pen the following wonderful doggerel verse as a New Year's gift for their efforts.
When female hearts beat high for virtuous Fame,
And patriot passions glow with hallowed flame;
Their good designs, who can refrain to paint?
Tho' weak his colours, and his lines tho' faint.
Hail! Lovely Fair! who grace that safe retreat,
Where Britain's friends in cordial union meet:
Whose well-taught minds, in just connection view,
What's to your God, your King, and Country due:
Since your sweet bosoms loyal ardours feel,
And true concern disclose for publick-weal;
Since you adopt our Royal Charlotte's plans,
Who, to her sex, a bright example stands;

Assured be, that ev'ry honest Man
Will idolize THE FAIR AMERICAN;
Brave loyal Tars, with Hearts of Oak, will vie,
For you to fight, to conquer, live or die;
By you inspir'd, they'll plead our common cause,
With vengeful Thunder, 'gainst the Congress laws;
Firm to sustain, and resolute to dare,
The Friends of George, no Gauls or Yankies fear:
With equal haste, the French and Rebels beat,
As if they rush'd your lovely lips to meet.
Soon as full arm'd, you bid your Privateer,
Go, share the trophies of the rising year;
Her martial crew, their vent'rous course, they urge;
Thro' Neptune's plains, piratic Gangs to scourge;
Our ancient foes, in naval combats, foil;
Still, in your laps, to pour the golden spoil:
Some Poet too, will tell each British Dame,
That New-York Ladies emulate their Fame;
On their loved Queen, still fix their faithful eyes,
To catch her manners living as they rise;
Your loyal compact, with due praise rehearse,
And place your names, in some immortal verse.
Thus, when Rebellion, to her native Hell,
With Diaboliads, is confin'd to dwell;
Your gallant Youths, will claim no higher Prize,
Than New-York Nymphs, in chaste endearing ties:
Then, should they deign, to bliss each am'rous boy -66
Muse
Haste - A curtain o'er those scenes of Joy.
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Another loyalist whose conduct, though in part activated by revenge, was also motivated by a high degree of selflessness was John
Goodrich, Sr. At one point in the war, having already lost heavily to
the rebels, he declared, "I am in the old Stile working for nothing
and finding myself

-

but am determined to Persevere for my King b

Country should I wreck a Second fortune."67 As commander of a privateer, rather than pursue rebel shipping, he spent the war offering his
services, without pay, as a guide and consultant to the British on
their various forays into the Chesapeake Bay. In fact, despite numerous historical assertions to the contrary, there is no evidence that
as the captain of a contmissioned vessel, he ever actually seized a rebel vessel. As to his conduct, in post-war testimonials, a British admiral, a commodore, a general, and a governor used such descriptive
phrases as, "self disinterested conduct," "disinterested Patriotism,"
"zealous disinterested conductIW and "the most zealous
Conduct.

&

disinterested

Perhaps the most exemplary instances of the patriotic spirit of
loyalist mariners occurred during similar incidents in July, 1778, and
July, 1780. Each time, the presence of a threatening French fleet coincided with crew shortages in the British fleet at New York. In the
first instance, both officers and crews of transports and merchantmen
in the harbor volunteered en masse to fill naval vacancies until the
crisis had passed. Between 200 and 300 men answered the initial call,
and ultimately 1,000 came forward. Others offered the services of
their vessels. In the second situation, Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot
requested the New York Chamber of Commerce to help raise 400 to 500
sailors for the Royal Navy. By the afternoon, the Chamber had already
gathered 350 volunteers. Within twenty-four hours a total of 2,000 had
made themselves available. Another example of loyalist aid to the navy
was that of Samuel Pearce, owner of twenty privateers, who claimed he
always loaned his crews whenever the navy needed them.69
Finally, as will be seen, the actions of some, specifically as
privateersmen, support a virtuous motivation rather than a purely financial one. Often, loyalist privateers freely engaged rebel warships
or privateers in serious actions. The significance of this is that if
profit minded, they could have avoided such actions and chosen to
search for safer, more vulnerable and lucrative merchantmen. That they
opted instead to incur serious physical risk in a fight offering less
reward says a great deal. Joseph Galloway certainly held up such conduct as evidence of loyalist virtue. 70
Another major reason for British and British colonial mechant/
mariners (other than those in the thirteen colonies) to back privateers was the belief that their employment would assist in the defense
of trade. They deemed privateering a counter response to their rebel
opponents involved in the same activity. For the true mainland loyalist, however, during the period covered by this study, this could only

have been an indirect and general motivating force. Apart from their
vessels in government carrying service, they really had no immediate
commerce to protect. Still, the employment of loyalist privateers
would be a factor in the defense of the empire's trade in general, and
undoubtedly at least some loyalists were public spirited enough to
view matters in this broader light. Joseph Galloway certainly perceived prospective loyalist privateers acting for this reason.7 1
It need be pointed out that some men occasionally entered into
privateers for rather unique personal reasons. A sickly Collin
Mackenzie signed articles on a St. Augustine privateer "for the Benefit of Sea-Air." His efforts were rather counter-productive, resulting
in his being captured and imprisoned in Charlestown.72
Privateering was undoubtedly appealing, because it gave loyalists a unique venue in which to act. By engaging in it, they gained a
sense of freedom of action with a high degree of control over their
own destiny. Generally, divorced from direct association with and control by the army and navy, they could attain a greater sense of identity, personal involvement and self-worth through awareness of the
significant role they knew they were playing in the war effort. Privateering allowed them an opportunity to fight, in their own way, what
had become their war as well as Britain's.
Many loyalists simply wanted to do their part to help, and privateering was the chosen means by which to do it. Fed up with the rebels, John Dunlop left North Carolina for England just so he could fit
out a privateer, return to America, and harass his enemies. Both
George Leonard and Joseph Galloway maintained there were numerous individuals desirous of doing their part to aid the cause as privateersmen. 7 3
Privateering offered the best venue in which merchants and mariners could express their support of the crown for another logical rea-

son. The various owners and captains were established, respectable men
with unique, specialized backgrounds and experience. That they should
join the army and stand in the line of battle with musket in hand is
expecting too much. For them to have found a berth on a naval vessel
equal to their abilities and status was impossible. As a result, privateering afforded the only realistic avenue of involvement, and as
men readily familiar with ships and the sea, what better way was
there? For common seamen, as well, in light of their background, the
activity was the logical choice. In fact, for merchants and seafaring
men privateering was really just an extension of their peacetime occupation.
George Leonard, privateer captain and owner, undoubtedly summed
up many a loyalist privateersman's views when he wrote:
The people under my direction are loyalists of this country who
fled for protection to the British standard, unwilling to be idle
spectators of a contest where their happiness depends on the success of British arms; we were also unwilling to enter as common
seamen on board his Majesty's ships or as soldiers in the army, as
most of us were by birth and education, gentlemen.7 4
As shown, there were a number of motivational elements that came
into play when people made the decision to remain loyal and support
the king. To summarize on the issue of negative opportunism and selfinterest versus public virtue, loyalists simply were not prompted in
their actions by the former. For the merchanthariner class in particular, the state of trade and privateering during the first years of
the war certainly negated profit oriented opportunistic self-interest
being an element in their decision making process. Furthermore, their
later actions attest to their sincere desire to play a part in the war
effort and illustrate their high level of virtue.
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CHAPTER 3

"GENTLEMEN WELL DISPOSED TO HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT:"

THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION'

The Chesapeake Bay region witnessed the most extensive and serious active involvement of loyalist mariners during the first two years
of the rebellion. There, a large number of individuals who would later
be part of the privateering community as owners, captains, and common
seamen rallied around Virginia Governor, John Murry, Lord Dunmore's
standard, offering assistance to the royal cause. Primarily, the men
whose identities are known were from Virginia, but a number from Maryland became active as well. Largely urban and coastal and dominated by
members of the merchant and mariner classes, there was also healthy
leavening of individuals from other backgrounds in this group. Men of
foreign birth were very much in evidence, as were ethnic and racial
elements. Motivated by various factors, most displayed their proBritish stance at a fairly early date. Some, however, were decidedly
neutral at first, and there is some evidence of equivocal behavior.
Regardless, most suffered significantly in one way or another for
maintaining pro-British sentiments and ultimately siding with them.
As

elsewhere along the North American coast, a weak Royal Navy

presence existed in the Bay, and like other governors, Dunmore believed a stronger naval showing would help maintain control of his
colony and protect the persons and property of those who remained
loyal. As early as May 1, 1775, Dunmore wrote both Vice Admiral Samuel
Graves and General Thomas Gage requesting additional naval support.2 On
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June 8, with control rapidly slipping from his grip, Dunmore, fearing
for the safety of his family and himself, fled Williamsburg and sought
sanctuary on H.M.S.

Fowey at Yorktown. There, H.M. Sloop Otter and

H.M.S. Mercury joined him and shortly after, British naval operations
against the rebels began.

A

July 7th report indicates the Otter would

cruise the coast in search of rebel provision vessels, and although
Dunmore could have had no knowledge of it at the time, such activities
were about to be authorized in London.3 As of July 1, the navy was to
establish a loose blockade with squadrons focusing on key points along
the North American coast.4 On July 5, William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth
and Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote Dunmore notifying the
governor that Admiral Graves's instructions were
to exert the most vigorous Efforts for suppressing the Rebellion
now openly avowed & supported in that Country, & to seize and detain all Ships & Vessels belonging to the Inhabitants thereof,
such only excepted as are the Property of persons who are friepds
of Government, & have shewn an Attachment to the Constitution.
These directives took the mandates of the Restraining Acts a step further in that all rebel vessels, whether trading or not, became subject
to seizure. While loyalist vessels were not to be molested, these instructions in no way should be interpreted to mean that they would be
allowed to carry on trade. In addition, naval forces were to protect
all loyal subjects and their property.6
In September, additional instructions were sent from London concerning naval operations and the roles the governors were to play in
them, One directive empowered Royal Navy officers to demand provisions
from colonists, offering a fair market price in return. If the offer
was refused, then, necessary items could be taken by force.7 Also, because of fears that large rebel merchant bottoms would be converted
into men-of-war, the navy was authorized to confiscate their masts and
rudders or otherwise disable them.' Of more importance, however, was
the circular directive sent to the governors reminding them that His

Majesty's vessels were only to be used for purposes assigned by the
Admiral, thus undercutting local authority and control.9 These orders,
in combination with the Restraining Acts and those issued in July,
were intended not only to create a blockade and bring to a stop all
rebel maritime trade, but prevent the insurgents from acting offensively with warships of their own.
Throughout the remainder of his campaign, Dunmore remained uneasy about not having sufficient naval vessels for his goals.10 Only
six spent any amount of time with the governor, and there were never
more than four at any one point. Furthermore, these vessels were not
only responsible for the Chesapeake region. They were required to
cover the Delaware Bay and the North Carolina Outer Banks as well. The
navy was stretched thin, and Dunmore had grounds for concern. To counteract this deficiency, he would increasingly rely on loyalist craft
and personnel to augment his force.11 Fortunately, there was considerable local talent to draw upon.
While naval plans were being formulated, on August 23, George I11
issued His "Proclamation for Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition." This
document would be of considerable importance for future privateersmen.
Of significance were the following passages.
To the end therefore that none of our subjects may neglect or violate their duty through ignorance thereof, or through any doubt of
the protection which the law will afford to their loyalty and
zeal, we have thought fit ...to issue this our Royal Proclamation,
hereby declaring, that not only all our officers, civil and military, are obliged to exert their utmost endeavours to suppress
such Rebellion, and bring the traitors to justice; but that all
our subjects of this realm, and the dominions thereunto belonging,
are bound by law to be aiding and assisting in the suppression of
such Rebellion,...and we do accordingly strictly charge and command all our officers, as well civil as military, and all other
our obedient and loyal subjects, to use their utmost endeavours to
withstand and suppress such Rebellion [ .] l2
On July 15, Dunmore had shifted his base of operations to the
Elizabeth River between Norfolk and Portsmouth, both towns being centers of loyalist activity.13 There, he hired the first of a number of

loyalist vessels, the William and then the Eilbeck (later the Dunmore)
to augment his flotilla.14 By September, loyalists were beginning to
join the governor seeking protection and offering support. Over the
following months, numerous loyalists gathered under the royal banner
that flew over what was fast becoming a floating town due to the accumulation of shipping which at times would total over one hundred vessels.15

A

number of these individuals, representative of all social

classes, would later be involved in privateering in one way or another.
A

large element of the Norfolk/Portsmouth merchant class sup-

ported Dunmore. Included in this respectable and established group
were Jonathan Eilbeck, Roger and Robert Stewart, William Calderhead,
Hector MacAlister, Robert Gilmour, Hugh Miller, Thomas Farrar, John
Begg, Neil Jamieson, and Robert Sheddon.16 Merchant George Blair from
nearby Smithfield offered his assistance as well. 17 This was a tight
group unified by common bonds. At least half were Scots.18 Ten were
first generation colonists of whom none had arrived earlier than the
last French war.lg Some still maintained strong family and business
ties with Britain. Neil Jamieson, undoubtedly the wealthiest of the
group, was factor for the Glasgow firm of Glassford, Gordon,
eth

&

&

Monti-

Co., as well as being a junior partner. 20 Robert Sheddon was a

partner in his brother's operation, John Sheddon

&

Co., also in Glas-

gow.21
Within the immediate Norfolk/Portsmouth band there were also
strong commercial, social, and family ties. Sheddon did business with
Calderhead and MacAlister.22 Calderhead was part owner with Gilmour and
Jamieson in a distillery.23 Jamieson and MacAlister had business ties. 24
Sheddon, Jamieson, and the Stewarts, at least, lived in close proximity to each other. 25 Of course, Roger and Robert Stewart were broth-

er~.'~As will be seen, other significant business and family ties existed as well with Robert Sheddon.
Being relatively recent immigrants to the colonies, the majority
of these men had not had time to acculturate. Their sentiments towards
Britain undoubtedly remained strong. In fact, they were in many ways
still more British than American. This, in association with the strong
personal and business bonds between themselves and the mother country
certainly helps explain, at least in part, their decisions to remain
loyal.27
Jamieson was also well connected with important loyalist merchants elsewhere, who would be involved in privateering. Such included
James Anderson and Nathaniel Coffin of Massachusetts, and Hugh and Alexander Wallace of New yorkm2'
Another link was that as merchants these men were closely associated with seafaring. Almost all were ship owners.29 A few still commanded vessels. Roger and Robert Stewart described themselves as sailors and shipmasters who had advanced themselves.30 Hugh Miller was a
sea captain as well as a merchant.31 Other Virginia skippers joining
Dunmore were Willoughby Morgan and, from the Eastern Shore, William
Picket who sailed for Sheddon.32 From Maryland came Captains Thomas
Slater of Baltimore and Joseph ~ a ~ l a n dIn. addition,
~~
though their
colony of residence is unknown, there were Captains Charles McDonald,
John Buchanan, and James Ridley. 34
Joining Dunmore too were elements of Virginia's middle class
such as shopowners John Lownds and John Carmont, and

Royal Navy vet-

eran turned shoemaker, John Muirhead. Carmont and Muirhead were also
first generation colonists from scotland.35
Of those future privateersmen who joined Dunmore from the lowest
of social classes, the slaves, the names of two, those belonging to
Mary Rotherway and Roger and Robert Stewart, are not known. Rother-

way's, however, gained his freedom from Dunmore. The Stewarts', along
with six of their other slaves, had been raised from a boy specifically to be a mariner.36 George Mills, only five years a slave in Virginia from the Guinea coast, ran away and gained his freedom as well
by joining the governor. Unfortunately, it is not known if he ever
served on a privateer. In his brief postwar memorial, however, he
stated that he spent the entire war at sea, without reference to naval
service, making it quite possible he served aboard such a vessel. 37
Of interest is the fact that some of these men were initially
sympathetic to the rebel cause. Jamieson signed the non-importation
agreement in 1770, and during the Tea Crisis, he even cooperated so
far as to send back a shipment of that commodity consigned to himself.38 In 1774, he, Sheddon, and Gilmour were members of the Norfolk
Committee of Correspondence.39 Jamieson was later on the Norfolk Borough Committee to enforce the Articles of the Continental Association.40 Sheddon signed the non-importation agreement as well in 1774 or
1775.
By late 1775, though unhappy with the situation in general,
Jamieson displayed loyalist preferences and an attachment to Dunmore.
He thought little of the rebels, and was so uneasy, he was prepared to
pull up stakes and leave if need be. With his trade goods aboard ship,
Jamieson slept with loaded arms and claimed he could depart within
thirty minutes notice. Still, he had enough faith in the British putting down the rebellion that he went so far as to order a shipment of
goods contrary to the association in mid-November.42
Jamieson's situation was interesting. As a man of great wealth
capable of extending considerable credit, he was actively courted by
the rebels as well as the British. Ultimately, however, Dunmore received the benefit of Jamieson's wealth. With loans totaling 530,000,
Jamieson made it possible for the Governor to supply his fleet. He

also worked surveying and appraising vessels taken into government
service and contracting for shipments of supplies.43
Some, such as MacAlister, Blair, and Carmont joined Dunmore
early, seemingly without hesitation, as active supporters.4 4 Both Blair
and MacAlister were granted captain's commissions

-

Blair in the

Queen's Loyal American Regiment and MacAlister in the Ethiopian Battalion.45 The latter also served as paymaster for Dunmore.46 Carmont and
Begg fought with the British at Great Bridge in December.47
For joining the British, all for whom the information is available, lost considerably in the way of real estate, debts owed, personal property, business, and merchandise, and this, in turn, undoubtedly solidified their loyal stance all the more. 48 Although comparatively minimal in amount, even runaway slave George Mills claimed a
loss of £10, which for him was considerable.4 9 Having joined Dunmore,
they continued to suffer at the hands of the rebels, which could only
have strengthened their resolve. MacAlister and Sheddon lost vessels
and cargoes for violating the association.50 Jamieson's and Sheddon's
houses and other Portsmouth properties were burned.

Begg, Carmont,

Blair, and Muirhead were all captured by the rebels, and the last
three were badly treated.52 Blair spent over twelve months in close
confinement, often in irons, until making his escape.53 Carmont, after
being convicted of bearing arms against the colony and then refusing
to help the rebels dig entrenchments, was tied with his arms around a
tree in freezing weather. With the circulation cut off and severely
frost bitten, he never regained the proper use of his hands. 54
At the same time, the strength of their convictions did not
waiver when they suffered reverses at the hands of the British. The
Royal Navy seized a vessel in which Jamieson had invested." On
Dunmore's orders, Calderhead scuttled three of the five vessels containing his wares and personal effects due to a lack of men to sail

them. 56 Sheddon lost two vessels and cargo in the same manner. 57 As if
Carmont had not suffered enough, while imprisoned, the vessel containing all his merchandise was also lost or destroyed with Dunmore.58
Interestingly enough, there were those who joined the British
despite what could be defined as ill-treatment at their hands. One of
these was Thomas Slater, On a return voyage from Granados to Virginia,
his brigantine, the Betsey, was. stopped by the Royal Navy and his crew
pressed. His voyage effectively over, Slater, although ill-used by the
navy, still offered his services to Dunmore. Then, after sitting idle
a while, the Betsey herself was pressed into service as a tender under
direct naval command. After fitting her out at his own expense for
this new role, Slater stayed with his vessel in a subordinate capacity.59
As is to be expected with such established and respectable men,
a number are known to have had families. Falling in this group were

Muirhead, Eilbeck, Morgan, Wayland, Jamieson, Sheddon, and Calderhead.60 When Jamieson departed the colony, it was necessary to leave
his wife, Fernelia, behind. As late as 1780, she was still in Virginia. Although the sources are vague, Eilbeckls wife may have remained as well. 61
Upon leaving Virginia, the vast majority of these men made their
way to New ~ o r k .
A ~few,
~ such as Sheddon, Eilbeck, and Morgan, went to
Bermuda.63 Roger Stewart returned to scotland.64
Most of these men, Calderhead, Gilmour, Sheddon, MacAlister,
Farrar, Begg, Jamieson, Eilbeck, Miller, Blair, and Lownds would go on
to invest in privateers.65 Picket, Muirhead (who would also serve again
in the Royal Navy), Slater, Wayland, McDonald, Buchanan, and Ridley
would become captains.66 The Stewart brothers would also own a privateer with one of them acting as skipper.67 In addition to being a part
owner, Morgan served in the capacity of a lesser officer aboard such

vessels, and for a while, commanded his own vessel, either a privateer
itself or a tender to one.68 Carmont appears to have acted as a common
seaman. 69 As far as is known, those who came from the slave community
acted as common seamen as well.70

Not all Virginia loyalists left with Dunmore. Some departed at
an early date without any affiliation with the Governor. John Sheddon,
brother of Robert, returned to Glasgow, Scotland, earlier when hostilities commenced.71 Another Scottish partner in the Sheddon firm was
John Sym of Smithfield, Virginia, who, because of the political unrest, returned to North Britain at an early date as well.72 Sym also
acted as factor for his kinsman, Andrew Sym, another merchant who had
spent time in Virginia, but had returned to Scotland at an earlier
date. 7 3 Andrew, with whom

Sheddon also conducted business, would soon

be heard from on the North American coast.74
There was also Emanuel Walker, another business associate of
Jamieson's. Walker resided in Petersburg where, though principal factor for the British firm of Spiers, Bowman,

&

Co., he had earned a

reputation as a rigid supporter of the Continental Association. By
early 1776, however, he had seemingly had enough and asked permission
from the Committee of Safety to leave the colony. That body granted
Walker's request on March 2, and he left for Philadelphia. Like so
many others, after first going to Glasgow, too, he would make his way
to New York and be involved in privateering as an owner.75
Typical of many Virginia loyalists, these men were Scottish immigrant merchants linked by both family and business ties to each
other and Britain. While John Sheddon and John Sym are not known to
have been involved in privateering, they were part of the web, and

their return home must have reinforced the ties to Britain of their
relatives, Robert and Andrew, who did enter into the activity.
Others who behaved themselves managed to maintain a neutral position and remain until early 1777. A t that time, however, being accused of "seducing and corrupting the minds of the people

...and giving

intelligence to the enemy," first generation British merchants who
would not confirm their allegiance to the rebels were required by an
Act of Assembly to depart within forty days after January 1, 1777.76
Merchants William Sheddon of Tappahanock (kinsman of Robert), Daniel
Fraser, a French and Indian War veteran, of Petersburg, and Henry
Mitchell of Fredericksburg, all left and made their way to New York.
Sheddon then went to Bermuda. Like so many in the exodus with Dunmore
or earlier, not only were these men recent immigrants, they were all
Scots as well. Also leaving for New York was immigrant merchant John
Begg who had earlier served with Dunmore until captured. After three
months imprisonment, the rebels released Begg on parole, but he later
refused to take the oath. Like the earlier group, this party lost
heavily in terms of money and property.77
Sheddon had run afoul of the rebels once already. Suspected of
having supplied Dunmore with provisions, the Essex County Committee
investigated his activities in November, 1775. Though acquitted, Sheddon's situation remained unpleasant, and one gets the impression the
Act requiring him to leave came at a time when life in Virginia for
men of his ilk was becoming unbearable. Prior to departure he was exposed "to the Resentment of the violent" and he often "experienced
ill-usage and injurious Treatment. "78
Of interest is the story of John Martin of Botetourt County. A
prosperous landowner and veteran of Lord Dunmore's War against the Indians in 1774, Martin managed to maintain a peaceful existence for the
first year of the war despite his support of the King. In 1776, how-

ever, the rebels "drafted" him for military service. Given his situation in a "Rebellious part of the Country,'' he felt obliged to accept
conscription and play along until an opportunity presented itself to
join the British. Unfortunately, the British did not arrive as expected and Martin spent many months serving in Georgia and South Carolina. Unable to return to Virginia and loath to actually fight with
the rebels against the British, when the chance to desert arose, he
took it. Getting aboard a ship for the West Indies, Martin made St.
Lucia. There, after first sailing on a smuggler, he signed articles to
serve on a privateer.79
One final Virginia loyalist must be mentioned, merchant and
landowner Samuel Martin. Martin is of interest because though born in
Virginia, he relocated to Whitehaven, Scotland, years before the war.
There, he conducted business operations which included a large trade
with his native colony, considerable shipping interests, and the management of at least a large portion of the family's Virginia properties totaling over 9,700 acres. Of course, he suffered heavy losses in
these areas. Martin, a relative of Governor Josiah Martin of North
Carolina, was important enough to have the ear of men such as John
Montagu, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty and William
Knox, Under Secretary to Lord George Germain. Though absent from Vir-

ginia during Dunmore's campaign, Martin was, nevertheless, somewhat
involved. While on a trading voyage to that colony, one of his vessels, the Unicorn, was taken into ministerial service by the Governor. 8 0
Throughout the war, Virginia slaves continued to make their escape to the British lines. Many, such as James Dalkeith, Isaac Bailey,
Benjamin Smith, Tom King, Maxwell Roy, Titus, James Jackson, Jack
Robinson, and Southey served aboard loyalist privateers. 8 1 Slaves in
Maryland did the same. Four known to have served as crewmen were

Isaac, owned by Alice Rous, and Daniel, Charles, and Abram, owned by
William Bell. 82
Maryland produced other privateers as well, some of whom have
already been mentioned. Another whose trials were similar to John Martin's was Robert Begnal of Georgetown. Although it is unclear if Begnal was an immigrant or second generation, he was of Irish extraction.
Because he refused to take the rebel oath of allegiance he was assessed triple taxes for a period of three years; the rebels believing
this would coerce him into line. When this plan failed, they conscripted Begnal for a nine month term of service with the militia. At
this juncture, the loyalist had two choices. He could submit to the
rebels or escape. Even though he realized he would lose a great deal
of his property by doing so, he opted to leave. He proceeded to load
his family and what valuables he could on his "Schooner Flattn and
sail for Portsmouth, Virginia. There, he made contact with the British
under Benedict Arnold who promptly commandeered his vessel for government service. Begnal lost all. Following a stint in the Commissary Department at Charlestown, South Carolina, Begnal and his family arrived
destitute in New York. There, in an effort to provide for them, he
signed on a privateer. Shortly after, he was taken prisoner, forcing
his wife and child to petition the British for relief to keep from
starving.83
Daniel Chamier, originally from a well-to-do London family, was
also a Maryland resident, having arrived in 1753. Described as honorable, friendly, hospitable, and philanthropic, Chamier removed to New
York where he became Auditor and Comptroller of Accounts for the army.
He also invested in a privateer before dying in December, 1778.'~
James Anderson, a mariner from Fell's Point (Baltimore), was a
very equivocal loyalist. Not only did he willingly take the rebel
oath, he willingly joined their forces and was made a lieutenant on a
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galley. Because his zealous conduct was viewed so favorably, he was
ultimately given his own command. What happened next that precipitated
a change in allegiance is unknown, but Anderson proceeded to sail his
vessel to New York and deliver her to the British. When next heard
from, he commanded a loyalist privateer. 85
There were yet other men from the Bay area who, although they
did not join Dunmore, would make their way to New York and pursue privateering. Benedict Byrne was a mariner from either Virginia or Maryland, who, before becoming a privateer captain, served in a provincial
unit, was captured, escaped to New York, and there acted as a pilot. 8 6
David Carcand of Calvert County, Maryland, was a planter, but he was
also "Bred to Sea." His nautical experience allowed him to pursue his
later role as sailing master on an armed vessel. 87
Two other Maryland loyalists were merchants, Anthony Stewart and
his father-in-law/partner James Dick. At the time the war started,
Dick had already faced problems with the rebels for at least several
years. In 1770, one of his vessels, the Good Intener, prevented from
unloading in the colony, was forced to return with her cargo. Stewart
is particularly noteworthy for having been the owner of the Pegqy
Stewart carrying tea consigned to Annapolis in October 1774. For this,
the mob confronted Stewart and forced him to sign a paper saying he
was sorry for the offense and would, along with the Williams brothers
who owned the tea, set fire to the vessel and its cargo. This he did,
destroying a brigantine valued at £1,500. Apparently this was not penance enough, for he was continually threatened and finally forced to
flee in 1775. Both he and Dick would go to New York. Dick would become
a privateer owner and Stewart would serve with the Associated Loyalists.88
Finally, there was no less a figure than Robert Alexander, lawyer, who was a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1775. Though

against British taxation, he was also against "republican Government"
and the use of violence. Opting for "Constitutional Correctionw as the
solution to the problem with Britain, he withdrew from Congress when
independence was declared. Forced to give up his law practice because
he would not take the oath, he left Maryland in August, 1777, to join
the British at Philadelphia and ultimately go to New York. There, he
would serve on the Board of the Associated Loyalists.89
Like other Virginians and Marylanders, a number of these men are
known to have lost considerably in terms of personal property, real
estate, etc.

Furthermore, families suffered. Begnal's situation has

already been recounted. For Carcand, who left his family behind,
losses resulted in their being in "Great Di~tress."~~
Stewart and Alexander were also forced to leave their wives and numerous children.92
Although the merchant/mariner class was the dominant element,
the Virginia and Maryland privateers exhibited a cross-section of regional society by including others of varied occupational, economic,
and class background, ethnic elements, and racial minorities. A small
degree of equivocalness and neutral behavior (acceptable and understandable under the circumstances) was detectable, and a number of motivational factors came into play when making the decision to become
active loyalists. These included the tenuous security offered by a
British presence at Norfolk. Also, these men were the recipients of a
considerable amount of rebel abuse, which either provoked them to take
the course they took or reinforced positions already taken.
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CHAPTER 4

"A SPIRITED, ACTIVE, INDUSTRIOUS FAMILY:"

THE GOODRICHES OF VIRGINIA'

During the summer and early fall of 1775, while Dunmore was attempting to buttress the royal presence, another important sequence of
events was transpiring, the consequences of which rebel merchants and
mariners would come to have cause to regret. Though perhaps an extreme
example, as this complex yarn shakes out, the reader will get an idea
of the trials suffered by at least one family during the revolution.
The Goodriches began the war in support of the rebels, acting on their
behalf. An error in judgement, however, and the consequent overreaction by the rebels to it (quite probably fueled by negative personal
factors) resulted in serious persecution of the family. This had the
affect of forcing them from the rebel camp and into the arms of the
British where they would become extremely influential in shaping the
course of the war at sea. The familyf transformation, however, was
gradual due to compounding events and circumstances in which they
found themselves caught in the middle.
On June 14, 1775, Thomas Newton, Jr., burgess delegate for Norfolk, Virginia, informed William Goodrich that Treasurer Robert Carter
Nicholas wanted to discuss a business deal with him.2 William, (Billie)
Goodrich, "a well made lusty Man, about 34 Years of Age [sic], about 5
Feet 8 or 9 Inches high, stoop shouldered, smooth faced, full eyed,
[who] sometimes looks redish about the Eyes, and generally wears short
light or yellow coloured curly Hair," was the second son of John Good-

rich, Sr. and brother of John, Jr. (Johnie), Bartlet, and Bridger.3 By
the eve of the revolution, this family, descended from ancestors who
arrived in Virginia in the 1630s, was well established and successful
as both landowners and merchant mariners. 4 The elder Goodrich's holdings were extensive. In Portsmouth alone, he owned three lots of land
and eighteen structures (plus outbuildings) which included (some serving dual functions) seven dwellings, six warehouses, one store, six
artisan shops, and a wharf. In the countryside, he possessed six estates with considerable livestock and land totaling 1,915 acres. In
Alexandria, he owned two lots with two more houses and another store.
In addition, he had well over thirty adult slaves, at least eleven of
whom were seamen.5
The family also owned twelve merchant vessels said to trade the
world over, but especially in the West Indies. Probably inclusive of
the twelve, they were concerned in a total of twenty-three merchantmen. As mariners they were acknowledged as perhaps the best the region
had to offer. Four of the adult males were described as being fully
acquainted with every inch of the Chesapeake Bay and its numerous
tributaries. These four were also said to display a "genius" for ship
design and construction.6
Furthermore, the Goodriches favored the rebel cause. As of May,
1774, John, Sr. was a member of the joint Norfolk-Portsmouth Committee
of Correspondence, and on at least one occasion, a Goodrich vessel
conveyed messages between committees.7 Goodrich also supported the Continental Association and actively urged individuals such as Jonathan
Ewing to sign the agreement as well. 8
For the deal about to be proposed to William, the Goodriches
seemed the perfect choice. They possessed every quality needed, including one final and very necessary ability. As mariners, they were
involved in an activity so many of their calling participated in,

smuggling. John, Sr. was actually known as a "famous Contraband Man,"
and because of this, as early as May 21, 1775, Richard Henry Lee suggested that he was the one for the job in question.9
Representing the family's company, William traveled to Williamsburg a day or two after receiving word from Newton, and there met with
Nicholas. Virginia desperately needed gunpowder, and William, undoubtedly due to his skills as a mariner and smuggler with considerable
trade connections, was asked to take bills of exchange valued at
£5,000 sterling, proceed to the West Indies, and purchase all he
could. A letter outlining Billie's instructions indicated that a great
deal of faith was placed in his abilities with "no doubt." Furthermore, the directive said, -we must rely altogether for your endeavours
for the best as it is impossible for me to say what is the [beslt
method to take in the islands[; I] therefore leave it to you to transact this matter as you think [best] for the good of the voyage." In
essence, William was given carte blanche to do whatever was necessary
to obtain the gunpowder and make the transaction. Also included in the
letter was a list of contacts, including a Mr. Isaac Van Dam, and the
directive that William should make one of his brothers privy to the
situation in case of accident and the need for someone else to take
over.10
William did not jump at the opportunity. He had doubts and was
apprehensive. When told the powder was to be obtained at any price, he
requested confirmation from the Assembly. He also questioned his personal safety, asking whether or not his life would be in jeopardy by
undertaking the voyage. Newton and Nicholas assured him it would not,
but did admit the possibility of William losing his vessel. In light
of the situation and William's experience, both the question and reply
seem rather odd.''

So, a smuggler was hired to smuggle, and on July 14, 1775, William Goodrich, in a sloop commanded by James Eastwood, set sail on a
voyage that would permanently effect his life, his family's lives, and
perhaps the lives of everyone else involved in maritime trade in North
America and the islands.12
William's voyage was a relatively lengthy one, lasting until October, because of the difficulty he had obtaining powder. His first
stop was Antigua where he sold £500 or £550 worth of bills of exchange
for cash. Next, he went to St. Eustatia where he sold another £2,000
and deposited £500 in cash with Isaac Van Dam, one of the contacts
designated in the instructions. Van Dam was to use it to pay for powder procured and shipped by a Mr. Bartrand at St. Pierre, Martinico.
Van Dam would then hold it in readiness for a vessel to pick it up and
carry it to Virginia. William then sailed to Martinico in an effort to
locate more powder, but once there, finding none and believing he was
watched by suspicious British officers, he left and, via other French
islands, returned to St. Eustatia. There, he found that Bartrand had
managed to get 1,800 pounds of powder and William also managed to buy
750 pounds more from a French schooner. Finally, in the proverbial
eleventh hour, "a small English Guinea Ship" arrived from which another 1,600 pounds was obtained. This brought the total to 4,150
pounds of explosives. The transaction with the Guineaman is of further
interest.13
Before continuing, however, it is necessary to backtrack a bit
and discuss another related event. At some point, and indicative of
the faith the Virginia rebels placed in the Goodriches' abilities, the
Virginians contracted with John, Jr. for a second shipment of goods.
This time, the family was to procure and run in a cargo of coarse linens. For this venture, they were not advanced any funds.1 4

While William was searching for powder, Bartlet was also in the
West Indies making transactions of his own. At Antigua, he had encountered the Guineaman first, and aware of the powder she carried and his
brother's search for the same, he offered to purchase it. This same
vessel, however, also carried a small amount of British textiles,
white lead, and linseed oil, and her Captain agreed to sell the powder
only on the condition that Bartlet take the entire cargo, the textiles
included. Of course, as British goods, these articles were proscribed
from importation by the Articles of Association. Despite this, because
of the need for powder and the difficulty in getting it, Bartlet
agreed to the transaction. The Guineaman then sailed to St. Eustatia
where the bargain was completed and for some reason, the cargo was
briefly transferred to an intermediary vessel, the schooner Fanny,
Robert Connoway, Master. Connoway, in turn, passed the powder to William. It need be noted that Bartlet did not make the transaction without making a profit himself. Having paid between three shillings and
three shillings, nine pence per pound for the powder, he charged William four shillings, six pence per pound. Although it must have seemed
of little consequence at the time, this deal would cause the family
considerable problems. 15
Meanwhile, in Virginia, in October, affairs began to warm with
the British becoming increasingly aggressive in response to rebel
military buildup. Early in the month, for their exploits, the Governor
and his naval associates were being called "pirates and banditti" by
the rebels.16 On October 12, Dunmore's troops began a series of successful forays up rivers into the surrounding countryside to relieve
the rebels of stores of arms, ordnance, and munitions. 17 Also, at some
point in late September or early October, without any authority for
taking such action, the Governor created an ad hoc Vice-Admiralty
Court to deal with the prizes being brought in. Lacking a judge, five

commissioners were appointed to oversee matters. As of October 5, at
least two prizes had been condemned.''
While contemporary rebel and later historical accounts give the
impression Dunmore's raiders, also styled "harpiesn and "sheepstealersn by the revolutionaries, committed heinous depredations, all

indications are that at this time and for months to come, forays
ashore were conducted merely to seize war materials and a printing
press, procure food and fuel for the growing number of people in
Dunmore's floating town, bring off slaves, and rescue stranded loyalists. As late as February 26, 1776, naval officers were still directed
to first offer payment for provisions from the populace. Property damage seems to have been minimal and confined to such things as the occasional outbuilding storing grain. There are no references to the
theft or destruction of other forms of personal property, nor are
there any accounts of physical abuse.19
The Governor was also aware of rebel smuggling activities and
knew an attempt to run in gunpowder was afoot. Furthermore, he knew
Billie was somehow involved in the later undertaking- In an effort to
intercept the shipment, Dunmore had two prizes (condemned by the Admiralty Court but not sold) fitted out as tenders (small auxiliary craft
taken into government service to act in consort with the naval vessels) to cruise for the powder vessel and other smugglers.20
On October 1, William sailed for the mainland with his cargo of
powder, a small assortment of weapons, and a parcel of shot, for which
he had spent £1,501.4.0, West Indian Currency (slightly over £850
sterling). The remaining amount of money he entrusted to Van Dam to
purchase additional powder, which he would store until William returned to pick it up. On October 9, Billie made Ocracoke on the North
Carolina Outer Banks. He then proceeded up the sounds to the Pasquotank River where he safely off-loaded the powder and a large quantity

of legal osnaburgs brought in on his own account. From there, William
headed for Norfolk to see Newton, but before arriving, he was warned
that Dunmore was looking for him and, in any case, Newton was not
there. So, he went to the family home in Portsmouth only to be told
the family had moved inland to one of their plantations. At the same
time, William received a second tip that Dunmore was searching for
him, because of his efforts to obtain powder for the rebels. So, off
William went again to the next refuge where he spent a day or two with
family before moving on to Williamsburg. According to William's own
account, while en route to the capital, he happened to meet Newton to
whom he gave a full account of the venture, and who, upon hearing
about it, seemed satisfied with matters as he should have been at this
point in the affair. William was then directed by Newton to continue
on to Williamsburg to meet with Nicholas and present the same account
to him. This was done with Nicholas also being satisfied with what he
had been told. William then returned home to move his pregnant wife,
"looking to layin in the corse of a month or solw to the care of a
midwife.21
Despite his knowledge that an effort to smuggle powder was in
progress and that William was involved, Dunmore seemingly had little,
if any, solid, specific information upon which to act. He later
claimed he knew of John, Sr.'s involvement, but James Parker later
stated that Dunmore had refused to believe anything ill of the elder
Goodrich, and so, he felt very deceived upon learning of his participation in the scheme. This tends to indicate the Governor had been
suspicious of Goodrich at some point and had confronted him, but Goodrich must have convinced him of his lack of personal involvement. Had
Dunmore believed family members, other than William, were party to the
undertaking, it seems likely he would have acted against them. Yet,
John, Sr. and John, Jr. appear to have gone about their business with-

out any personal interference. On October 15, however, the situation
changed. On that date, while John, Sr. was on the coast keeping watch
for his returning vessels to help facilitate their entry through the
blockade, Dunmore intercepted the following letter written to Goodrich
by his son-in-law and sometimes business associate, Robert Sheddon.22
Sir
Johnie came up yesterday, and Set off about 2
O'clock this Morning for Nansemond - T.Hs. Boat could not
find the way in, and got safe up here - Johnie hired a
Vessel, which would Sail this day - Morris would be in
time to prevent any other Vessel, Returning except long
Splice with Salt from Turks Island, which is much wanted Johnie has placed several boats for to look out - I have
not heard from Nansemond Since Billie went up, but no
doubt the business is done - J. Webb set of to Secure the
papers &c and to push the Sloop out - The F. must now be
at Sea 10 or 11 Days - Bartlates Letters is not yet come
to hand - The Sloop Sailed this day fortnight and has a
considerable Value in Course Linens a Board which Billie
seemed resolute to have Secured, I beg't him to get W. Cr
to undertake it and not be seen himself in Sas it
might be a Means of discovering what Course to Stear Receive your shirt &c by Jupiter who goes to Conduct
Greenock and Luckie - I wish you may be so luckie as to
get a Sight of the Fto Secure her and the letters a
Shore to dessapoint the many Malicious Enemys you have,
who have made themselves bussie for your destruction Every thing remains quite here at present, take care of
yourself which is the only uneasiness we have now.- I am
Sir
Your Most Obedt. Servt
Robert sheddonZ3
Clearly indicating clandestine shipping operations and the Goodrichest
involvement, this letter enraged Dunmore, who immediately had Sheddon
and John, Jr. apprehended and brought before him where they met the
full force of the governor ' s violent wrath. 24 Under interrogation,
Sheddon somehow convinced Dunmore he had no involvement with or knowledge of the gunpowder. He declared his sole purpose in writing the
letter was to warn family and friends of potential trouble in an illadvised undertaking with the other cargoes, and so prevent their
ruin.25 Releasing Sheddon, Dunmore turned his attention to John, Jr.,
clearly implicated by the letter, who must have confessed to even
more, because he was clapped in irons in close confinement.26 In the

course of the confrontation, either Sheddon or Johnie explained the
abbreviated parts of the note. "T.Hs." was Thomas Hardwick, "F" referred to the schooner Fanny, "W.Cr." was Willis Cooper (Wills Cowper), and the "Sw pertained to ~ u f
Before continuing, several comments need be made about Sheddon's
very interesting missive. In the past, there has been, with good reason, some confusion about the number of vessels referred to and their
cargoes.28 While a number of craft are discussed, there are three either mentioned directly or alluded to that are of significance. First,
there was William's sloop with a cargo of gunpowder and osnaburgs
which had already made port on the Pasquotank ~iver." Then, there was
a second sloop with a valuable lading of coarse linens which had also
made port near, if not at, Suffolk, Virginia. 30 Her cargo undoubtedly
consisted of the textiles the rebels had contracted for. These, valued
at £840 and for which the family was owed £1,098, are known to have
been landed and sold in October.31 Finally, there was the schooner
Fanny carrying the enigmatic letters as well as an additional cargo of
osnaburgs.32 Like William's, these textiles seem to have been legal and
brought in on Bartlet's personal account. Combined, the brothers' personal cargoes consisted of 50,000 yards of osnaburgs valued at a very
tidy sum between £3,125 and £3,750. 33
Furthermore, some historians believe that the textiles referred
to were the same as those purchased illegally by Bartlet from the
Guineaman.34 Of course, this would constitute smuggling against the Articles of Association. In fact, not only is there no reference to the
textiles bought by Bartlet, those actually discussed do not match up
with the illicit textiles in either value or type. Their worth of only
£297.17.10 is certainly not comparable with the considerable value of
the osnaburgs and coarse linens known to have arrived.35 Furthermore,
the illicit textiles consisted of "Checks Cotton Ginghams Striped hol-
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land Jeans Scotch thread Printed Linens [and] Irish Linens" certainly
not osnaburgs or the coarse linens consisting of dowlas, Russia sheetThe
ing, and linen, as well as more osnaburgs of German man~facture.~~
bottom line is that there is no indication the illegal cargo was smuggled in at this time. As far as the rebels were concerned, all three
textile cargoes that did arrive were legitimate. It was Dunmore who
would have viewed the shipments as illegal and did.
Another interesting feature of the note is that given the fact
both sloops had already returned, and their cargoes were secure, the
only concern was for the Fanny and the "letters" she carried from
Bartlet. The exact nature of the "letters" will probably never be
known, but it is evident the family did not want them falling into the
wrong hands. There are, however, three possible interpretations as to
the identity of these mysterious items. First, it is possible they
were actual letters containing incriminating information the family
wished to keep secret, but this does not seem likely. If necessary,
such documents could easily be destroyed and the contents conveyed
verbally at a later date without loss and with no one the wiser. Secondly, the term "letters" could be a code word for smuggled goods, but
this makes little sense in light of the fact that other smuggled goods
are referred to directly as what they are in the same note. This
leaves the third and most logical explanation. The letters were letters of credit. Such would certainly have been of value and something
the family would not wish to destroy or have fall into the hands of
their enemies.
This leads to the question of the identity of the "many Malicious Enemys." Quite logically, the reference was to Dunmore, and obviously, he was a concern. He was certainly attempting to intercept
the gunpowder and other goods shipped by the Goodriches, and his efforts clearly gave the family cause for worry. Sheddon was undoubtedly

referring to Dunmore's possible interference when he stated he did not
want William to go to Suffolk to personally handle the transaction
with the coarse linens, because his presence "might be a Means of discovering what Course to Stear-." In essence, William's presence would
tip off Dunmore as to the location of that cargo. Also, John, Sr. was
on the coast in an effort to assist his incoming vessels from falling
into Dunmore's grasp.
Yet, there are agpects of the letter that strongly suggest
Dunmore was not the only enemy. Primarily the letter was an update of
information for John, Sr. on the state of affairs, but it also served
as a warning. Keeping in mind that Goodrich, Sr. was already acting to
keep his vessels from Dunmore, it is evident he was quite aware the
Governor was intent on causing trouble and certainly did not have to
be reminded of the fact. Furthermore, there is the wording of the letter. Despite the fact Sheddon's prose leaves a great deal to be desired, the phrase, "many Malicious Enemys you have, who have made
themselves bussie for your destruction" clearly indicates a fair number of people conspiring against Goodrich. Dunmore would constitute
only a single enemy. Also, the use of the word "Malicious" is of note
in that it conveys a personal element which would seem unlikely to exist between John, Sr. and the Governor. Finally, the phrase, "your destruction" conveys a sense of someone wanting to totally ruin the elder Goodrich in some manner.
At the time the letter was written, only two vessels remained
unaccounted for at sea, and only one of those, the Fanny, was seemingly of serious consequence to the family. Still, while the loss to
Dunmore of a single schooner and cargo, if not insured, and even the
letters, would have constituted a financial setback, perhaps even a
serious one, it would not have resulted in Goodrich's destruction,
monetarily or otherwise. The very real possibility of occasionally

losing a vessel under any circumstance was a risk every merchant mariner took and accepted.
Furthermore, all the family members were accounted for, safe,
and beyond the Governor's grasp at the time Sheddon wrote. So, Dunmore
did not present a personal threat at that time. In fact, it is highly
doubtful he had previously presented a personal threat at all to anyone but William, and even if he had apprehended Billie, it would not
have resulted in John, Sr.'s destruction. The governor was far more
concerned with intercepting the powder than with catching whoever
brought it in. Of course, this does not negate the fact that anyone
caught doing so was going to be in serious trouble. Still, Dunmore did
not consider John, Sr. to be involved, and if it was John, Sr., himself, who convinced him of this, the elder Goodrich knew the Governor
was a threat only if he was found out by being caught. That the family
members were able to go about their business unmolested shows Dunmore
was certainly not acting like someone bent on John, Sr.'s destruction,
and John, Sr. was not concerned as much with Dunmore as he was with
simply getting his cargo in safely. That Dunmore did not act until after intercepting Sheddon's letter adds considerable credence to this.
Also, the fact John, Jr. was, seemingly, so easily apprehended supports the idea that family members were little concerned about the
governor targeting them personally. In essence, while John, Sr. was
concerned about Dunmore in a general sense as a potential problem,
Dunmore was not concerned about John, St. in a specific sense. The
governor was a problem to the family only if they were caught.
All this tends to suggest that John, Sr. had personal enemies in
the rebel camp as well as political ones in the British. Someone in
Goodrich's position as a wealthy merchant had undoubtedly had a few
conflicts over the years with individuals in the course of simply conducting routine business. One we know of was no less a figure than

Robert Carter 111 who on two occasions was so displeased with the
Goodriches that he ceased conducting business with them altogether.37
One thing is certain. Someone informed on the family to Dunmore
about the powder. William was certainly of this belief. The rebel
leaders acknowledged the fact as well. An angry Edmund Pendleton implied the act was more than a slip of the tongue stating, "A villain
has given Lord Dunmore information of it." Considering the obvious
clandestine nature of the operation, whoever the culprit was, he must
have been fairly highly placed in the revolutionary government. 38
Accepting the Goodriches had personal enemies in the rebel camp,
the question remains whether the informer conveyed his intelligence
because the Goodriches, specifically, were involved, or simply because
the news of the powder itself was significant. Of course, the answer
will probably never be known. If the former, however, there is a clue
to what the malefactors intended. They wanted John, Sr., personally,
to be caught by Dunmore, hoping he would at least be imprisoned, if
not executed, for treason. This would certainly entail his destruction. Even if the informer and "Malicious Enemysn were unassociated,
Dunmore's being aware of the family's involvement could be used to advantage by the latter. It would be hoped John, Sr. would be caught,
and that possibility may have been actively promoted. Unfortunately
for any "Malicious Enemys," if this was part of their agenda, Dunmore
must have initially let them down by refusing to believe John, Sr. was
a party to the gunpowder scheme.

Of primary concern to the family at this point were the letters.
Of course, it is doubtful any rebel "Malicious Enemys" were aware of
their existence, but someone was clearly looking for some means of destroying John, Sr. Sheddon, aware of the enemies' intentions, knew the
letters offered the means of their doing so, and was duly anxious
about their safe arrival. Of course, this line of thought would indi-

cate there was something incriminating about the letters which the
family wished to keep the rebels from finding out about. What? The
most plausible explanation is, if they were letters of credit, which
seems likely, they probably indicated Bartlet had conducted other
business with the British in the islands. They might also indicate the
family would be doing business with political undesirables in Virginia. As such, their interception, in addition to resulting in a financial setback, could also result in John Sr.*s destruction. In essence, whatever incriminating evidence they contained could be used to
ruin his reputation and make it impossible for him to conduct business
within the existing political climate. At the same time, however, it
need be noted that such letters could only point to family members
having done business with British merchants or their intent to do so.
Because they were not a commodity, bringing them in, in and of themselves, could not be construed as going against the Association or being illegal in any other manner.
If the "Malicious Enemys" existed, which seems probable, they
were in a good position to see their goal of John, Sr.'s destruction
carried into effect. If matters worked out as they probably hoped, the
Governor would handle affairs for them, and they could avoid getting
their hands dirty. If this failed, they could continue their own efforts. The family may well have been caught between two groups of enemies.
Because of the family's reputation as smugglers, historians have
assumed that all their cargoes were illicit.39 There is no basis for
such assumptions, and to this point, one thing is apparent. There is
no evidence the Goodriches had done anything overtly wrong with regards to Virginia and the rebels. On the contrary, they had gone to a
great deal of trouble and personal risk to honor their two contracts,
and two of their vessels had imported an additional large quantity of

legal osnaburgs which could only have been of use to the Virginians.
Certainly, all seemed happy with the powder deal, and no one found
fault with the contract for coarse linens. The worst they could have
been accused of was conducting business with the enemy based on information gleaned from the letters. Even then, however, there is no indication of their actually smuggling anything and going against the
Articles of Association. Furthermore, during William's and Bartlet's
absence, John, Jr. went so far as to show his loyalty to the rebels by
passing on intelligence and warning them of a possible attack by
Dunmore on Williamsburg. 4 0
The Goodriches were, however, in serious trouble, having given
"mortal Offensen to Dunmore, who was "very violent", and who, having
John, Jr. in his power, possessed considerable leverage.4 1 Hearing of
his son's unhappy situation and undoubtedly concerned about his well
being, John, Sr. contacted Dunmore professing "his Sincere repentance
of what was past, and his earnest desire of returning to his duty."'*
He also sought an audience which was arranged. At this meeting Dunmore
made it clear that procuring the powder was a capital offense. Also,
although there is no indication the topic arose at this time, it could
hardly have escaped John, Sr.'s notice that a large part of his Portsmouth holdings, including his house, warehouses, stores, shops,
wharves, trade goods, and several vessels, were literally under Dunmore's guns. Threatened with an extreme loss of property in addition
to the seemingly very real possibility of losing a son, Goodrich, under duress, fell under Dunmore's control. His only choices were to put
on as good a face as possible, bow to the inevitable, attempt to
soothe Dunmore, try to talk his way out, comply with the Governor's
wishes, and hope for the best. In the manner of a true businessman,
John, Sr. offered the simple explanation that the powder deal was just
an opportunity for "a good freight." The whole affair was a business

matter and nothing more. This obviously was not enough, because Goodrich then made a serious proposition to Dunmore. He would offer up
William as a hostage while he, himself, sailed to the West Indies to
procure the powder and any remaining money for the Governor. Dunmore
agreed to this, and John, Sr. committed himself and his family to a
very dangerous game of walking a narrow path between the proverbial
rock and hard place. 43
William was brought on board Dunmore's ship to join Johnie by
October 31. At that time, the Governor applied pressure for more information. Intimidated, Billie offered additional details about his
voyage and dealings with Van Dam in a formal deposition.4 4
Armed with a pass from Dunmore, John, Sr. set off on in early
November to South Quay on the Black Water River to get William's
sloop, which had been moved there from the Pasquotank, and set sail
for St. Eustatia. He made it no further than Ocracoke Inlet where he
was stopped by a tender in Dunmore's service.4 5 The tender's captain, a
Mr. Jones, refused to acknowledge the pass on the grounds that Goodrich was known to the British to be an "old Rascal," and therefore,
Dunmore would never have issued such a document.4 6 It had to be a forgery. As a result, the British "Used him very Ill."" Soaking wet, and
without food, drink, bedding, or a change of clothes, Goodrich was
clapped in the hold of a vessel and kept there for a several days.
Following this, he was sent in his own sloop, possibly in irons, to
Norfolk. There, Dunmore, in exasperation, informed Jones of his error
in performing his job too well, and a new scheme was f~rmulated.~~
According to the new plan devised by Dunmore and the Goodriches,
William would be sent (seemingly under guard) on one of the naval tenders to obtain the powder and any remaining money. 4 9 Once he had obtained the funds, he was to use them to purchase arms and additional
powder for the British and then return any left over to Dunmore.50

John, Sr. and John, Jr. were paroled on the condition they report on
board Dunmore's ship every ten days.51 William sailed, probably in the
fourth week of November, and John, Sr. retired to his plantation on
the Nansemond River.52
William's account of his seizure by Dunmore, his father's efforts to go to St. Eustatia, and his own subsequent selection for the
task are of interest. While the basics of his story conform to other
known facts, the specifics he offered initially appear questionable.
In general, William recounted his being captured, John, Sr.'s attempts
to get to the islands and his being detained by Jones, and as a result, his (William's) being selected to make another effort. Beyond
this, however, Billie recounts these events in a very different and
somewhat strange light. He stated he was seized at 2:00 a.m. by a
party of eight men and an officer at one of his father's plantations
while en route back to St. Eustatia. He further stated that at that
time he had yet to see his father since his return from the West Indies and believed him to still be at the Capes. Then, William professed that when John, Sr. heard of his being taken, he picked up the
directions concerning the transaction with Van Dam and, taking over
the operation, sailed to St. Eustatia to complete the unfinished business. In the process, the elder Goodrich was captured by Jones. The
paperwork seized at the same time showed William had left a considerable amount of funds with Van Dam, and as a result, the younger Goodrich was ordered by Dunmore to retrieve the money and powder.53
As noted, these specifics do not fit the story as known, with
the result it initially appears William's account, written later when
a prisoner, was a fabrication perpetrated to get him off the hook.

Yet, there are indications, in some cases in the specifics themselves,
that William was telling the truth as he knew it. In essence, it seems
William did not know about his father's dealings with Dunmore, the

plan he would be held hostage, or his father's reasons for going to
St. Eustatia. If this is accepted, then William's account makes perfect sense.
Even William's assertion that Dunmore did not find out about the
remaining funds deposited with Van Dam until after John, Sr. was captured at Ocracoke is believable. Of course, Dunmore knew, having heard
it from John, Sr. who had probably received the information via Sheddon. William, however did not convey this fact in his deposition for
the governor, and consequently, if William was in the dark about the
whole affair, to his knowledge, this would have been the first time
Dunmore had become aware of the fact.54
That William was seized at 2:00 a.m. at one of his father's
plantations, a fair distance from Norfolk, supports the fact that he
had not been made privy to the scheme. First of all, the unnecessary
detail indicates the account, in itself, is true. Furthermore, according to Dunmore, John, Sr. was to insure William would be at a certain
place at a certain time to be apprehended. This being the case, if
William was aware of what was transpiring, it must be asked why a more
convenient time and location were not selected? It must also be asked
why William would make up such a yarn when undoubtedly, if he were
aware of the true nature of the situation, the explanation of acting
under duress with the threat of capital punishment, would have sufficed.
This leads to the final argument in support of the fact William
had no knowledge of what was going on. Having just spent a considerable amount of effort avoiding capture by Dunmore, why would he suddenly and willingly submit to imprisonment and the seemingly very real
possibility of facing execution, even if directed to do so by his father? To reiterate, it really does appear William had no idea of the
true nature of what was transpiring between his father and Dunmore.

Furthermore, the situation exemplifies the fact that the family members did not always conspire and act in concert.55
While John, Sr. attempted to clear the Outer Banks for St. Eustatia, son-in-law Robert caught up on his business correspondence,
which reflected exactly what he had come to think of the Articles of
Association and where he stood politically. On November, 9, he penned
a missive to his brother, John, in Glasgow, Scotland, patting himself
on the back for what he felt was the important assistance he had rendered Goodrich in the matter with Dunmore and stating he was in good
standing with the rebels. Next, Sheddon clearly indicated his preference for the Crown. Then, citing the profits made on the 50,000 yards
of osnaburgs brought in on William's sloop and the schooner Fanny, he
openly defied the non-importation agreement by advising his brother to
invest as much as possible in a large cargo of "every Necessary Arti-

cle

-

None of your Luxuryw and send it out to Virginia where there

were great demands and profits to be made. The intention was that another business associate in Glasgow, former Virginian Andrew Sym, also
be a partner in the venture. In a second letter to John dated the next
day, Robert again indicated there was a fortune to be made and suggested John Goodrich, Sr. might be brought in on the deal as an investor. It should be noted that there is no indication the matter had
been discussed with Goodrich. On the contrary, all evidence suggests
that Sheddon's father-in-law had no knowledge of the scheme. He was
only suggested as a possible alternative partner as an afterthought.
Goodrich was not referred to in this regard in the first letter, and
given the fact that at the time both were penned he was attempting to
sail to St. Eustatia, there was no opportunity for Sheddon to have
discussed the matter with him between November 9 and 10. The letter
does, however, indicate Sheddon's awareness of his father-in-law's
past and propensity for smuggling.56

For a man so involved in smuggling, Sheddon seems to have had
considerable problems when it came to successfully sending incriminating mail. These letters were intercepted as well. This time it was by
the rebels.57
By late October, the situation in Virginia was intensifying. On
the 27th, the British made a brisk but unsuccessful attack on Hampton
resulting in the loss of the Hawk, tender.58 In November, Virginia
troops began to move against Dunmore, and in an effort to hinder them,
several tenders cruised up the James River with H.M. Sloop King Fisher
to destroy the ferries at Jamestown Island and Burwell's Landing.59
Others sailed to take up station at strategic points to enforce the
blockade, "seising all that pass.n60 As of November 5 , a tender at Ocracoke had taken two prizes loaded with salt.61
On November 15, Dunmore used the occasion of his victory at
Kemp's Landing as reason to issue a proclamation written on the 7th
and held in readiness for the appropriate moment. This declared martial law and required all loyal subjects capable of bearing arms to
rally to him. Furthermore, "all indented Servants, Negroes or others,
(appertaining to Rebels,)" that could and would shoulder a musket
would be freed if they offered their service to the King. With this
proclamation, Dunmore drew his line in the sand forcing the populace
to decide their loyalties.62
By late November, "Tenders were plying up the Rivers, plundering
Plantations and using every Art to seduce the Negr~es."~~
All indications are that until the proclamation, and probably for some weeks
thereafter, the tenders in Dunmore's service were commanded and probably manned with Royal Navy personnel. The reliance on and increased
use of Loyalists to command and man tenders seems to stem from the issuing of the proclamation.

Early December witnessed Dunmore arming additional sloops and
schooners taken into government service for use as tenders.64 By late
in the month, at least three with loyalist commanders and crews were
at sea. Robert Stewart was captain of one, an eight or ten gun sloop.65
Affairs did not always go well for these vessels. The rebels captured
the other two while they were foraging and attempting to collect
stranded loyalists.66 Although some of the loyalist vessels serving
Dunmore were occasionally referred to as privateers, there is no indication the Governor ever exceeded his authority and issued letters of
marque. Furthermore, the loyalist tenders generally did not cruise on
their own as would a privateer. In most instances, they acted in consort with Royal Navy craft, thus placing them under the control of
professional British officers.
During this same time, Dunmore began raising two regiments of
troops, the Queen's Loyal Virginia Regiment from white Tories, and
Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment from blacks. On December 9, a nasty
and tragic action at Great Bridge resulted in a British defeat, forcing them to fall back on Norfolk. As the rebels advanced on that port,
local loyalists flocked to the Governor for refuge. There, with British and rebels confronting each other, matters were tense, and on
January 1, they came to a head. Caught between the opposing forces,
Norfolk was burned during an engagement in which both sides did their
best to intentionally level certain sections of the town for their own
reasons.
Meanwhile, with regards to the Goodriches, by early December,
individuals in the rebel camp were increasingly aware of the family's
ill-treatment at the hands of Dunmore and commented on it sympathetically.67 Others grew suspicious. Questions were asked about the Goodriches' contact with the Governor and their conduct concerning the
powder seemingly on his behalf. 6B In essence, the family' s association

and activities with the governor, regardless of the reason, were causing doubts. The reference to John, Sr. in the letter from Sheddon to
his brother must have raised a few eyebrows as well. Consequently, on
December 11, the Virginia Convention appointed a Committee headed by
James Mercer and including Newton, William Aylett, Richard Henry Lee,
Richard Bland, and others, "to enquire into the Conduct of John Goodrich William Goodrich and John Goodrich junr. relating to the importation of Gunpowder and other Articles for the use of this Colony.a69 It
should be noted there was no reference to Bartlet.
At some point in December, an event transpired that was undoubtedly the most disreputable act in a long series. The incident also illustrates the public's awareness of the family's activities. While
William was away, an enraged mob, believing he had sold out the rebel
cause and intended to deliver the powder money to Dunmore, showed up
at the house where his wife was recuperating from giving birth three
days earlier. It was their intent to burn the structure with her in
it, and only the exertions of family friends prevented their doing so.
Still, fearing for her life, these friends, within two weeks, sent her
off by sea to a place of safety.70
On January 4, 1776, a separate, local committee met in Isle of
Wight County to deliberate on John, Sr.'s activities. Primarily this
group was concerned about the fact John, Sr. was able to freely sail a
small schooner on the Nansemond and James Rivers without interference
from Dunmore. Goodrich offered a logical and legitimate explanation.
He used the schooner to report to Dunmore every ten days as per the
agreement of his parole and in fact, he had only made the trip four
times. Seemingly on his own Goodrich also offered that he intended to
ship some corn from his plantation in Isle of Wight to that in Nansemond. Regardless of the legitimacy of this explanation, the committee
felt that if others could not travel as freely, then John Goodrich

should certainly not be allowed to do so. Furthermore, they declared
he could not ship provisions of any kind without authorization from
the Convention or Committee of Safety. The Isle of Wight Committee
then turned the proceedings over to the Convention's Committee and ordered Goodrich to deliver himself and his vessel into the custody of
the commanding officer at Burwell's Ferry near Williamsburg. Given the
degree of public outcry exhibited by the mob in attacking William's
wife and the fact he was being investigated by two committees, John,
Sr. was certainly aware of the fact he and his family were in serious
trouble. Yet, there is no evidence that John, Sr. was anything but
complacent and cooperative about going along with the directives, indicating a belief on his part that he was guiltless of any crime.71
Problems were beginning for Robert Sheddon as well. On January

5, the Virginia Convention declared his conduct inimical, and as a result, his sloop, the Agatha, and a part of her cargo of rum which had
been seized were decreed to be forfeit to the colony.72
John Goodrich, Sr., on January 10, performed a rather brazen act
which, under the circumstances, tends to further reflect just how sure
he was of himself and his innocence. He petitioned the Convention to
direct the Committee of Safety to pay him the balance of his account.
This was undoubtedly the amount due for the coarse linens which had
yet to be paid.73
On January 13, the Convention's Committee met and presented its
findings on the Goodriches. Accepting that John, Sr.'s

actions were

the result of his drawing "the resentment of Lord Dunmore," his unhindered excursions by water were merely to honor his parole, and the
corn he intended to transport was only a small amount intended for the
use of his family, they
Resolved that the said John Goodrich hath been active in favour of
this Colony and hath suffered considerably on that Account that
nothing in his Conduct appears to be inimical to the common cause,

but that no Grain or other Article of Prp4vision should be Waterborne in the neighbourhood of the Enemy.
As to William's conduct in going back for the powder and remaining funds, the committee accepted that he too had acted under duress.
They also seemingly accepted the word of John, Sr. and John, Jr., despite the fact they had had no contact with William since his recent
return, that he had brought back neither powder or money.75
Out of the frying pan and into the fire, family members were
suddenly confronted with an altogether new charge, the smuggling of
British goods proscribed by the first Article of the Association.
Bartlet, in absentia, and John, Jr. were accused of conspiring to
break the rules and run in the additional goods purchased from the
Guineaman. In St. Eustatia, the textiles had been repacked and concealed in rum puncheons for shipment, and the invoices badly altered
to indicate they had been shipped from that place rather than Liverpool and Antigua and were of Dutch rather than Irish manufacture.
Bartlet then shipped the cargo in the schooner Fanny to some point on
the Potomac River where it was received by John, Jr. Like his father,
Goodrich, Jr. seems to have fully cooperated with the committee by
freely answering their questions and so honestly admitting that this
had been done as to supply his inquisitors with specifics. He even
produced the invoices which were being used as evidence against him.
In his defense, John, Jr. recounted how Bartlet, in order to get the
gunpowder from the Guineaman which was badly needed by the colony, had
been required to purchase the rest of the cargo as well. This fact was
confirmed by the testimony of Robert Connoway, Master of the Fanny.76
In addition to finding fault with the textiles, the Committee
made a point of noting that Bartlet had sold the powder to William at
a profit. In doing so, they conveyed a strong hint of disapproval of
this action as well. Although it is not stated directly, there is the
impression Bartlet's actions were considered less than patriotic.77

Despite John, Jr.'s explanations and the fact William had been
directed to do whatever was necessary to get the powder, he and
Bartlet were found guilty. The goods in question were to be forfeited
for the use of the colony. Furthermore, in accordance with the punishment prescribed by the Articles of Association, a resolution would be
published in the Gazette requesting that no one have any further business dealings with either of the two brothers. 78
At this point, some comments are in order about the historiographical treatment of the Goodrich family in general. Because of the
family's reputation for involvement in smuggling and the fact members
did actually smuggle in the small amount of British textiles, historians have conveyed the impression they were all basically bad people
who were dishonest about everything else they did.19 It has been difficult for historians to conceive that family members, because of their
participation in an activity generally winked at could still be honorable men in other respects. They were businessmen, and in the world of
18th century business, involving a relatively small and closely associated community of men, a merchant's word and honesty were of great
importance and a key to the level of success the Goodriches had obviously attained." As in any community, there were rules of conduct, and
if you did not play by them, you did not play at all. This is not to
say John, Sr. was all pure and lily white. As shown in his dealings
with Dunmore, he was more than capable of dissembling. Dunmore, however, was the enemy at the time, and so, such conduct can be deemed
acceptable under the circumstances. Furthermore, although clearly
tightly knit, the family is treated as a single entity in which members constantly acted together conspiratorially and in complete harmony as a group. In essence, historians maintain they conspired and
lied about everything, and this view has seriously biased interpretations of their conduct and testimony.81 In reality, the individual ac-

counts of each are quite candid. There is no reason to doubt them. In
further defense, given the various voyages undertaken and the number
of times and places different family members were in the custody of
one faction or the other, contact between them was relatively brief
and sporadic. What contact there was took place during a series of
events ever increasing in complexity and often rapidly developing.
There was little opportunity for family members to meet to fabricate
and coordinate their stories. Yet, the detailed testimony of any given
family member, recounting their personal involvement in a specific incident and forming only a part of the puzzle, meshes with and corroborates that of another.
Regarding the testimony offered at the inquiry, John, Jr.'s explanation for why the textiles were purchased in the first place is
considered merely a fabrication to excuse a blatant smuggling effort
and get out of trouble.82 In fact, the story makes perfect sense and
there is no reason to doubt it. Such a transaction does not seem at
all atypical for the 18th century. The Guineaman was from Liverpool
and as such, was undoubtedly preparing for the last leg of a long triangular voyage. For the sake of cost efficiency, her captain would
have wanted to get rid of all of his cargo as fast as possible. He
certainly would not have wanted to incur additional expenses while
waiting around hoping to find a buyer for the relatively piddling remainder of his cargo valued at only £297.17.10.
Furthermore, when there were obviously very large, valuable cargoes of legitimate textiles to be had, it must be asked why anyone
would purposely risk getting into trouble for such a comparatively minor additional quantity? As mentioned earlier, the osnaburgs brought
in legally and already sold by William and Bartlet were valued at between £3,125 and £3,750.

Historians have asked if the story about purchasing the textiles
were true, then why were family members simply not open and honest
about it from the beginning? If they had been candid about the transaction, given the circumstances, it seems doubtful the Virginia government would have found fault with them. The family's failure to do
this is held against them as illustrative of their devious motives and
lack of honesty. 83 While this idea entails some valid reasoning in the
proverbial perfect world, in the real one it reflects a certain level
of naivete. Still, the question needs to be addressed. Why did the
family not tell the convention and instead conceal and smuggle the
textiles? Clearly aware the textiles were a problem, they could not
count on the Virginia rebels being so understanding. The family might
still get into trouble and lose the cargo as well through confiscation. The cargo, however small, still represented an investment
Bartlet would not wish to risk losing. All indications are that under
the circumstances, right or wrong, Bartlet simply either did not think
the textiles were of any consequence or did not care. Furthermore,
William had been told to do whatever was necessary to get the gunpowder. Though, in retrospect, clearly an error in judgment, it seems
plausible that for Bartlett, as a smuggler, the easiest, most trouble
free, and safest way to handle the textiles was to bring them in clandestinely with no one the wiser.
More importantly, if both John, Sr. and John, Jr. were lying
about these facts, why did they not lie about everything else? On the
contrary, both were extremely cooperative, honest and forthright about
everything else to the point of offering testimony and evidence that
was incriminating. In light of this there is no reason to believe they
fabricated a self-serving yarn about the nature of the transaction
with the Liverpool vessel. In turn, if father and son actually had
cause for concern about their guilt and were intent on worming their

way out of a tight spot, it would have been easy to deny everything,
keep their own council, and conveniently lose or misplace the incriminating invoices. This did not happen.
As to the smuggling act itself, as mentioned earlier, some historians believe the illicit textiles came in on the Fanny in midOctober. There is no evidence to support this, and in fact, it could
not have been the case. John, Jr. received the cargo himself somewhere
on the Potomac River. At the time in question, however, he was in
Dunmore's custody. In conjunction, it seems highly unlikely that as an
experienced smuggler, Bartlet would have shipped such a cargo without
first communicating with his brother about its impending arrival, giving him time to make preparations to receive it. Yes, William had already returned prior to the arrival of the

Fannv

and might have given

word she was coming in. The Fanny, however, had actually sailed days
before William got back, and taking into account the uncertainties of
wind and weather, Bartlet, an experienced mariner, certainly could not
have counted on his brother getting back in time to make necessary arrangements. Such a scenario would have been entirely too haphazard,
leaving too much to chance. All indications are the textiles in question came in at a later date.
Of note is the fact that, although both brothers were held
equally responsible, given the nature of the deal with the Guineaman,
the decisions regarding the transaction and intended smuggling were
Bartlet's alone. The act was certainly not premeditated, and he could
not have conspired about the purchase either before or during the
event with John, Jr., because he was in Virginia. Although undoubtedly
later informed about the textiles' purchase and plans to smuggle them,
Johnie's involvement was really only as an accessory after the fact.
What was he to do but help his brother who had already committed himself to this course of action?

Also of significance is the fact that it is apparent the matter
of the textiles had only just come to light. There was no reference to
their being a topic of inquiry for the two committees at an earlier
date. Yet, suddenly they were an issue with which, to use a modern
term, the family was "blind-sided." Adding weight to this argument is
the fact Bartlet was suddenly named as a co-conspirator. Roughly only
two weeks before, probably on December 27, Bartlet and his sloop, the
Dorothy, in ballast, were seized by a rebel vessel actively employed
-in stopping vessels suspected of breaking the Articles of Association.
Although the Dorothy was detained, it seems Bartlet was released.
There is no record of his being held, and the fact he was not present
for the inquiry supports he was not. If a charge of smuggling had already been leveled at Bartlet at the time he was stopped, something
one would think officials, especially the captain of a vessel apprehending potential smugglers, would be aware of, it is difficult to
imagine Bartlet not being placed in custody and sent to Williamsburg.
He was not. Consequently, the matter of the textiles could only have
come to light during the early part of January after the Dorothy was
seized.

''

Not only was the charge recent, certain aspects of it were suspicious. It must be asked how individuals with a reputation for being
experienced smugglers could get caught with and examined for such an
inconsequential cargo? Bartlet had certainly taken pains to run it in
clandestinely, and it was run in successfully. They were not caught in
the act. Perhaps the reference to John, Sr. in the Sheddon letter had
caused suspicions. Even so, clearly someone (a "Malicious Enemyn?) had
to have been looking very hard for evidence against the family to have
found out about this past clandestine incident. Then, in conjunction,
someone (another nMalicious Enemy"?) had to have informed on them, Finally, it needs to be asked why, considering the family's efforts on

the part of the rebels, involving considerable trouble and risk, and
their ultimate honest explanation about what had transpired, such a
major issue was made out of what was really a relatively inconsequential affair and such a harsh penalty imposed? With the posting of the
resolves in the press, John, Jr.'s and Bartlet's business careers were
effectively over. They became persona non g r a t a in the rebel merchant
community. They were ruined. The situation is even more curious in
light of William having been directed to do whatever was required for
the successful completion of the voyage. In a worst case scenario,
someone really was intent on John Goodrich's "destruction." William
certainly believed someone had let the cat out of the bag to Dunmore.
At best, the Virginia rebels come off looking very naive. They had
hired smugglers to smuggle, then became upset when they smuggled.
The very nature of the proceedings is rather suspicious as well.
In December, the Virginians had established an Admiralty Court, one of
the purposes of which was to deal with smugglers. Yet, the Goodrich
brothers were not accorded the benefit of a trial under this institution's authority. They were merely pronounced guilty by the investigating committee.85
A

final note on this part of the story concerns the Virginians

taking a dim view of Bartlet's having made a profit off the powder he
sold to William. Perhaps, to again use modern parlance, it was time
for a "reality check" with the rebels. Bartlet was not the person designated to fulfill the contract, but he went to considerable time, effort, and personal expense to acquire additional amounts of the needed
commodity. Consequently, it is somewhat hard to find fault with him, a
merchant, making at least some money out of the deal.
While these events were transpiring for family members in Virginia, William was having an interesting time in St. Eustatia where he
had been sent to claim the powder and unspent money and had arrived by

December 6. He later asserted he had no intention of returning with
either for Dunmore. In fact, a large part of the funds were not even
available to collect. Van Dam had sent bills valued at £2,000 sterling
to France to buy additional powder. As for the remainder, £3,762.11.0
in West Indian currency (roughly £2,150 sterling), William, with Van
Dam's assistance, came up with a scheme to appease the Governor. He
would return just enough of the bills, two with a total value of £400,
to keep the Governor happy. Approximately £1,750 sterling would remain
with Van Dam. In support, Van Dam offered a ledger and note explaining
the balance of William's account and assuring the rest of the money
would be handed over when it was known the bills had cleared without
protest. Then displaying his business savvy, William made arrangements
that only he or his brother, Bridger, could receive the remaining
money from Van Dam in the future. This stipulation put William in the
position of controlling the situation relative to both the rebels and
the British. Of note, William later stated there was, in fact, powder
ready to be picked up when he arrived in St. Eustatia. This, he simply
left, and Van Dam later sold it to a vessel from New ~ork.'~
Somewhere between January 4 and 9, 1776, William returned to
Virginia where, failing to mention the existence of the powder, he
handed the two bills and Van Dam's account over to Dunmore, explaining
that the remaining bills had been sold. Upon receipt, the governor
seemed satisfied with the state of affairs and released William. There
is no evidence William purchased any arms or additional powder as per
his instructions.87
By offering bills of exchange, William bought time and lulled
Dunmore by hoodwinking him, at least to a certain degree. Bills of exchange were the 18th century version of checks, not ready cash. Although Dunmore seemed to think those William brought back could be redeemed for the British, their negotiability remains questionable. If

not negotiable, the bills were worthless. Even if they were, the bills
were of no immediate value to Germain. Issued by an illegal and as yet
unrecognized government and drawn on the London firm of John Norton

&

Sons, it seems unlikely Dunmore could find a buyer among his followers
(or anyone else in the colonies) willing to take the risk of purchasing such dubious paper with such a suspicious history. As an alternative, all he could do was send them to England, which is what he did.
This course of action would take time and undoubtedly still be problematic. Norton and Sons had strong Virginia ties, supported the rebels, and were aware of the circumstances for which the bills had
As such, they certainly would have quesoriginally been ~irculated.~~
tioned their appearance in the hands of British officials and, at
least, argued against payment. In any case, the rebels had not as yet
actually lost any money due to William's actions. At worst, the immediate funds designated for munitions was reduced with the 2400 in a
state of limbo. In light of William's plan to pull the wool over
Dunmore's eyes, it seems probable he originally intended to inform the
Convention of his actions. In turn, even if Norton and Sons were
obliged to make payment, regardless of the bearer, the Virginians
could still contact them with orders to refuse payment to anyone attempting to cash the bills. By one account, upon being set free, William promptly set out for Williamsburg, perhaps partially for this
reason, perhaps because he had heard of his family's situation there.
Whatever the reason, upon finding out about William's destination,
Dunmore had him detained and again confined on ship.89 William, himself, stated Dunmore released him on parole to visit his family with
whom he spent three days before returning to the Governor as a prisoner

.

90

It seems highly unlikely that William was lying about his intentions and the nature of what transpired when he met with Van Dam, pri-

marily because of Van Dam's actions in response to the situation. Keep
in mind that Van Dam was not a Goodrich associate. He was recommended
to William by the Virginia Government. In other words, he was on the
side of the Virginians not the Goodriches. Given that Billie arrived
under guard on a British warship, if he really intended to reclaim the
powder and funds for the British, one would think Van Dam would have
detected something was amiss and withheld everything. Furthermore, it
would be expected he would be suspicious enough to contact the Virginians to assess what was going on and inform them of the situation.
He did none of this. On the contrary, he went along with William,
handing over the two bills and penning an explanation for the others.
Clearly Van Dam did not feel anything was wrong. His actions indicate
he was aware of William's predicament, convinced of his true intentions, and willing to play along. This goes far to support that William was telling the truth about what transpired in St. Eustatia and
why. He was only going through the motions of acting on Dunmore's behalf.
At this point, John, Sr.'s statement to the committee that William returned neither powder or money can be addressed. The testimony

is also held up as evidence of the family's dishonesty given that William actually came back with two bills of exchange.91 In fact, John,
Sr.'s comment, when juxtaposed with William's account of events, was
truthful as far as he knew it to be. Recall that William said he initially did not intend to return with either item, indicating a premeditated plan of action. John, Sr. was very much a part of formulating the plan for William to go to St. Eustatia. As such, it seems
likely the two conspired beforehand merely to go through the motions
of getting the goods and money without actually doing so. Believing
this was what William intended and what would occur, John, Sr. felt
confident saying his recently returned son had brought neither item

back. Furthermore, John, Sr.'s testimony was undoubtedly taken down
under examination prior to January 13, possibly before William's return, and even as of that date, he seems to have had no contact with
his son to learn otherwise. Even if he had heard from William, John,
Sr. was not lying. William brought back bills of exchange rather than
cash.
As stated earlier, the Goodrich family has been viewed as a single group that constantly acted together in complete agreement. What
one did, all supported and did as well. In fact, of the five male family members under consideration, all were adults who led their own
lives and were responsible for their own actions. They must be viewed
as separate individuals, each making his own decisions for his own
personal reasons in his own time. Accepting this, the question must be
asked when the various family members jumped off the fence rail into
the loyalist camp.
Historians maintain that all family members, if not already committed to the loyalist cause, were well on the road to becoming so by

.

December, 1775. 92 Certainly, John, Sr ' s post-war memorial to the Loyalist Claim's Commission states he was in Dunmore's service at that
time. 93 Technically, in a qualified sense, he was, but for the same
reason he failed to mention his involvement with the rebels and the
gunpowder, he obviously would not mention the fact he was not a willing associate. In any case, as will be shown, the December date is far
too early for most of the family members. Each departed from the revolutionaries at different times in succession, seemingly when each had
had enough of accumulating rebel provocation. The Goodriches were
caught in the middle of a spiraling sequence of events beyond their
control. Because of their activities for the rebels, they were in a
position to be intimidated into association with the loyalists. This
contact, in turn, led to increasing doubts and persecution on the part

of the revolutionaries progressively forcing them away. In reality, it
can be said rather than leave the rebel camp, the Goodriches were alienated and driven from it into the waiting embrace of Dunmore. The
governor, becoming aware of their potential usefulness to the royal
cause, would court their favor and welcome them when they had no place
else to go. As of December, however, the only rebel affronts to the
Goodriches were the assault on William's wife and the establishment of
the committee of inquiry. While serious, most family members seem to
have accepted these incidents and taken them in stride. In January,
the accusation and conviction for smuggling in conjunction with the
apparent doubts about the family's patriotism, because of their contact with Dunmore, constituted additional provocations. Yet, most of
the family still professed loyalty to the rebels and acted accordingly. Bartlet was the exception.
Bartlet's activities between mid-October and late December are
somewhat of a mystery and a bit problematic. All indications, however,
are that he stayed in St. Eustatia in October, and remained in the
West Indies (if not specifically at the Dutch island) throughout the
fall and early winter. There is no report of his having returned to
Virginia during this time. Sheddon's cryptic note of October 15, while
indicating that Bartlet's enigmatic letters were expected, offer no
hint that Bartlet, himself, would be arriving. Another source states
that on October 16, Dunmore intercepted correspondence from Bartlet in
St. Eustatia which he had sent on yet another vessel. 94 If it is accepted the illicit textiles were shipped at a later date, given they
were sent by Bartlet and allowing the Fanny time to make a return voyage, this activity would indicate he was at St. Eustatia at least until early November, if not later in the month. He was also at that
same island during the first week of December at the end of which he
returned to Virginia. 95

As of December 22, it is evident he had not only returned home,
but was acting for Dunmore as well. The Governor contracted with
Bartlet to hire the Fanny for government service into which she entered on that date. Furthermore, Bartlet went so far as to fit her out
at his own expense. His commitment to the royal cause at that time is
interesting because it predates not only the inquiries, but also his
seizure and release by the rebels. Clearly, the Virginians were not
yet aware of his actions, and it is possible family members were not
as well.96
The facts recorded by the rebels about Bartlet's detainment,
probably on December 27, pose a problem, however, about his location
in that at first glance, they would appear to contradict his being in
Virginia on the 22nd. One document states he was twenty days out from
St. Eustatia when stopped. Another reiterates Bartlet had cleared from
the Dutch island and adds his destination as Nansemond. Yet a third,
of a later date, is interesting, because it says the voyage was from
Antigua to Norfolk. Ignoring the third document for the moment, the
first two, when read in association, tend to imply Bartlet was taken
immediately upon his return following a twenty day voyage. Of course,
this raises the question of how he could be at sea and dealing with
Dunmore at the same time. The answer is really quite simple. Bartlet
had actually been in Virginia at least a week prior to detainment.97
In support, the weight of evidence is with the documents pertaining to the hiring of the

m.
These include not only the testi-

mony of Bartlet and Dunmore, but the surveyors' report as well, all
agreeing the schooner was taken into service on December 22. As
Bartlet's presence was required to make the agreement as well as fit
her out, there can be no doubt about his actually being there. 98
How then can the rebel documents be accounted for? The facts
they offer, while rife for misinterpretation, are essentially true and

even offer a few hints. While there is no doubt Bartlet left St. Eustatia twenty days earlier, that the actual voyage took twenty days,
although possible considering the uncertainties of wind and weather,
is suspect. Other vessels seem to have regularly made the passage in
less than two weeks; some, such as William's sloop, in much less.99 In
essence, Bartlet could have easily returned earlier, before the 22nd.
In light of other known facts, the twenty days must be interpreted to
indicate only when he left the islands, not where he was or what he
did in the interim. In conjunction, as will be seen, the discrepancies
between destinations can actually be used to explain what occurred.
There is also the intriguing fact that the Dorothy was in ballast. For a merchantman to make a passage without a cargo was certainly not at all uncommon, but given the situation and the individual
in question, it is curious. Why would an experienced merchant in a position to procure a cargo for a destination known to be an excellent
market make the run in ballast? In fact, after all the time spent in
the islands, why did Bartlet choose that point to go home? The answer
is that Billie had just arrived with information from home. 100
NOW, Bartlet's activities in December can be tentatively pieced
together. It seems unlikely he had not heard something about what was
going on with the family. The Fanny's master may have been able to
convey a partial account outlining the basics. Yet, it is doubtful
Connoway was privy to any of the finer points of the behind the scenes
negotiations, and during the time frame in question, there would have
been much that transpired after his departure for the island that he
could not have known. Consequently, while aware the family was having
problems, there was much Bartlet must have been in the dark about.
William would have offered his brother the first detailed, first-hand
account bringing him up to date on just how serious matters at home
had become. Hearing this, Bartlet made a hasty departure for Virginia

which accounts for his sailing in ballast. His destination, quite
logically, was Nansemond, not a place of business, but one of the family seats. In light of the fact Norfolk was under the control of
Dunmore, then considered an enemy, there is no reason to believe that
port was his destination at that time. In any case, it is likely
Bartlet made Nansemond by the 19th or 20th, only to find that since
William had left, affairs had taken on a whole new and even more serious complexion. The rebels, having called for an inquiry and attempted
to assault William's wife, were showing themselves to be as great an
enemy as the Governor. Obviously, in Bartletls mind, they were even
more so, because these two rebel actions seem to have been enough
provocation to make him decide to throw in with Dunmore, which he did
within a day or two. Having made the pact, Bartlett was in the logical
process of bringing the Dorothy around to Norfolk to join the Governor
when she was detained, thus accounting for the discrepancies in destinations.
The reference to Bartlet's departure from Antigua is really of
no consequence. It can easily be explained by the fact it was undoubtedly Bartlet's last port of call prior to St. Eustatia. It was probably noted, because it was a British port and therefore suspicious.
Three days after the inquiry in which John, Sr. and sons were
exonerated of any inimical conduct against Virginia with regards to
their trading efforts to obtain necessary items for the colony, the
committee reported its resolution to the Convention concerning the father's petition for payment. After acknowledging that family members
had satisfactorily carried out the contract for the coarse linens and
admitting they were due payment of £1,098, the committee offered yet
another affront when it announced its intention to retain the money
until all the powder funds were accounted for. In essence, after having just declared the family innocent, the committee conveyed it still

had serious doubts and was distrustful of them. Interestingly enough,
at the same time, indicating they were still in the dark about
Bartlet's status, they did agree to return the Dorothy. 101
Not to be put off easily, John, Sr. immediately entered two more
petitions on the same day. The first concerned the status of son-inlaw Robert Sheddon, daughter Agatha, and their two children who were
aboard a vessel in the harbor at Norfolk. After acknowledging he knew
the Convention viewed Sheddon as inimical because of his attempted
smuggling, Goodrich pointed out that Robert had been of some service
in procuring the powder. He hoped the Convention would thus view him
in a more favorable light and allow him and his family to return
ashore "and reside under the protection of this Colony." This was
hardly the request of a man who had turned traitor.102
Goodrich then repetitioned for payment. This request is noteworthy for its sense of restraint, humility, and complacency, given that
he could not have been at all happy about the rejection of the first.
After quite justly pointing out the family "had exposed themselves to
great dangers and had suffered many hardships and inconveniences and
had incurred considerable expense in their endeavours to serve this
Colony", he prayed the "Convention would take the same into Consideration and make such reasonable Compensation as shall be thought
just. "103
In light of the nature of this second request, a refusal to comply in any way on the part of the committee could only be viewed negatively. John, Sr. had just cunningly put them in a position in which
they were required to play their hand one way or the other, letting
him know exactly where he stood. While the Convention responded favorably to the petition concerning Sheddon's wife and children, the
second request fell on deaf ears.104

By February, compounding events, including the attempted assault
on William's wife, conveyed to John, Sr. that the family was in such
serious trouble with the rebels, that the safety of his own wife and
youngest children was cause for concern. At some point prior to the
15th of that month Margaret Goodrich received a pass from the Committee of Safety for herself and the three youngest offspring to leave
the colony. Also allowed to accompany her was Bridger. 105

Described as

"about 5 Feet 10 Inches high, stoop shouldered, a genteel well looking
young Man, about 24 Years of Age, [sic] of a daring bold Countenance,
light coloured Hair, his Face a little freckled,"106this is the second
glance at this youngest of the adult brothers. Although he had been
authorized by William to collect the powder money, there is no evidence Bridger was actively involved in any of the family's dealings to
this time. That he was allowed to leave supports this. He would, however, become a major player in the family's fortunes. As of the 15th,
however, it is evident these individuals had yet to depart, because on
that day the Committee added that such slaves as were usually employed
as domestics could also leave with Margaret.107
Also by February, the Governor's tenders were exceedingly active. By one account, they brought in prizes daily. One was a brig and
a number of others were New England vessels sent for grain and
flour. 100 On February 3, six tenders went raiding with three pushing up
the Nansemond; their boats making it as far upstream as Goodrich's
plantation. During this foray a storehouse with corn was burned.

A

re-

bel perspective contended the raid was partly undertaken with the concurrence" of Goodrich and sons, to bring off two vessels loaded with
provisions by locals. To what degree if any the Goodriches were involved is impossible to say. If, in fact, a family member was party to
this at this time, it was undoubtedly Bartlet. The others had yet to
cast their lot with Dunmore. This, however, was about to change.109

On February 26, Andrew Snape Hamond ordered Captain Matthew
Squire, H.M. Sloop Otter to proceed to Baltimore to seize or destroy
two rebel armed vessels laden with flour. Failing this, the Otter was
to cut out any vessel in the harbor loading provisions or being armed,
and if she met with resistance, she was to fire on and destroy the
town. General orders were to seize and detain all rebel ships and
ships trading with the rebels. Accompanying the Otter were two slooptenders, the Edward and the Samuel. The Samuel, was commanded by one
of the Goodrich brothers. There is nothing to firmly indicate which,
but the weight of circumstantial evidence indicates it was Bridger.
Also along as "superintending Pilot" on the Otter was John, Sr. In addition to his navigational responsibilities, his role in the endeavor
was to assist Squire in obtaining livestock for the ~ritish.''~
That Bridger was the brother in question is supported by a number of factors. To begin with, he is known to have been active with
Dunmore at this time.111 Also, historians traditionally link him with
this event. 112 Finally by process of elimination, after accounting for
the whereabouts and activities of the other brothers, only Bridger is
left. There is no evidence John, Jr. ever commanded a vessel for the
Governor. Bartlet was in the West Indies at this time.113 This leaves
only William, and as will be seen, all evidence supports he had yet to
join Dunmore.
The only evidence suggesting Bridger did not accompany the raid
is highly suspect. A document listing prizes condemned and sold under
Dunmore's authorization includes a vessel reported to have been taken
by Bridger on March 17, which does not match any of those taken by the
Otter and her tenders. Of course, this would indicate Bridger was
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elsewhere at the time. The date, however is extremely unreliable. Certain aspects of this document, which shows signs of having been drawn
up long after the events it records, are rather haphazard, especially

the dates of capture. For twenty-two prizes listed, dates of capture
are given for only three, including Bridger's. The two remaining are
wrong. Consequently, this document can not be relied upon for proof of
Bridger's whereabouts, and unless new sources come to light to the
contrary, it must be accepted he commanded the Samuel in late February
and March. '14
At this point in time, there can be no argument that Bridger,
despite his complete lack of previous involvement, certainly had even
more reason to join Dunmore than Bartlet. Someone in the rebel camp
had sold out his father and brothers to the Governor about the gunpowder. His family's patriotism and conduct had been questioned to such a
degree that two formal inquiries had been held to investigate them,
and two brothers had been publicly censored. Then, adding insult to
injury, the Convention withheld payment of a considerable amount of
money owed the family. Worst of all, an attempt had been made on the
lives of a brother's wife and infant child. All things considered, for
Bridger, it seems enough was enough.
What of John, Sr.'s reasons for acting with Dunmore at this
time? Historians maintain that as a merchant and smuggler, he was unscrupulous and profit minded to the point that he was motivated in his
decision by simple unmitigated greed, and the governor supposedly made
him an offer too profitable to refuse. 115 There is absolutely nothing
to support such an opinion. On the contrary, Dunmore, himself, later
asserted that the Goodrich "Services were performed free of Fee or reward, and upon every occasion, the Family demonstrated self disinterested Conduct. "'I6

The worst that can be said is that in his early

dealings with the governor, John, Sr.'s actions were governed to a degree by the threat of considerable property loss to the British if he
did not comply with their demands.117 In light of the prevailing historical viewpoint, it must be asked just what financial rewards John,

Sr. hoped to glean by changing sides? By joining Dunmore he gave up
control of a considerable part of his wealth to the rebels and risked
losing that which remained. At a time when the family was realizing
significant profits dealing with the revolutionaries, as the value of
the osnaburgs attest, all the Governor could offer was the possibility
of taking a few prizes and the rather tenuous backing of a government
that might look favorably on them for their conduct and see fit to
protect their vessels. 118 Given a choice based on potential profits,
Dunmore could offer John, Sr. nothing he could take to the bank. There
was nothing to gain and even more to lose. In fact, after John, Sr.
began acting with the Royal forces, the family still lost at least one
vessel and cargo, valued at L697, to the British under the Prohibitory
Act. 119 Also, the Fanny was lost to the rebels while in government
service.120 Only with extreme hindsight can it be said the family
gained anything by joining the British. In the case of John Sr., as
will be seen, he personally gained very little if anything.
In reality, there can be little doubt John, Sr. was motivated by
the same provocations as Bridger. He was certainly more directly affected by them. Yet, despite his services to the governor, his actions
then and later indicate his participation was less than whole-hearted
and he maintained serious reservations. Despite all that had befallen
him, he was not, as yet, a devout loyalist.
In addition to John, Sr., two other pilots accompanied the Otter
and her consorts up the Bay. 121 When this small squadron arrived off
the mouth of the Patapsco River leading to Baltimore, a very interesting situation developed involving two of these men, one of whom was
undoubtedly Goodrich. Unfortunately, although John, Sr. served on the
Otter,
---

it is impossible to identify which of the two pilots concerned

was which. Then again, it does not really matter. As the Otter approached the entrance to the river on March 8, she ran aground. After

considerable effort, she was gotten off five and a half hours later.122
During this same time, the two tenders, the Samuel and the Edward,
went into the mouth of the river to take a rebel merchantman, the ship
Molly, Captain Laurence, also aground.lZ3 The following day, the Samuel
and the Edward were still trying to secure the Mol.1~when the Maryland
State Navy ship Defence and a small ad hoc flotilla of local vessels
approached, driving away the tenders and forcing them to abandon their
prize. 124 While this was transpiring, the Otter was making every effort
to get under way and come up in support, but was unable to do so when
it was "found from the Pilot's ignorance it was impossible. "Iz5 If this
pilot was Goodrich his conduct can only be viewed as very suspicious
for a man reputed to know every creek and inlet of the Bay. It can
only be interpreted that he was being uncooperative and feigning ignorance in an effort to hinder the mission.
With the return of the two tenders, the first pilot was replaced
with a second.lZ6 Given John, Sr.'s reputation and position as chief
pilot, if he was not the first pilot then he was certainly the second.
There can be no doubt that a frustrated Captain Squire would have selected his best man to take over. Yet, interestingly enough, the second pilot did no better than the first. Conveying an apparent reluctance to proceed, he argued Baltimore could not be approached for a
number of reasons. The river was chained, shore batteries with heavy
guns existed, and the trees marked for navigational aids had been cut
down. 127 Interestingly, although the rebels were frantically in the
process of gathering vessels to sink if need be and block the harbor,
none had been sunk as yet, and there does not seem to have been any
actual chains.128 As to the shore defenses, Squire's orders stated that
if a battery that could not be overpowered was in place at the mouth
of the river, he was to abort the mission.129 All that existed, however, was a hastily erected breastwork mounting "several" guns at

Fells Point, upriver near the town itself.l3' Allowing the second pilot
the benefit of the doubt regarding these two potential deterrents, he
may have believed and been acting on false information supplied to him
by someone on the Molly. The third argument, however, is more difficult to accept. Again, calling into account John, Sr.'s reputation, is
it to be believed that as a highly experienced pilot, undoubtedly selected because of his qualifications for the mission, he would have
absolutely needed the navigational markers to negotiate his way up the
river? The rebel vessels do not seem to have had too much trouble corning down without them. Regardless of the validity of the arguments,
the very fact they were cited as insurmountable obstacles reflects an
individual not overly intent on seeing the objective carried out. If
the second pilot rather then the first was in fact John, Sr., we are
still confronted with a man whose actions could only serve to hinder
the operation. Squire certainly did not have a pilot he could rely on
when he needed one, and the intelligence given him seems to have been
a major factor in his decision to abort the mission. 131 His superior,
Captain Hamond was definitely of the belief the mission failed due to
a lack of competent pilots. 132
Although the situation at Baltimore proved too much for the &
ter and her
-

consorts, forcing them to withdraw back down the bay, they

nevertheless managed to take seven prizes and burn another during the
cruise.133 Four or five more, including the Molly, had been seized at
the mouth of the Patapsco, but were recaptured by the Defence.13' Of
those retained, a schooner and two sloops, were specifically taken by
Bridger in the Samuel.135
The Baltimore voyage is noteworthy because two accounts offer
insight into Bridger's character, showing him a committed, determined,
angry, volatile, and even vengeful young man. He was someone to take
notice of and be concerned about. Rebel Captain Thomas Wirt, while a

prisoner of the British, heard him say, "that if they did not get
fresh provisions the next time they came up here they would knock down
all the Houses along Shore."136 In actuality in this particular instance, although this sounds like a rather nasty threat, Goodrich was
really only reiterating Squire's orders from ~am0nd.l~'
Nevertheless,
the statement does reflect a resolute individual.
The second account, from the rebel press, is significant not
only for the image offered of Bridger, but for conveying just what the
rebels thought of him. In fact, the image presented is absolutely
priceless. While the basic facts concerning Goodrich's conduct are
probably true, the rebel diatribe is so over-blown and filled with
anti-Goodrich sentiment that upon reading it, it is difficult to suppress a good chuckle. Recounting captures by Squire's vessels, the
Maryland Gazette stated:
among many others they took two poor industrious French Neutrals,
so called, as they were crossing the bay in a small boat, and
robbed them of their all, being the hard earnings of ten years
honest industry - The infamous Goodrich, the younger, commanded
one of the tenders, and his father was in the Otter as Pilot The violence and barbarity of the former towards the prisoners
will hand down his detested name to posterity loaded with the
curses of his ravaged and oppressed country - The other officers
in general treated these and other prisoners not only with humanity but politeness; but this native barbarian, the reproach of his
country, and basest of all Paracides, added brutal insult to his
robberies - he tore from these poor people every thing that they
had on board, even down to an old razor and a peck of meal, and
picked thf&r pockets of 97 1. the fruits of many years sweat and
labour [ . I
Bridger was a very busy young man during late February and
March. He used the brief periods when not acting with the Royal Navy
to cruise independently. As of March 26, he had four additional prizes
to his credit.139
Upon returning from Baltimore, John, Sr. attended prize auctions. Whatever his political stance at this point, he was still a

merchant mariner with an eye for a good ship to be had at a bargain.
On March 27, he purchased the schooner Betty, one of Bridger's
prizes. 140
In February and March, while Bridger was busy taking prizes and
upsetting the rebel denizens of the Bay, Bartlet was involved in other
activities for the Crown. On February 13, he contracted to hire the
sloop Lord Howe to Dunmore for Government service.141 At some point, he
also received a commission in the Queen's Loyal American Regiment.142
By early March, he was back in St. Eustatia on the Governor's
behalf attempting to retrieve the rest of the powder funds. Bartlet,
however, was not alone. Rebel agent Abram Van Bibber was also there,
in part for the same purpose. Van Bibber met with frustration, because
he was not authorized to receive the funds as per William's instructions to Van Dam. Bartletls intentions were thwarted as well for this
same reason and by a new complication. Van Dam was dead. The money was
tied up with only Van Dam's widow having any control of it whatsoever,
and she was not about to hand it Over. According to Van Bibber,
Bartlet "came out a great Tory" attempting to claim the money on the
grounds he had a right to it, because the Virginians had withheld payment for the coarse linens.143
With the failure of this approach, as per Dunmore's instructions
should a problem arise, Bartlet went to Antigua to procure a letter
from Vice-Admiral James Young directing the Governor of St. Eustatia
to have the money handed over. 144 "[Blut having no Credentials whatever
and giving rather a lame Account of himselfw Bartlet did not impress
Young, who believed him an "Imposter" and did not supply the letter.145
Because Bartlet failed at this, it was assumed his claim was invalid,
and Van Bibber resumed his efforts. Using all of his "Interest and
art", "Bowing c scrapingn and placing himself "under many obligations

to manyw he managed to repossess a large part of the money. For the
rest, he received pledges of its payment in time.146
That Bartlet went for the money rather then William or Bridger
is clear indication neither had joined Dunmore by the time Bartlet
sailed which was probably just after hiring out the Lord Howe. If they
had, there can be little doubt one of them would have gone instead
given they were the only ones authorized to pick it up. This tells us
something else. In light of Bartlet's troubles, either William refused
to authorize Bartlet as a recipient, or had not even bothered to tell
his brother about this stipulation with Van Dam. It would seem he certainly had not told Dunmore. According to Young, Bartlet had no acceptable credentials which one would think William would have given
his brother if he were privy to and supportive of the undertaking.
Again, it would appear the family did not always act together.
As of March 30, William finally threw his hat into the loyalist
ring.147 Until this point, the worst that could be said about William's
involvement with Dunmore is that he was the actual owner of the sloop
Samuel commanded by Bridger on the Baltimore expedition. Whether the
-sloop was used for government purposes with William's blessing, or
Bridger acted on his own in using his brother's vessel without asking,
is unknown. Even if William willingly allowed the use of his sloop, it
was a relatively passive act. The latter alternative is, however, a
distinct possibility in that Bridger had, in fact, been master of the
Samuel
- since at

least 1774. Bridger was Dunmore's man, and he and the

Governor had the Samuel. within their power. In essence, use of the
sloop may well have been beyond William's contr01.l'~
It is difficult to imagine that anyone in the family had more
cause to doubt his ties to the rebels than William. Being sold out to
Dunmore, the inquiries, the treatment of his brothers, the withholding
of payment due, and of course, the attempted assault on his loved

ones, must have given him cause for serious reflection on matters. In
light of the state of affairs, can it be wondered that he not only
questioned but disavowed his association with the revolutionaries?
Yet, even all these reasons combined were not enough to drive him to
such action. There was something else.
William left an interesting and candid account which, though
rambling, garbled, generalized, and vague in terms of its chronology
of events and time frames, explained his decision to change his allegiance. The gist of the passages of immediate concern is as follows.
Upon returning from St. Eustatia in January, William was again confined on ship by the governor who attempted to convert him to the
royal cause. William warded off Dunmore's approaches, saying he "could
not think of taking up a m against a cuntry that was Acting in devence
of there Liberties." The rebels, however, then began to suspect William's association with the Governor concerning the powder with the
result that payment was withheld for the textiles and an angry mob attempted to assault his wife. William then spent the next three months
on parole on a vessel after which Dunmore again attempted to sway him
and again William refused.14'
In William's own words,
This Occasion'd his Lordship to grow a little mad. "What," says
he, "don't the ill treatment of those fellows on shore to Mrs.
Goodrich lead you to resent it?* I replyed that I did not think it
was right to resent the ill treatment of a few Invious men on the
whole Cuntry, and that I could not take up armes agains them with
a clair Contience as long as they were acting in defence of there
Liberties. "But," says he, "you may depend upon it that they mean
to Shake of their dependence on grate brittain?" Then I told his
Lordship that if he would alow me to remain nuteral until1 they
did declare themselves free and independent of grate brittain,
that I should then look upon myself to be in duty bound to take a
part in favour of grate brittain, and would do avery thing in My
power to appress the Americans in such a declaration. Upon which
we parted, and I do declair upon my honour, Gentlemen, that I did
not do nothing in favour of government but what I was obleged to
do before they Declared for Independence. Upon the declaration of
Independence in Virginia, 1 told Lord Dunmore that I was then
ready and willing tySotakea part in favor of grate brittain Agree
able to my promiss.

At face value, this account does not jibe with other known
facts. It conveys the impression that after Dunmore's second effort to
sway William at the end of three months, even more time passed before
William made his decision based on independence being declared by his
fellow Virginians. Logically, this would imply he remained neutral until after at least May 15, when Virginia formally decided to support a
vote of independence in the Continental Congress, if not July 2. Yet,
as will be seen, William was clearly active on Dunmore's behalf as of
March 30. Of course, this would indicate William's statements about
his rebel sympathies, motives, and activities were false. There is,
however, another way to interpret this testimony which shows William
was, in fact, sincere and truthful.
As indicated, the sequence of events and time frames are poorly
related and thus, misleading. This is apparent from other corroborating evidence and even from information offered earlier in this same
document. For instance, the rebels were clearly suspicious of the family's activities over a month before refusing to pay the money owed.
In conjunction, William's testimony makes it seem the assault on his
wife three days after giving birth coincided with the decision to
withhold payment and occurred after his return from his second voyage
to St. Eustatia in early January. Yet by his own earlier statement
clearly referring to the latter half of October, she was then, "big
with Child and looking to layin in the corse of a month or so."lS1 A
supporting document, also written by William and referring to the same
time, says she was then upwards of eight months pregnant.152 This certainly indicates a birth date in late November or early December, well
before the time implied in the deposition. Furthermore, in what is a
relatively lengthy document, the writer only offered two specific time
references, and even these are vague. He mentions the deal with Nicholas was made "Sometime in July" and the shipment of coarse linens ar-

rived in October.153 William is also known to have been simply wrong
about his dates. He stated he was captured in August when it was
really July.154 In essence, William merely conveyed his meanings and
facts poorly. Although clearly an intelligent young man, the grammar
and organization of this and other documents show he was less than a
gifted writer.
Part of the key to interpreting William's deposition lies in interpreting the reference to the three months spent aboard ship. Rather
than meaning exactly ninety days beginning with the second week of
January, Billie was really only saying he was on parole during the
three months of January, February, and March. Given this, Dunmore's
second visit could have occurred as early as mid-March thus allowing
William a couple of weeks of neutrality before making his decision. If
this interpretation is accepted, then some sense can be made of this
testimony in that at least the time period referred to
fits with when William is known to have joined Dunmore.
This, however, still does not explain the clear statement that
William did nothing until after independence was declared. If William
was not lying, then it is apparent he was not really referring to a
time after May 15 or July 2. Something occurred prior to March 30 that
unequivocally convinced William independence was at least a foregone
conclusion. What?
In fact, there were a number of incidents and factors, singularly or cumulatively, that William could have viewed as evidence the
rebels had adopted such a stance. Certainly, the topic was already one
of serious discussion amongst the rebel leaders and in fact had actually been debated in the Continental Congress in late February with
the radical majority in favor.'55 By March at the latest, six of the
seven Virginia delegates supported such an a~ti0n.l~~
Also, the end of
January witnessed the publication of Tom Paine's inflammatory Common

Sense, calling for a break from England and convincing many of the
need to do so. Perhaps by late March talk of independence had become
so commonplace that to some it simply seemed inevitable.
In late January, Dunmore offered a reconciliation proposal to
the Virginians. 157 During the third week of February, they rejected it
on the grounds they did not have the authority to treat with the governor. The proposal had been forwarded to the Continental Congress as
the only governing body that could respond to it. This action clearly
indicates Virginia recognized the higher authority of a governing
group other than the king and Parliament

- a group acting independ-

ently. 158
Even more important, however, and more likely to have affected
William's decision, was the fact that toward the end of the third week
in March, shortly before William changed sides, Dunmore received word
of the Prohibitory AC~.'~' With the implementation of this Act, the
Crown, for all practical purposes, began treating the colonies in rebellion as enemies outside the empire. Open season was declared on rebel shipping for the Royal Navy. So serious were the Act's mandates,
some rebels questioned the need for a formal declaration of independence. They felt, in effect, the British Government had just done
it for them.160
Then, most significantly, came the rebel response which was perhaps the most influential factor in swaying William. The Continental
Congress had actually received notice of the Act as early as February
27.1b1 On March 23, Congress, evoking the Laws of Nations and repre-

senting the "United Colonies", authorized those colonies to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal against British shipping.16* This was the
action not only of an independent government, it was the action of an
independent government formally at war with England. Whatever William's level of political consciousness, as a merchant mariner of con-

siderable experience and status, in the world as he knew it, the significance of this act could not have escaped his particular attention
and understanding. To a man of his specific background this would easily be construed as a declaration of independence. Did William actually hear of this prior to switching sides? There is no evidence at
all to support that he did. Yet, news of the magnitude of this act
must have spread quickly through the rebel communications networks,
and the seven days between March 23 and 30 were more than enough for
word to reach Virginia, Dunmore, and thus, William. Certainly something during the last week of March convinced William Goodrich independence had been declared at least as he understood it. In any case,
William's decision was a thoughtful one based on many valid considerations. Any or all of the factors discussed may well have convinced a
disillusioned young man that his associates had gone too far and he
could not go with them. Like many others, while desirous of redressing
grievances with the Crown, William could not bring himself to break
from it, and he joined the Royal forces. He had played the game to the
end.
In further support of William's sincerity and truthfulness, the
contents of his deposition can be viewed from another angle. At the
time he penned his account, he was a prisoner in serious trouble for
what the rebels perceived as his treasonous conduct in changing
sides.163 Granted in putting pen to paper, he conveniently failed to
comment on topics that might serve to incriminate him, while emphasizing those actions which would show him in a better light. Consequently, it would be easy to view his statements simply as an effort
to talk his way out of a bad situation.

Still, it simply did not mat-

ter when or why he changed sides. He had done it and no amount of
sugar-coating his explanation could alter this. In fact, the fabrication of such an elaborate yarn could serve no useful purpose. On the

contrary, if William really intended to mean he had done nothing in
Dunmore's service until at least after May 15, then his statement to
that effect could only serve to expose him as a blatant liar. The rebels were clearly aware of his activities prior to that date, and consequently, any statement on his part to the contrary could only do
more harm than good.'64 In conjunction, the other numerous facts he recounted which can be corroborated are true, so there is no reason to
doubt his sentiments or motives.
Still, before William entered Dunmore's service, the rebels offered him and the family one more slap in the face. On March 29, the
Committee of Safety seized control of the family's plantations with
the intention of managing them and keeping the profits until compensated for the unaccounted powder funds.165 In his post-war memorial to
the loyalist claims commission (a document that dovetails with the account just discussed though suffering the same problems) William
clearly stated he joined Dunmore after the confiscation of property,
and in part, because of it.166 If William had yet to make a firm decision, it appears this act of the Virginians was the proverbial straw
that broke the one-time rebel's back. On March 30, taking command of
the Samuel, Billie departed on his first cruise for the British. 167
Of particular interest is the fact that on the same date,
Dunmore wrote the following to Lord George Germain, the new Secretary
of State for the Colonies.
My Lord in my dispatch No 34, 1 had frequent Occasion to men
tion a Family of the Name of Goodrich, Natives of this Colony,
this is a Spirited, Active, industrious Family, and it has cost me
much trouble and pain (knowing the Service they would be of to
which ever Party they joined) to secure them in His Majesty's
Service. The Male part consist of a Father and Seven Sons, five of
which are Arrived to the Age of Manhood, who are now most Zealously engaged in His Majesty's service, four of them are perfectly
well acquainted with every River, Creek or Branch within this Bay.
I have now five of their vessels employed constantly running up
the Rivers, where they have orders to Seize, burn or destroy every
thing that is Water Born, that they can get at; they often Land
and take off what Provisions they can get, which keeps the Rebels
in constant motion, and I generally send a few of the 14th Regi-

ment with them. I mention this Family to your Lordship, for two
reasons, the first is, least any of their Vessels of which they
have many, in various parts of the World should fall into the
hands of any of our Ships of War, that they may have that Attention Shewn to them that I think them so well entitled to. - My
second reason is, that should we ever see better times in this
Quarter (which I pray God may be soon) that His Majesty may Shew
them such marks of His favour as he as he thinks their Services
are deserving of. - They have all left their Houses, Negroes,
Plantations, Stock, and everything else at the Mercy of the Rebels, and are now with their whole Familys Water Born in this
Fleet.168
This document is noteworthy for several reasons. First of all,
it indicates all of the adult male family members had joined Dunmore
by March 30. It is probable, however, the Governor was overstating his
case in claiming John, Jr. was with him. He certainly erred in saying
Johnie's family was with the fleet at the time. 169 John Jr.'s status as
a rebel or loyalist during the spring and early summer remains a mystery. All things considered it would seem likely he at least sympathized with the other family members in their decision to join Dunmore, and perhaps he even supported their doing so. Furthermore, it
would come as no surprise to find he had formally changed his allegiance as well, but if he did, there is no reference to it other than
this statement, and it must have been in a very minor, low-key capacity. There is no known reference to his cruising for Dunmore, and
while the Governor's dispatch might be interpreted to imply otherwise,
even it offers no direct statement to that effect. On the contrary,
Dunmore states only four of the family members were accomplished mariners, clearly referring to John, Sr., William, Bartlet, and Bridger.
Supporting this is a later statement by Captain Hamond to the effect
that only John, Sr. and three sons were active in the governor's service.170 In fact, no reference has been found to indicate Johnie ever
commanded a vessel under any circumstance or even went to sea in any
capacity other than perhaps as supercargo on short voyages in the Bay.
In light of this apparent lack of activity, and in conjunction with
circumstantial evidence to be discussed later, it is quite probable

John, Jr., in fact, adopted a stance of neutrality and attempted to
maintain it. Perhaps this was enough for Dunmore to feel he had him in
his control.
As to the fifth "adultw son, this was undoubtedly Edward, the
oldest of the "three youngest childrenw allowed to leave with Margaret.171 Very little is known about Edward's activities during the war
other than that later he was involved in privateering to some degree. 172 There is, however, no other reference to his serving Dunmore,
and given his age and situation, it seems extremely unlikely he acted
in any capacity on the Governor's behalf. As an obviously very young
"adultw he was not old enough at this time to act independently, and
his presence with the fleet was undoubtedly due to the simple fact his
mother was there.
This document is interesting too, because it can hardly be coincidence that Dunmore wrote this at a time corresponding exactly with
William's decision to join him. It is tempting to read between the
lines and interpret Dunmore as saying that after all his efforts, with
William's decision, he had finally won over all four family members
who counted most for his purposes; John Sr., William, Bartlet, and
Bridger, the four mariners familiar with all parts of the Bay.
Finally, the dispatch is significant for one other reason at
least partly accounting for the family's decisions. While the Virginians were busy persecuting the Goodriches for relatively petty reasons
which blinded them to the family's potential usefulness to their
cause, Dunmore, though he had initially treated them roughly, realized
and esteemed their worth to such a degree he was willing to overlook
what were, in reality, far worse offenses and actually court their
support. This made the Goodriches' decisions all the easier. Few are
prone to stay where they are not wanted.

William, commanding the Samuel and in company with the sloop
173
-Lilly, departed from the Elizabeth River and sailed up the James.

The a
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a prize, had been recently purchased by Dunmore on March

25.174 On this cruise, her first in government service, it is remotely
possibly John, Sr. commanded her. One rebel newspaper account written
several weeks later associated him with one of the events of the
cruise.175 On the other hand, both William and Dunmore later made
rather detailed statements concerning the same event and neither alluded to the presence of the elder Goodrich.176 Also, although Bartlet
later stated his father was given command of a tender "about the Month
of March," it was "to go on an Expidition to Ocacock," North Carolina. 177 More significantly, in a post-war memorial, John, Sr., himself, did not make reference to the incident. On the contrary, he
clearly stated that after Baltimore, his next activity for Dunmore was
to go to North Carolina, which, as will be seen, he did, in command of
the Lilly. 178
William's objective was twofold. The first involved a nocturnal
visit to the family plantation at Nansemond to bring off slaves and
livestock. In this, he was only minimally successful, regaining possession of only two slaves.
In response, the Virginians took quick action. The remaining
Goodrich slaves were to be "secured" and their livestock sold at public auction. Though still in bondage, the two blacks who were reclaimed could consider themselves lucky. The fate of some remaining
slaves was to be transported by the rebels to labor in the mines in
the interior. These were probably the lead mines in Fincastle County
(present day western West Virginia and Kentucky) to which other loyalist slaves, including one of Sheddon's, were sent.179
The second part of the excursion offered more reward. Per
Dunmore's orders, William was to intercept a large merchantman, the

Molly, known to be coming down the Bay with a considerable cargo of
flour and wheat. In fact, this was the same ship the Samuel and the
Edward had found aground and tried to take at the mouth of the Patapsco. William was more successful, taking his first prize in the conflict. Several weeks later, the rebel press credited John, Sr. with
the capture of the Molly, but far more reliable sources, including
testimony from Dunmore and William himself, indicate Billie was responsible. John, Sr. if actually present in the Lilly, seems to have
been nothing more than a bystander acting in his usual capacity as a
pilot. 180
Within a few days of the tenders' return, John, Sr. was actually
in command of the Lilly. Acting under Dunmore's orders, he sailed for
the North Carolina Outer Banks where he was to act as pilot for the
naval tender Fincastle, Lieutenant John Wright, then attempting to
procure provisions. Upon John, Sr.'s arrival, a very interesting series of events, with regards to his conduct, would be played out. 181
On April 14, James Buchanan, half owner of the schooner Polly
and her cargo of Indian corn, staves, and headings, aground on the
swatch at Ocracoke Island, watched what he thought was a pilot boat
approaching. Much to his chagrin, the vessel in question turned out to
be the armed sloop Lilly fresh from detaining the sloop Two Brothers
at Ocracoke Inlet. Without hostility, her master, John Goodrich, Sr.,
asked to examine the Polly's papers, and upon doing so, informed Buchanan the schooner was a lawful prize. Goodrich did not, however,
take possession of her, nor did he disarm her crew. He merely related
that his superior, Lieutenant Wright, would arrive that evening and
deal with the matter.182
As stated, Wright appeared that evening, finally putting a prize
crew on the M

y which promptly plundered her. That same night, an-

other vessel, a sloop, passed by. Interestingly, while his crew clam-

ored to give chase, John, Sr. let her go. He sympathetically reasoned
that because she was known to be persecuted for not conforming to the
Articles of Association, she could not load a cargo and so, was empty.
This failure to pursue brought Wright's wrath down on John, Sr. the
following morning. There was apparently no love lost between these two
men. Years later in his post-war memorial, John, Sr. still saw fit to
criticize Wright, referring to his "intemp ce. and imprudent Conduct".
In addition, at some time while the Polly was still aground, the pilot
told the lieutenant he thought she should be released. Old and not
valuable, she was not worth the trouble of getting off the shoal.183
At some point, probably on the 15th, Goodrich hailed a third
vessel, the sloop Friendship. Asking for and examining her papers, he
simply told her master, Abraham Adderly, to report to Wright who would
decide the matter in the morning.

On the 16th, the Fincastlq departed

with Adderly's craft and the Two Brothers, leaving Goodrich behind
with the Polly.

A

fourth unidentified prize also remained which, given

the lack of any reference to her being taken by Goodrich in a wealth
of documentation, was probably one of two seized by Wright, referred
to in John, Sr.'s confession. Accounts differ, but either adverse
winds, tides, or weather, prevented Goodrich from getting over the
bar, forcing him to remain another night. 184
As noted, John, Sr.'s conduct at Ocracoke was interesting and
suspicious. This was because of its general passiveness. He was never
hostile with or put a prize crew on either of the two vessels he
stopped in Buchanan's presence. In fact, he passed on all responsibility to Wright. Furthermore, he let one vessel escape, and attempted to
have another one set free. Quite telling is the fact the cargo of little value on the Polly consisted of Indian corn. In other words, she
carried provisions, the very thing Goodrich had been sent to help procure. These are not the actions of a man actively and whole-heartedly

waging war against the King's enemies. Nor does this reflect the conduct of a greedy man. These are the actions of a man who is doing just
enough to put on a creditable front to get him through a distasteful
situation he wants no part of, but has no choice in.
It must be noted that about two months later, the owners of the
Two Brothers entered a claim against the Goodrich estate for recompense for this vessel which was wrecked after leaving Ocracoke. Referring to the actual capture they stated:
John Goodrich of Virginia in an armed Sloop called the Lilly with
force and Arms violently seized and took possession of the said
Vessel and Cargoe with her Crew and having taken out their Captain
put on board a prize Master and some Mariners and ordered her to
Sea under Convoy of a certain Lieutenant Wright [ ]

.

In fact, some of Goodrich's men

did serve as prize crew on the

Two

Brothers.186 Obviously, this conveys a somewhat different impression of
John, Sr.'s behavior than does Buchanan's account. Buchanan, however,
was present, so his testimony concerning John, Sr.'s conduct carries
greater weight. As to the violent nature of the capture by force of
arms, this simply does not jibe with how Buchanan, a rebel third
party, viewed both his and Adderly's seizure. In addition, in both Buchanan's and Adderly's situations, they were not even boarded. Goodrich merely directed the masters to bring their papers to the Lilly
for examination.187 Also, by the owner's own account the Two Brothers
was not under way when taken, negating any need for force to bring her
too.ls8 All in all, the report of the Two Brothers' owners does not
ring true. Consequently, one of two assessments can be made of these
comments. It is entirely possible the Two Brothers' owners were
greatly overstating their case, or, giving them the benefit of the
doubt, to them, even without actual physical violence, the simple act
of an armed vessel merely taking possession of theirs constituted a
violent act undertaken with armed force.

The next day, in the pre-dawn hours, with only a small ad hoc
crew on board that included George Blair, the Lillv was approached by
four or five boatloads of armed rebels intent on retaking the prizes
and capturing the tender. Caught by surprise as the boats pulled
alongside, John, Sr., trapped and in self-defense, committed his first
real hostile act against the rebels. He gave his crew the order to
fire on them. There was not time, however, for his crew to respond as
the rebel boatmen climbed aboard to take possession. Because of Goodrich's command, a Captain Harney leveled his gun at John, Sr. and
pulled the trigger. The story of John Goodrich, Sr. should end here
with all events discussed so far perhaps warranting only a minor footnote in history. But, Harney's piece flashed in the pan. Goodrich and
his crew then seem to have submitted with minimal resistance, if
any.189
A short time later, James Anderson, another boarder, heard Goodrich to say, "he was a prisoner and that he had been so harassed on
Both sides he did not value his life. "lgOThese are not the words of a
man who has whole-heartedly committed himself to a cause. At the very
least, these are the words of a very unhappy man caught in the middle
who would prefer to have nothing to do with either side but cannot escape their grasp; a man forced from the rebel cause he once supported,
but as yet unwilling to embrace the crown fully.
As a prisoner, John, Sr. was taken first to New Bern and then
Halifax, North Carolina, during which time he was confined in shackles
and suffered unpleasant jail conditions. At Halifax, depositions were
taken from individuals present at Ocracoke, and John, Sr. made a confession. In it, he candidly recounted his activities with Dunmore, including his participation in the Baltimore raid and the cruise to
North Carolina. He went on to say Dunmore never ordered him to take up
arms nor do anything that he would construe as base. In conjunction,

he declared he served Dunmore, because he was obliged to do so.
Dunmore had dismissed a death penalty resulting from the powder incident, and he had a considerable amount of Goodrich's property under
his control. Of interest is the fact that Goodrich attributed the
prizes taken at Ocracoke to Wright. In light of his conduct, this was
technically correct. At the end of the month, John Goodrich, Sr. "a
most notorious Tory," was sent to Virginia to face charges.191
During early April, either Bridger or William assisted the Governor in another way. One of them supervised the construction of a
galley rowing sixteen oars and intended to carry fifty men, six threepounders, and twelve swivels.192
Later that month, while his father was beginning his captivity,
Bridger was again cruising in a tender. On April 21, he appeared off
Hobb's Hole (Tappahanock) on the Rappahanock River. There, he chased a
New England schooner loaded with corn upstream and took her. Upon return, however, the prize ran aground. On the 23rd, the local rebels
set out in four sailing boats to retake the Yankee. With the enemy
craft closing on him, Bridger abandoned the prize, but not before attempting to burn her. Two of the rebel boats maintained the chase, and
coming up with the tender, commenced a vicious little action with
small arms at close quarters. This lasted fifteen or twenty minutes
before the tender broke it off. Reports of loyalist casualties vary
between 3 and 8 men out of a crew of twenty-four. This high loss of
perhaps one third of the compliment reflects the intensity of the
fight

.
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Once again, Bridger had displayed his brash personality. At some
point during the operation, he boasted he would capture General Lee,
all the rebel armed vessels, and be up the river within two weeks. 194

An irate Landon Carter referred to Bridger as a "Pirate" and a "Villain," "detestable in the Eyes of heaven. "Ig5

The Hobb's Hole raid was noteworthy because of another participant, Richard Dale, destined to be John Paul Jones's first officer in
the famous fight between the Bon Homme Richard and H.M.S Serapi., a
distinguished naval captain in his own right later in the revolution,
and one of the first United States naval captains of the New Republic.
Even more interesting, however, is the fact that having already been a
rebel officer in the Virginia State Navy, at this particular point
Dale was sailing and fighting with his old school chum, Bridger Goodrich. Dale's presence with the loyalists reflects the confusion and
indecision of at least some about taking a political stance. At the
beginning of the war, Dale was the senior officer on a brig owned by
Thomas Newton. By early 1776, he was a lieutenant in the Virginia
Navy. Captured by a British tender, while held prisoner, his old
friend, Bridger, visited him, and "After much solicitation, and many
plausible and seductive arguments," Dale was won over. For his efforts, Dale was severely wounded in the head during the fight at Hobb's Hole. While recuperating, he had time to reflect and came to the
decision "never again to put himself in the way of the balls of his
country." As will be seen, however, Dale's convictions remained shaky
for a while longer.196
During this same month, another future loyalist privateersman,
William Picket, was active. Earlier, Picket was a merchant captain in
Sheddon's employ. As such, he was undoubtedly known to the Goodriches,
and at this time, he commanded a sloop-rigged pink owned by them.
Cruising off the Virginia Capes, he was involved in bagging a French
sloop carrying arms and munitions to the rebels.197
During this time as well, Robert Sheddon experienced additional
problems with the rebels. At some point in late March or early April,
in a vessel attempting to reach Dunmore, he was pursued by a party of
rebels intent on his capture, and submitted only after being fired on

several times. On April 3, at Great Bridge, he was brought before the
Commissioners of Norfolk who were investigating suspected loyalists.
Sheddon must have been a truly persuasive individual, because once
again he talked his way out of a tight situation. The jury found him
"not guiltyw of "being an enemy to Americaw and he was "honourably acquitted.w198
Despite this verdict, other rebels were not so easily convinced
of Sheddon1s innocence. On April 11, General Charles Lee ordered Sheddonls apprehension yet again. At some point, probably during the
fourth week of the month, he was retaken and sent first to Suffolk and
then Williamsburg to be investigated.'''
John, Jr. experienced difficulties too. Although the circumstances surrounding his apprehension remain a mystery, by April 30,
he was in custody in Williamsburg. On that date, after posting 52,000
bond to the Committee of Safety, he was released under the recognizance of his father-in-law, William Harwood, with instructions to report before the committee on the first Monday of May and not to have
any contact with Dunrnore or any other loyalists.200
Between April 28 and May 2, the rebels struck again.

Under or-

ders from Charles Lee, they burned and destroyed the houses, warehouses, vessels, and other property of Goodrich, Sheddon, and Neil
Jamieson, at Portsmouth, and seized their considerable stores of salt,
molasses, and other valuable commodities needed by the Virginians.201
Even leading Virginia rebels thought this act was too much. Edmund
Pendleton rebuked Lee for exceeding his authority.202 During the conflagration, John, Jr.'s wife and child were forced to flee for safety
and seek sanctuary with Dunmore. On May 3, the Committee of Safety
granted leave for Harwood to retrieve his daughter and grandchild under a flag of truce.203

As directed, John, Jr. appeared before the committee on May 6.
The only action taken against him at that time, however, was to confine him under guard as a "suspected Person" to his room at a Mrs.
Coke's in Williamsburg.204 On May 26, without any additional proceedings, John, Jr. was again released on bond into the custody of his father-in-law with instructions to appear again on June 3.205
While these events were transpiring with other family members,
John, Sr. and George Blair were forced to walk from Halifax, North
Carolina, to Williamsburg, where they had arrived by May 6.206John,
Sr., at least, endured the trek handcuffed, and like a trophy, he was
displayed "at each public place thro which he pass'd to every Mark of
agonizing Ignominy and Insult."207 At the Virginia capital, both were
confined in the jail with other suspected loyalists including Robert
~heddon.~O*
On May 7, William managed to pass a message through the
lines via a flag of truce notifying his father several changes of
clothing and some money were being sent. William also conveyed that
Margaret was so upset over his capture that she was quite ill. As soon
as she recovered, however, she would come to be with him, foregoing
the safety and security of Dunmore's fleet.209
News of John, Sr.'s capture spread. Indicative of what an infamous cause c&l&bre he had become is the fact his being taken prompted
reports and comments from North Carolina to Pennsylvania.210 Upon hearing the news, at least one individual, Josiah Parker, went out of his
way to dig up more evidence against ~oodrich.~ll
Parker can perhaps be
best described as a rabid zealot, firebrand, and hatchet man, literally. He was responsible for torching the property of Goodrich and
~ ~ fact,
~
he had relished his role in this unothers at ~ o r t s m o u t h .In
dertaking so much that upon receiving his orders from General Lee,
through Colonel Muhlenburg, to destroy Goodrich's and Sheddon's buildings, he promptly wrote back pointing out that Lee had failed to men-

tion Jamieson, and that he, Parker, thought that loyalist's property
was worthy of the same attention.213When planning an attack on
Dunmore's fleet the day before, Parker was asked what to do with Tories found on the vessels. Illustrating his complete hatred for loyalists, he responded, "damn them, Tomahawk them all and throw them over
Board, and give yourself no further trouble about them. "214 Of additional interest is the fact that he, too, was from Isle of Wight
County, was a member of the Committee of Safety, and was involved in
the inquiry there into John, Sr.'s conduct at least to the extent of
carrying the committee's report to the Convention.215
Parker sought out James Eastwood, the Goodrich captain who commanded William's sloop when bringing in the powder and skippered the
same when John, Sr. was attempting to go to St. Eustatia. Eastwood
told Parker about how Dunmore had intimidated John, Sr., the negotiations between the two about retrieving the powder and money, and the
circumstances of Goodrich's capture by Jones's tender at Ocracoke in
November. It seems unlikely any of this was news to the rebel powers,
and if it was, it was in keeping with the facts already established.
Parker, however, claimed Eastwood conveyed something else; that Goodrich had acted as a spy for Dunmore, both in late October and when on
parole during very late November and December.

"[A]

better pimp they

not have got, for his diligence, at last Convention, made Dunmore esteem him as his first favourite."216
In fact, this accusation borders on the absurd. As to Goodrich
playing the spy in October, he only had roughly two weeks to do so
during which he was involved with far more pressing matters and certainly not in a physical position to obtain intelligence. The only
thing he could have divulged to Dunmore, and perhaps it was what
Parker was referring to, was the nature of the gunpowder transaction.
As to the period of his parole, Parker referred to Goodrich's "dili-

gence, at last Convention." This initially seems to convey the impression John, Sr. regularly attended that group's assemblies and passed
on information learned at them. Upon reflection, however, if this is
what Parker intended to convey, he was guilty of a serious fabrication. To begin with, it seems most unlikely that a man whose activities were under suspicion and close scrutiny as of December 11, would
have dared or even been able to play such a game. Furthermore, all indications are that he remained at the Nansemond plantation.217 It was
the four voyages from there to Dunmore that in part aroused suspicion.
Even if he had been in Williamsburg, it could not have been for any
duration. The travel time of four round trips from there to Nansemond
to Norfolk and back would account for a considerable amount of his
whereabouts.
Parker's account was penned in a letter to his superior, General
Lee, who must have passed it on to the committee set to investigate
~ o o d r i c h .That
~ ~ ~body cornered Eastwood and had him give a sworn deposition concerning John, Sr. Confirming that Parker's accusations of
spying were false is the fact that Eastwood's deposition, while reiterating everything Parker claimed to have been told in even greater
detail, mentions nothing about spying, when it would seem likely this
was what the committee would have been most interested in hearing
about. Furthermore, when the time came, none of Eastwood's testimony
would be cited as evidence against John, Sr., nor was any other evidence brought forth that he had been involved in such activities.219
As of May 13, John, Sr. was preparing his defense. At that time,
having heard that Captains Wright Westcoat [Westcott] and Laban Goffagen were in the capital, he requested both be present at his trial.
Barring that, he desired they be detained until depositions could be
acquired from them. There is no evidence the rebels complied with this
request.220

On May 16, yet another blow was struck the family. The Committee
of Safety ordered the Isle of Wight plantation sold.221Shortly after,
although already under lock and key, Goodrich was deemed dangerous
enough to warrant being restrained even further with irons.222 By one
account, he was chained immobile on his
Margaret arrived on May 29, with the smaller children. Evidently, she thought she would actually be able to stay at the jail
with her husband. The rebels quickly made it clear, however, that
would not be allowed. She could only visit, and after initial contact,
she could not leave Williamsburg.224
In early June, probably on the 4th, John, Sr. petitioned the investigating committee. Stating he was heartily tired of the "Confinement

&

Damn,d Irons" which he had endured for sixteen days, he de-

sired, even welcomed, the commencement of his hearing. He wished to be
able to defend himself against "the many false Aspertions, Laid to his
Charge, by Envious Informations and Representations." He added that he
felt his actions were as "Little Offensive to his Countryn as could be
for a man in his situation. Then, pointing out he had had a great deal
to lose in the beginning, he had, in fact, lost almost everything. Towards the end of the petition, concerning his affiliations, he offered, "I took a warm

&

Early Part which Involved me in Lord Dunmores

Hands I am by his Means now in Your hands or in Other words Discharged
from the Obligation I was bound to him In.n225
This petition is particularly intriguing, because of the phrase

" many false Aspertions ...by Envious information and representations."
It recalls to mind the "many Malicious Enemys." Like nMalicious," "Envious" conveys a personal element, and as such, the two words share a
certain affinity. This is quite possibly another allusion to there
having been personal enemies in the rebel camp who did not wish the

family well. As will be seen, all indications are the committee denied
John Sr. a hearing of any kind.
About this time, word circulated that John, Sr. was to be sent
upcountry to the interior for imprisonment. Seriously upset over the
news, Margaret, on June 5, petitioned the rebels not to do this. 226 Her
petition was tabled.227 Of note is the fact the Convention minute book
for that date originally stated, "Two petitions of Goodrichs Read",
but the "two" is suspiciously marked out. 228 The more complete "Proceedings" only mention Margaret's. 229 One historian suggests the second
was John, Sr.'s request for a hearing.230 If so, the deletion of the
reference would support that his request was ignored.
On the following day, the Convention directed a committee to investigate the conditions of the jail. This facility was undoubtedly
not the most enjoyable place to spend time under any circumstance, but
overcrowding, bad ventilation, summer heat, poor sanitation, and bad
food created an unpleasant and unhealthy environment for its residents. On June 7, the committee reported this and the fact John, Sr.
had been suffering a slight fever for three days. They feared it would
worsen and become "putrid." Consequently, it was ordered that Goodrich
be released from his shackles and sent under a "strong guardn to a
more suitable place to recover. On June 10, he was returned to the
jail.231
Assigned to investigate John, Sr. was the Committee of Privileges and Elections, whose twenty-one members included such notables
as Patrick Henry, Robert Carter Nicholas, Richard Bland, Henry and
Richard Lee, Archibald Cary, and Dudley Digges.232 On May 7, this
standing body had been vested with judicial powers to examine suspected enemies of the state.233 "The legislature, not the court, would
sentencew John, Sr.234 On June 11, Henry presented the group's findings
to the Convention. After recounting in detail evidence of John, s
:
r
S

activities with Dunmore gleaned from Goodrich's own confession and the
depositions of James Buchanan and James Anderson, all taken in North
Carolina, Henry stated the Committee's resolution which was adopted by
the Convention. "Resolved that the said John Goodrich is guilty of
bearing Arms against this Colony and is also guilty of aiding and assisting the Enemy by giving them intelligence contrary to and in contempt of an Ordinance of the last C~nvention."~~~
The nature of the testimony and consequent resolve are curious
for several reasons. To begin with, only three documents, recorded at
the same place and time, were used. More significantly, none of these
statements came from witnesses speaking on Goodrich's behalf, although
he had asked for such support. Most significantly, there is no reference to any recent testimony from John, Sr. taken since his arrival in
the capitol, despite his request for a hearing. In conjunction, there
is evidence the Committee actually arrived at its conclusion at least
as early as June 5. It was probably a leak of their decision that
prompted Margaret's petition of that date. If this is accepted, and if
John, Sr.'s petition was written on June 4, then a very interesting
picture of the situation develops.236
The nature of the testimony actually cited in combination with
John, Sr, having yet to be heard at a time coinciding approximately
with when the decision against him was made supports two things. John,
Sr. was not allowed witnesses on his behalf, and he was not even allowed to speak for himself and testify in his own defense. In fact, it
is quite likely John, Sr.'s petition was written, because of this very
thing. If Margaret had received word of the Committee's decision, it
is safe to say she conveyed the news to her husband. Consequently,
John, Sr.'s petition may well represent a last desperate effort to be
heard, written in response to news of the resolution. In turn, this
would explain why the petition was ignored. The decision had already

been made and there was no point in acknowledging Goodrich. In any
case, the only recorded instance of members of the investigating Committee ever personally confronting Goodrich was when, in his presence,
the confession taken in North Carolina was read.237
Despite the fact there was no accusation or evidence offered of
spying, the resolve clearly stated John, Sr. was found "guilty of aiding and assisting the Enemy by giving them intelligence." This must
refer to his conduct as a pilot, a role Goodrich freely confessed to
and the main activity that was held against him. 238 In such a capacity,
guiding naval vessels and tenders in search of rebel shipping and provisions, he most certainly offered important intelligence. He was not,
however, privy to or divulging the colony's state secrets.
As punishment, the rebels confiscated the remainder of Goodrich's estates, making provision from their revenue for the care of
the prisoner, Margaret, and the youngest children. John, Sr., himself,
was ordered under heavy guard to detention in Charlottesville. Reflecting some sense of decency, the Conunittee allowed him the use of
one of the goaler's personal rooms in order to regain his health before making the journey. As of July 2, there was still enough concern
about his physical condition that the Committee of Safety directed a
doctor to examine him and report on his condition. It was not until
July 22, that the Council of State finally ordered him taken to the
interior.239
With matters concerning John, Sr. under control, the Virginians
again turned their attention to John, Jr. Though he had been directed
to report to the Committee of Safety on June 3, there is no evidence
anything transpired at that time. On June 14, however, the Committee
told him to appear on June 21. They also, issued summons for two men
to appear and give evidence at John, Jr.'s examination.240

On the 21st, the Committee met, considered the accusation that
John, Jr. was "inimical to the rights of American, and decided his
fate. There being no evidence against him or forthcoming witnesses,
they dropped the charges. They maintained, though, that he remained
under "general suspicionn and should post E1,000 bond not to give intelligence to the enemy or assist them in any way. On the same day,
the Convention concurred with the Committee and ordered the oath administered to Johnie.241
On June 25, with father-in-law Harwood vouching for
him, John, Jr. promised future good behavior and was discharged on parole. Still a suspect, though, as directed, the Committee attempted to
administer the oath. John, Jr. refused to take it. The only response
was to order him disarmed.242
The situation of John, Jr. is of note. It seems he was suspected
of guilt merely by association. He was a Goodrich. The circumstances
of his confinement and examination, however, tend to support the fact
that he never committed himself to Dunmore's service. The rather relaxed nature of his captivity (the fact he had been allowed to go
about armed shows just how lax) clearly indicates he was not viewed as
a dangerous enemy of the colony as were his father and brother-in-law,
and no evidence was ever tendered against him. The only thing that
could really be held against him was that in the end, when all else
was said and done, he refused to take the oath. His actions following
his release further support that he was at least attempting to maintain a neutral stance. Although Bartlet would later refer to John, Jr.
as prisoner in Virginia, and he would eventually leave the colony and
go to New York, there is no evidence of any overt efforts to escape
his lax security during the time he remained, and his departure went
~nmentioned.~'~
All indications are that he was content to sit on the
sidelines with his family and avoid involvement one way or the other.

Even after he left the colony, he does not seem to have been overly
active with the British. To date, only a single reference has been
found to John, Jr. having invested in a privateer which, in light of
the numerous references pertaining to the involvement of other family
members, tends to indicate his participation was comparitively minimal.2 4 4 So, with his acquittal, the story of John, Jr. is really at an
end. For this Goodrich family member, profit was certainly not a guiding motive.
While events played out for John, Sr. and John, Jr., affairs
were not going well for Robert Sheddon. On June 10, Patrick Henry had
presented the Committee's findings on his conduct.245 They really had
nothing substantial in terms of specifics to offer as evidence against
him, citing only his general contact with Dunmore, his attempt to escape capture, and that he "was generally thought about Norfolk to be
In fact, it was maintained Sheddon had actually aided rebel Wills Cowper and others by warning them that Dunmore was intent on
their capture. Still, the resolve was to confine Sheddon on parole to
parts of Surry County at least ten miles from the James River with instructions not to give intelligence to the British or help them in any
way. The next day, the place of confinement was changed to an area of
Dinwiddie County at least ten miles from the Appomattox River. Sheddon
was allowed fifteen days to get his affairs in order and arrive at the
designated location.247
It is doubtful Sheddon bothered to comply with the Convention's
resolves. At a later date, he simply stated that after being held
prisoner for several months (April, May, and June), he escaped to rejoin Dunmore with whom he remained. In another account, although he
incorrectly stated he was captured in February or March, he mentioned
being held captive for fifty days. This span conforms fairly well to
the period from when he was taken in April to just after the Commit-

tee's resolution. In essence, it would seem Sheddon took advantage of
the fifteen day grace period to rejoin the Governor. His activities
for the duration of the campaign remain a mystery.

He would, however,

go to Bermuda and be heard from again.248
During this same period in June, related events were transpiring
in Northhampton County on the Eastern Shore. There, at some point during the first week of June, Bartlet, having sailed from the Caribbean
with a cargo of produce, small arms, gunpowder, sugar, and sail cloth,
was captured in a small armed vessel at Cherrystone

Tried be-

fore the Northhampton County Court for being "inimical to the Rights

&

Liberties of America," he was found guilty.250 An appeal to the Virginia Council of State proved unsuccessful. On July 24, that body upheld the verdict of the county court and sentenced Bartlet to parole
in the town of New London, Bedford County. The guards transporting him
were directed to hurry in order to catch up with the party escorting
John, Sr. and so travel together. 251
To believe the Goodriches were badly treated, even innocent, is
to accept the unthinkable. Virginia's revolutionary leaders were human
and capable of making grievous errors in judgment, if not worse. Edmund Randolph, at least, admitted as much. Following are his comments
on the matter replete with masterful double entendre and cryptic reference.
Virginia committed but few errors in the selection of men to
whom she committed her interests. But she was not equally fortunate in the repudiation of a father and his three sons, of the
name of Goodrich. They were so original and happy in their genius
of shipbuilding that from the construction of vessels adapted to
all the waters of this colony, many cargoes escaped capture and
relieved the most urgent wants of the navy and of the people. But
upon a doubt whether upon some occasion they had acted correctly,
they were suspected of being unfaithful to the country and forced
into the condition of enemies.
Fertile as revolutions generally
are in character equal to every growing necessity, Virginia never
repaired the loss which she sustained in these men.
Whether
they were guilty or not of the first imputations was decided by
the voice of the public, according to the temperament of him who
judged. But a cloud may suddenly envelop well-disposed and capable
men, which they may not easily pierce, or which if lessened is

...

...

never wholly dissipated. They may be forgiven, and the attainder
of their reputation may be proclaimed to be unjust, but the suspicion infects every struggle toward full and delicate confidence.
The cause of these men I pretend not to perfectly understand or to
advocate. But it is a superfluous function of history to warn a
republic to avoid temerity in condemning, without the highest
proof, her servants w h ~ ~ ~ u n tthe
i l hour of darkness shone with
luster in her service.
Upon reading this, one gets the distinct impression something remained
unsaid. In essence, there is the feeling Randolph was privy to additional information, but, for whatever reason, thought it best to keep
his own council and say no more.
Many of the particulars necessary to fully explain and understand the Goodrich's situation will probably never come to light.
Still, analysis of events and personalities shows that they were
treated quite shabbily by their fellow Virginians, and indications are
that a darker, personal element lay behind this. The complex sequence
of events in which they were caught had the affect of transforming
them from rebels to arch loyalists. Family members were given little
choice in their decision to side with the British.
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CHAPTER 5

"THE LITTLE TENDERS HAVE HAD GREAT SUCCESS:" LOYALIST
OPERATIONS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION, 1776'

For Dunmore, as May, 1776, progressed, the Rebels increased
their hold on Norfolk and Portsmouth and a major attack on the fleet
appeared imminent. Consequently, on the 22nd, after destroying a nunber of small and worthless vessels and quantities of goods, the governor began the evacuation of the harbor. Sailing up the Bay, the fleet
arrived off Gwynn's Island on the 26th. There, amidst the mounting
losses and squalor due to smallpox and gaol fever, the group fortified
and prepared for the rebels.2
During this time and until Dunmore gave up his attempts at maintaining control over Virginia, tender activities continued, involving
a fair number of craft manned by a substantial number of loyalist
crewmen. Although these mariners suffered losses both in vessels and
personnel, they were nevertheless effective, continuing to disrupt rebel trade and provide other services for the governor.
During May and June, tenders accompanied the navy as far as
Delaware Bay for blockade duty. There, on May 2, the prize brigantine/schooner turned tender, Betsey, was seized after being cut off
and trapped in a river by rebel row galleys and the Continental Schooner Wasp. Though under naval command, her former master, future privateersman Thomas Slater, was still on board as part of the crew. During
the action, the naval personnel abandoned the Betsey, allowing Slater
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to resume command with the assistance of two black loyalist mariners
who also remained. All three were captured.3
Following his capture, Slater attempted to defend his actions by
claiming he had been coerced into serving the British, and after regaining control of his vessel, was actually trying to flee them when
taken.4 His explanation fell on unsympathetic ears, and he was imprisoned at Philadelphia.5 As with other loyalist captives, his accomrnodations were less than satisfactory, prompting him to formally protest
the bad food, absence of bed and bedding, over-crowding, lack of
money, and minimal clothing. At the time he penned his complaint, he
had been ill for ten days.6 After nine months in the Philadelphia jail,
the rebels put Slater in irons and sent him to Baltimore. Upon arrival
there, the shackles were removed, and Slater took advantage of the
situation to make his escape. Free, he made his way to New York where
he would join the future ranks of privateersmen at that port. 7
Late in May, Dunmore's raiders were joined by a "tall slim, gallows looking fellow," Maryland pilot and shipowner Joseph Wayland,
Jr., destined to become one of the most feared privateersman on the
Bay. 8 A strong supporter of the King with a serious dislike of the rebels in his region, Wayland first made contact with Dunmore while carrying provisions to the fleet. He then joined the governor on a regular basis in the capacity of pilot and commander of a tender.9
Although there is nothing known about the resulting foray, on
June 10, Captain Hamond ordered Lieutenant Wright of the Fincastle to
undertake a raid. He was to take [Bridger] Goodrich, then in the sloop
Lady Susaq, run up the Rappahanock River, destroy rebel galleys and
other craft collecting there, and "otherwise to annoy the enemy. "I0
The tenders performed other services in addition to raiding.
Some were sent to the Eastern Shore of Maryland to bring off loyalists
and gathered

"between fifty and Sixty."ll There having been no room

for more, in late June Dunmore dispatched four more tenders and a naval vessel to collect others left behind.12 This flotilla, which Wayland accompanied, also took the time to do a little raiding in the
area of Hooper's Straits, Maryland. From Hopkin's Island, they took
sixty head of cattle, two young men, and "every thing else that was
valuable. "I3
Although in mid-March a tender's crew had plundered a plantation
overseer's house, with this foray, the raiding took on a new, more serious complexion. Kidnapping, along with the wanton pilfering and destruction of private property, entered fully as a new element. Worse,
matters had become personal. One loyalist took the opportunity to
carry out a vendetta, carrying off a William Roberts, a number of his
slaves, and a considerable amount of other property. Loyalists also
burned the home of another rebel, Samuel McChester.14
In the later half of this same month, one of the Goodrich brothers undertook a successful cruise. As to whether it was Bridger or
William, however, remains unrecorded. In any case, at some point prior
to the 23rd, one of them seized a French West Indiaman coming in to
trade with the rebels.15
Illustrating the degree of notoriety the Goodriches had achieved
by this time was an erroneous account concerning one of the family
members. The rebels reported one of the brothers was en route to New
York when, in a ship to ship duel with the rebel privateer Tyranz
nicide, he was killed and his vessel taken. The news was important
enough to be conveyed to the rebel headquarters at New York from which
it was relayed to Virginia. Another more detailed account seems to
have reached that colony by a different route. There, the news was
heralded in both Purdie's and Dixon and Hunter's ViruinAa Gazettes.16
Obviously, many rebels wished the intelligence was true, and must have
been disappointed upon finding it otherwise.

On July 9, having erected two batteries of artillery on the
mainland opposite Gwynn's, the rebels commenced a severe bombardment
of the island and anchorage. Having thoroughly disrupted Dunmore's position, the rebels planned an assault for the following day. First,
however, three tenders covering the intervening waterway had to be
overcome. These vessels consisted of the naval sloop-tender Lady Charunder a Midshipman Thomas, the loyalist schooner Lively, John
-lotte
-.
Forsyth, and the loyalist sloop Lady Stanley, William Younghusband.
After playing on these vessels with two six-pound field guns, the rebels, in about thirty canoes, attacked across the haven. This forced
the Lively's crew to abandon their position and ground their schooner
up a creek on the island. There, they put a torch to her before making
their escape. The crew of the Lady Charlotte held out a tad too long
before attempting to burn her and taking to their boats. The pursuing
rebels were in time to put out the flames and take a few prisoners.
Little is known about the role of the Lady Stanley in this engagement.
Rebel sources state she was poorly armed and offered no resistance.
British sources state she was burned during the defense of the island.
With their position under fire, the loss of three tenders, numbers
greatly reduced by disease, and no suitable supply of water, the British decided the island was no longer tenable. On July 11, they moved
to a new base of operations, St. George's Island at the mouth of the
Potomac River. 17
At St. George's, once again a threatening rebel force began to
collect on the mainland opposite, and the supply of water proved insufficient.18 On July 22, to obtain additional water as well as raid,
tenders accompanied naval vessels up the Potomac. After filling water
casks, skirmishing with the enemy, and burning the house of a rebel
colonel, the expedition pushed up-river to the vicinity of Mount
Vernon where a shore party brought off three of George Washington's

servants.19 On the 27th, the squadron returned to St. George's in time
to assist in fending off an ill-advised rebel attack.20
By this time, though still within close proximity to the main
force, some tenders seemingly acted independently. As of July 15, Wayland was cruising off Smiths Island, Potomac River. There, having already taken a sloop belonging to Joseph White and another craft, Wayland took the boat of Moses Yell.

According to Yell, Wayland wanted

the mast from his boat to replace one on the sloop which he intended
to turn into a tender with four four-pounders and twelve swivel guns,
"to guard the Islands and keep the Shirt Men from going on to abuse
the Inhabitants." Before this could be done, however, Wayland received
orders from Dunmore to rejoin the fleet, with the result that after
burning the sloop and second prize, he returned the boat to Yell who
only suffered the loss of some clothes and about forty shillings. 21
Despite the ugliness of some loyalists' conduct, both Yell's account and another left by Joseph Mariman, Yells' mate, show Wayland's
actions to have been not only gentlemanly, but even kind and considerate.22 Mariman stated:
they [Wayland] then asked him [Mariman] from whence he came, and
what he had in, his answer was they had Plank and Tar, they were
from Potomack loaded in Hunger river and bound to Potomack again.
Wheeland then asked this Deponent if he did not belong to the
fleet; this Deponent askld what fleet? they answered the English
fleet, this deponant answered he did not, he then asked him, who
he was for, either the Country or the King, this deponant told him
he did not choose to intermeddle with either side, he then asked
him how many men he had on board, this deponant told him there was
but one person besides himself, he then asked him, this deponant
if he were a tory or not, he then told him he could not tell, the
said Joseph Wheeland then told him he belonged to the English
fleet and he must go along with him, he then asked him if he was
willing to stay with the fleet, he then told him the said Wheeland
no, for he had a wife and children, and wanted to get home as soon
as possible, the said Wheeland said he would not detain any person
that had a family against their will, but if they had no family
they should not goe, he then asked him for some victuals for he
was very Hungry. He then ordered him to get in the Canoe with the
Mulatto fellow Lazarus and go up to the three Schooners that lay
in the Creek, and tell some person to give him some victuals, and
while he was giving orders, there came two other persons
in a
Canoe with a Case of Gin 6 Rum and gave him a dram.23
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Although Wayland was fast earning a reputation in the northern
part of the Bay, time was already running out. In late July, Wayland,
in a small schooner with three other men, was taken in a creek off
Hooper's Strait by a party of thirty rebels.24 Stripped of his clothes,
he was sent to Annapolis where the Council of Safety confined him on
charges of supplying Dunmore's fleet and burning White's sloop.25 On
September 10, the investigating committee reported its findings, and
on the 12th, they sentenced Wayland to imprisonment in a log jail at
Frederick, Maryland, until he paid for White's vessel and posted bond
for good behavior.26 As of October 28, he was still naked in the jail
at Annapolis where he feared for his life daily, and having no money
to purchase new clothes, he requested those taken from him be returned.27 At some point, Wayland's father secured his release by posting bond and paying damages. 28 Shortly after, however, new charges were
leveled, and Wayland was again imprisoned. This time, he would remain
so, often chained hand and foot, for four years. While in captivity,
the rebels burned his house, forcing his wife and children, who barely
escaped the conflagration, to survive on the charity of friends.2 9
Also in July, William Goodrich reemerged. His specific activities
between taking the Molly and this time are unknown beyond his having
commanded a tender.30 Billie had made his joining Dunmore somewhat conditional on the Governor's supplying him with a suitable vessel.31 Although it took a while for Dunmore to address the issue, at some point
during the month he sent Goodrich, now in the Ladv Susan, to Bermuda
to purchase an eighteen-gun brig. 32 Had William been successful, such a
vessel would have added some serious weight to the Governor's position. As it was, no such vessel was available, and young Goodrich decided to give up and return home. 33 Three days out at six a.m. on July
27, a strange sail was sighted to windward, and the Lady Susan went to

investigate. Too late, William discovered her to be the sixteen-gun

Continental Brig Lexinqts, Captain John Barry, and about nine a.m.,
the hunter became the hunted. By noon, the two vessels were within
range of each other, and a running fight commenced, the L e x i n m with
her bow chase guns in play, and Billy replying with a three-pounder
firing from a cabin window and occasionally with the after battery
guns when he yawed a bit to bring them into action. By 2:30, the

,

ingtoq managed to come up with the Lady Susan, at which time, being
horribly outgunned and outmanned, William struck his colors.34
As prisoners, William's crew received the option of remaining so
or joining the rebels, and much to Billie's disgust, seven of the ten
white crewmen (the eight black seamen were not offered the opportunity) chose to switch sides.35 One of these men was Richard Dale who
entered as a midshipman on the rebel brig. 36 Seemingly, despite his
earlier promise to himself after being wounded, it required one more
cruise and action on a loyalist vessel to persuade him fully. Despite
the fact Dale's conduct could only be described as highly treasonous
by the standards under which the Goodriches had been judged, his actions never appear to have been questioned. As for William, despite
the general rebel opinion of family members, he was warmly greeted by
Barry and well treated while in his custody at sea.37 He was carried to
Philadelphia. There, treated as "a theif or a RobberR rather than a
prisoner of war, his deposition was recorded, and he was placed in
close confinement in the state prison where he was not allowed to
speak to anyone. 38
For Dunmore, by the end of July, the situation at St. George's,
and with the fleet in general, had worsened. Sickness had taken its
toll on manpower. There was no reliable source of water and there was
a general lack of other necessities for what, by then, amounted to
1,000 loyalist noncombatants representing hundreds of families, in addition to troops and seamen. Furthermore, rebel opposition, in the

form of both warships and militia, increased regularly. The island was
simply no longer a suitable base for operations.39
In addition, the naval personnel, while sticking it out, were
heartily tired of raiding, a form of warfare they considered beneath
their dignity.4 0 Also, shepherding the civilian fleet diverted ships
needed elsewhere.4 1 Even worse, naval personnel, already limited in
number and suffering the same effects from sickness as everyone else,
were required to assist in manning the numerous civilian craft due to
a general shortage of mariners.42 In light of a11 these factors, making

the outlook bleak at best, Dunmore decided at last to release his grip
on Virginia. On August 5, the fleet cleared the Virginia Capes. Upon
doing so, it split into groups bound for Halifax, St. Augustine, England, Bermuda, and the West Indies.4 3
Of the Goodriches, only Bridger remained at large. Nothing specific is known of his activities between early June and the time the
loyalists departed, but affairs were about to catch up with him. There
are also few details regarding his capture first reported on September
16 and again on September 18.4 4 Having assumed command of the prize
ship Molly during the evacuation, Bridger was, by one account, under
orders from Dunmore to carry 15,000 bushels of wheat to Halifax. 4 5 Another source indicates his destination was Bermuda.4 6 Wherever he was
bound, Bridger was taken by Captain Nicholas Biddle in the Continental
Brig Andrew Doria and carried to Philadelphia where he joined William
in prison. 4 7 There, the brothers endured hardships similar to other
confined loyalists. In November, Billie formally complained to the
President of the Continental Congress that some money he had received
had been taken from him, leaving nothing to send to his parents or
with which purchase necessary articles such as winter clothing for
himself and his brother.4 8 In December, the two were sent to Baltimore.
Upon their arrival on the 21st, Congress ordered the brothers to be

imprisoned in the jail. They were to receive only provisions and articles of absolute necessity while awaiting the Congress's pleasure. All
the Goodriches were accounted for under lock and key. Rebel mariners
and merchants could rest easy, at least for a while. 4 9

It is impossible to determine exactly how many tenders sailed
for Dunmore during 1775 and 1776, and of these, how many were owned,
commanded, and/or manned by loyalists. Nor is it possible to arrive at
the precise figure of how many loyalists served on such vessels.
Still, all indications are the numbers were fairly considerable, and
some respectable minimum figures can be derived. Whatever the numbers,
these "base" and "deluded wretches," "scoundrelWs, "Marauders,"
"Paracides," "barbarianWs, "renegades," "Banditti," "miscreants,"
"VillainWs, "pirates," and "hell-hounds,

(so styled by the rebels)

with widely varied backgrounds and motives, caused serious trouble for
the revolutionaries and inflicted considerable damage to their trade.
Seventeen vessels have been identified as tenders commanded and
manned by loyalists. Vessels and/or captains not cited previously were
the sloop Lord North, Charles McDonald, the sloop Lady Gower, John
Wilkie, the sloop Lady Auqusta, Lowes, and a schooner, Hugh Miller. 51
There was also the Governor's flagship, the Dunmore, commanded by
James Lowes.52 Then, there was a troopship Dunmore (possibly the same
vessel), under John Buchanan and the prize turned storeship, Molly, at
one time commanded by James Ridley. 53 In addition, there were the
schooner Fanny, and sloops Lord Howe and Edward, under contract to the
Governor from Bartlet Goodrich. Finally, though under naval authority,
the Edward, the brigantine/schooner Betsey, and the sloop Fincastle
(after the transfer of command from Robert Stewart to Lieutenant
Wright) had at least some loyalist personnel aboard.54

There were undoubtedly other tenders with loyalist associations.
At a time in early May after three of the seventeen had been captured
or lost, and at least one other, Bartlet's, was elsewhere, the rebels
reported a total of twenty-one in the harbor at Norfolk alone. One of
these was the Fincastle, then under naval command, and probably a few
others were under naval control as well. Still, after taking these
vessels into account, and the fact others, both loyalist and naval,
were undoubtedly at sea, the figure indicates an even greater number
of loyalist tenders were under Dunmore's authority.55
Of the seventeen vessels, the type, in terms of rig, is known
for fifteen. Clearly indicating a preference for small, fast, easily
handled vessels, suitable for close inshore employment, there were ten
sloops (one a pink) and five schooners.56 The small size is further indicated by the armament carried by nine of the sloops, two schooners,
and one of the untyped vessels. Apart from the Stewarts' atypical
sloop, relatively heavily armed with between eight and ten cannon, and
the radically polarized untyped vessel and one of the schooners with
only small arms, all mounted between two and six carriage guns.57 The
known weight of metal of these weapons was light, all being only two
or three-pounders.58 At least three of the sloops and one schooner carried swivel guns as well, numbering six per vessel where known.59 The
same schooner also mounted a cohorn.60 In keeping with this basic
trend, a reference to an unidentified tender (perhaps one already included in the count) describes her as mounting two carriage guns and
twelve swivels.61 Also, late in the campaign, Wayland planned to fit
out a prize sloop with four four-pound carriage guns and twelve swivels.62
A word is in order on the relative sizes of the various types of
vessels in terms of tonnage. For sloops, twenty to twenty-five tons
was considered small, forty to fifty tons was medium, and vessels up

to one-hundred tons were large. Schooner sizes roughly mirrored those
of sloops. Comparatively larger were brigs. Sizes for this type ranged
from thirty or forty tons to one-hundred and eighty tons, with exarnples in the sixty to one-hundred ton range being typical. Snows generally averaged slightly larger than brigs with ninety to one-hundred
and twenty ton versions being the norm. Ships were larger yet, and
with tonnage running from forty to four-hundred tons, they offered the
widest differences in size. One-hundred to two-hundred and fifty-ton
ships, however, were the more common.63
Compared to regular men-of-war, the crews of these vessels were
rather diminutive as well. Still, a respectable number of loyalist
mariners served on them. The compliments of eight of the seventeen are
known with numbers ranging from a schooner with roughly ten men to a
sloop with as many as twenty-four.64 In addition, at the lower end of
the scale, there was a sloop with eleven men.65 Towards the higher end
were an unidentified tender and John Collett's, both with sixteen seamen. 66 In between were two sloops, each with fifteen crewmen and another with fourteen.67
Two additional figures exist for the crew of the sloop Lady SUI
san.
-

In June, when under Bridger Goodrich's command, her compliment

was twenty men. In late July, with William Goodrich as captain, her
crew consisted of nineteen men. These numbers are not included in the
eight for the following reasons. The sloop with twenty-four men was
that commanded by Bridger at Hobb's Hole in April. Though unidentified, this vessel was probably the Lady Susan which Bridger is known
to have been in command of shortly after. Consequently, in all subsequent calculations, erring on the side of caution in an effort to
avoid duplicating crews, the three figures will be considered to represent the same crew on the same tender. Furthermore, for ease of discussion, this vessel will be referred to as the Lady Susan. Accepting

these three figures represent the crew of the Lady Susan at different
periods, then it is interesting to note that the size of her compliment actually decreased a bit over time. The first and more serious
reduction, from twenty-four to twenty, may well reflect the casualties
sustained in the Hobb's Hole fight. The second decrease, however, from
twenty to nineteen, is really of little, if any, consequence.68
Regarding the other tenders, generally, it is safe to say the
crew of one vessel does not overlap with that of another thus duplicating the number, In other words, for the most part, the figures represent distinctly separate bodies of men. The tenders in question appear to have stayed in service for the duration or until captured at
which time there was no exchange of prisoners. There is, however, one
exception that needs to be taken into account. This involves the men
of the Lively. Though lost at Gwynn's, her crew managed to escape.
Having done so, it seems likely they entered on other vessels, perhaps
other tenders. Consequently, again erring on the side of caution to
avoid a duplication of crews, in the following calculations a multiplier of sixteen rather than seventeen tenders will be used.
Accepting these figures offer a representative sample, working
with an average number of twenty-one men for the &dl Susan, an average crew size of fifteen men can be derivedS6' This average coincides
neatly with the mid-range figures in the sample, showing they are not
skewed. If the average numbers are projected by multiplying by sixteen, then no less than 240 loyalists served on these tenders.
In addition, there are figures for three captured but unidentified tenders, two of which had a combined number of about fifty men,
and the other, eighteen.70 Though the figure of fifty is not exact, for
the sake of this study it will be used to represent the total number
of men on the first two vessels. It need be noted that being unidentified, they might be the same as vessels already included in the seven-

teen. They are not, however, the same as the three vessels with the
largest crews, the two with the smallest, or the Fincastle (when commanded by Stewart), the Lively, or the Lady Stanley, for which the
crew sizes are not recorded. These eight tenders were taken at other
times and places or were not taken at all.71 Furthermore, given there
were obviously more than seventeen loyalist tenders total, it seems
highly unlikely the three vessels in question were the same as the
three of the nine remaining for whom crew size has been reported.
Whether they represent duplicates or not, one thing is clear. Considering the additional figures all date to the later half of July, when
compared to the proportionately greater number of small crews to large
at an earlier date, they reflect a higher ratio of larger compliments.
In other words, the crew sizes of loyalist tenders appear to have generally increased late in the period. Of course, this trend supports
that an additional number of loyalist mariners joined Dunmore as the
campaign progressed. Perhaps the figures reflect an influx of individuals from Maryland as the Governor's fleet moved up the Bay.
If the three unidentified vessels were the same as three others
included in the seventeen, but for which the crew sizes have not been
counted, the average number of sailors per tender late in the period
rose to seventeen. This is actually a conservative figure considering
later, larger crew sizes are averaged with smaller ones from earlier.
In essence, if the crews of an earlier date conformed to the trend of
increased size, the resulting average would be even higher. When extrapolated by multiplying by sixteen, a total figure of 272 men is derived. If the three tenders were additional vessels, then the average
of seventeen multiplied by nineteen, the new number of representative
vessels, results in a total of 323 loyalist seamen.
Supporting the median figures and an increase in crew size is an
alternative approach. Of the eleven tenders with known crew size (in-

cluding the three unidentified vessels), for four, the figures predate
the evacuation of

orf folk."

Two more are from the time of the occupa-

tion of Gwynn's ~ s l a n d .Four
~ ~ represent the weeks in Maryland waters. 74
For the crew representing the Lady Susan, there are figures for all
three periods.75 The averages for both the first and second periods are
sixteen men per vessel. While slightly higher than the earlier fifteen
men per tender, the figure is, nevertheless, close. This figure of
sixteen is also slightly skewed upwards, because the smallest crew recorded actually falls within the third time frame, where, when averaged in, actually still skews that average down. The average crew size
for the last group is nineteen men per vessel. All in all, these figures are both comparable with those established earlier and reflect an
increase in crew size.

An additional figure can be added to the totals. The compliment
of the Governor's flagship, the Dunmore, consisted of thirty-one individuals. 7 6 When this is added to the lowest number derived, a total of
271 men is obtained. When added to the highest, a total of 354 is ar-

rived at. Also, three additional figures exist, representing partial
crews of four loyalist tenders. These can not be added to the numbers
just stated because all four vessels have already been factored in
with the seventeen when discerning the averages. They do, however, account for known, documented crewmen. In July, Mariman, as Wayland's
prisoner, claimed seeing parts of the crews of three schooners, in
all, about twenty men, ten of which, after deleting the ten from Wayland's crew already counted, can be added in.77 In addition, roughly
seven loyalists can be identified on the Lilly, and the seven slave
mariners belonging to the Stewarts can be added as well. 78 Finally,
Captains Miller, Picket, Forsyth, McDonald, Younghusband, and Robert
Stewart can be factored in. The bottom line is that actual known crew
members on loyalist warships totaled 250. Exclusive of the crew of the

D u ~ p q g(technically not a tender) and five of the captains who are
the sole representatives of five obviously larger crews, 214 loyalists
remain associated with only twelve of at least seventeen and quite
possibly twenty tenders. This figure conforms well to the averaged and
projected figures which, though admittedly rough, safely and conservatively support that no less than about 275 Tory mariners saw active
duty on loyalist commanded tenders with Dunmore, and quite possibly as
many as 325 served on such craft.
These figures do not include those loyalists who served on the
twenty additional identified tenders, active at different times, under
direct naval command.79 There were only six naval vessels that spent
any time in the Virginia theater assisting Dunmore. While the crews of
these six were relatively large, they were of a finite number required
for the effective and efficient handling of the vessels. Only so many
could be spared for duty on auxiliary craft. At the same time, naval
personnel were increasingly reduced by illness. Sickness aboard the
Otter was described as "epidemick," and many died."

The logs and jour-

nals of these vessels contain a number of references to sailors who
had "Departed this life. "'l Hamond was particularly concerned about
personnel losses due to the sicknesses that ravaged the fleet.82 Other
mariners certainly became casualties or were taken prisoner. Crewmen
were at a premium; so much so that Hammond was quite worried at one
point upon hearing Squire intended fitting out an additional tender
for the Otter, believing it would weaken her compliment too much. 83 The
situation was dire enough to warrant the occasional transfer of crewmen from one naval vessel to another to make up differences.84 To make
up the losses and man their auxiliary craft, the navy supplemented
their crews with local talent. Unfortunately, figures indicating to
what degree loyalists were relied on are lacking. Still, there are
some references supporting that they were employed. The crew of Sla-

ter's Betsey were pressed as were two men from another merchantman and
three from a third.B5 The Fincastle, when under naval command, still
relied on the services of seven local mariners, and there were two
blacks who were not naval personnel on the Betsey with Slater at the
time of her capture.86 The sloop-tender Edward also had some black seamen aboard during the Baltimore expedition as did the

m and another

of the Otter's tenders.87 Slave John King spent time on H.M. Sloop a n 3
Fisher
- before being returned to his owner, John Goodrich, Sr.

88

All in-

dications are that a fair number of additional loyalists served on naval vessels at this time.
This leads to another related topic. A high proportion of some
loyalist crews and the total number of loyalist sailors as well, were
black. Of the combined crews on the Baltimore foray, twelve to fourteen were Negroes. B 9 Later, four were on the Edward when she was captured, and there were six on the Samuel when she took the Molly. 90 At
least five served between the Hawk and another of the =Leg's

tend-

ers. 91 In April, the twenty-four man crew of Bridger Goodrich's tender
was described as being comprised mostly of slaves, and later, there
were eight blacks with the Lady Susan when ~aptured.~'The mulatto,
Lazarus served with Wayland, and the slave Caesar acted as pilot on a
tender.93 Then there were the Stewart's seven slave mariners and the
two men who served on the Betsey. 94 George Mills ran away to serve at
sea as well. 95 Three or four blacks made up a part of the Lilly's small
crew when John Goodrich, Sr. was taken. 96 One of the two tenders of unknown type had a crew of sixteen including two Negroes, and in the
other, Collett's, fifteen of the sixteen men were of that same race. 97
Finally, there were no less than twenty-five serving on the Dunmore,
men and women. 98
When added up, no less than eighty-two black mariners are accounted for. It is, however, impossible to derive a solid percentage

of black to white seamen on loyalist tenders. The available figures
are simply too few, small, varied, and unrelated. Efforts to attain
such a figure were made from nine different angles, two of which
proved so convoluted they are of dubious value. As to the other seven,
first, the total number of actually accounted for loyalist mariners,
266 (including thirteen known to have been on naval tenders plus John
King, Caesar, and George Mills), was compared with the total number of
known black mariners. Next, the total number of loyalist sailors on
loyalist commanded vessels, 250, was compared with the total number of
blacks, sixty-eight, serving on like craft. For the Samuel, the figures fifteen and six were used. These represent the total compliment
on the Baltimore raid and the six blacks reported on her a little over
a week after her return from that operation. Then, the same was done
after deleting the six white and twenty-five black crew members on the
flagship, Dunmore. She was not technically a tender, and the high ratio of blacks in the crew tends to skew results. Following this, the
percentage of Negroes relative to the entire compliment was examined
for five vessels for which both figures are established. This entailed
seventy-six whites and thirty-two blacks. Finally, the total number of
blacks, forty-two, known to have made up parts of the crews of seven
tenders, was averaged to achieve a number of six per vessel. This figure was, in turn, compared for three median crew sizes, fifteen, seventeen, and nineteen, derived for loyalist tenders. The results, were
31%, 278, 20%, 42% 40%, 35%, and 32%, receptively. Clearly, this offers too wide a spread to tell anything definite, but all figures do
indicate the ratio of blacks to whites was fairly high. Of course the
percentages, as indicated by specific numbers, varied considerably between vessels, but it seems safe to say that overall, perhaps one
third of the total number of loyalist mariners serving Dunmore were
black.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine how many of these
blacks were free men and how many were slaves.

Furthermore, of the

slaves, it is impossible to discern how many were runaways taking advantage of Dunmore's proclamation, and how many served under the control of their owners simply because they were slaves. The only reference found to a free black was Pompey White, captured on the ~dward."
Three of his crewmates, however, were slaves, and the general evidence
supports a high percentage of other blacks were still or had recently
been in bondage.100 Certainly John King and Caesar were slaves as were
the Stewart's seven men, two on an unidentified loyalist tender, at
least some on Collett Is, and three on the naval tender,

Per-

haps slaves Mike, Harry, and Aberdeen, who shared the Williamsburg
jail with their owner, Goodrich, were the same blacks taken on the

Lilly.102 "Thomas Saunders, John Lucy, John Pomp, Samuel Sawood, Jack
Masson, Charles Mills, Chance, and JefferyIW captured on the Lady Susan, were
-

slaves as well-103 This last vessel and crew are noteworthy,

because it appears Dunmore purchased four men specifically for service
on her.104 Only George Mills, Aaron, and Johnny, can be confirmed as
runaways, although there were undoubtedly others. 105 In any case,
Dunmore's reliance on black personnel was repugnant in the extreme to
the revolutionaries. Concerning the Governor's policy, one rebel
called it "Damned, infernal, [and] Diabolical."Io6 Another stated:
"Hell itself could not have vomited any thing more black. "lo' Despite
such viewpoints, black mariners with Dunmore seem to have performed
the same yeoman service many would on loyalist privateers later in the
conflict

.

Many loyalists, at least in the maritime community, appear to
have been of an opposite mindset regarding blacks. They do not seem to
have been bothered in the least by the idea of black sailors, or serving alongside them. Others with Dunmore were apparently little trou-

bled by associating with blacks as well which offended rebel proprieties. Arriving at Gwynn's, the loyalists, "on their evening after
landing amused themselves with a promiscuous ball, in which a certain
spruce little gentleman opened with one of the black ladies.,108
Furthermore, considering the situation, loyalists must have
known the possibility of losing their slaves was very real, but retaining possession of them does not seem to have been a high priority.
In fact, the Stewart brothers would free their slave mariners. 109 This
is not to say all these loyalists viewed blacks as equals. In an account of his capture, William Goodrich failed to acknowledge the eight
slaves with him as full crew members.'1°

Still, the practice of relying

on black tars would be widely embraced by loyalist privateersmen, especially on vessels with southern and West Indian affiliations.
Actually, even less is known about the backgrounds of the white
loyalist crewmen. Though serving before the mast, James Gilchrist of
Norfolk, with associates such as St. George Tucker, undoubtedly fell
into the category of gentleman adventurer.111 Fifteen white crewmen
taken on two tenders in December were referred to as "Americans."112
Another reference concerns the crews of three schooners under Wayland's command in July. A captive reported encountering about twenty
of these individuals who he described as all "Country born" but one.113
These two sources tend to support the conclusion that the majority of
the mariners with Dunmore were natives, but the reference to one man
of foreign birth does indicate the possible presence of an occasional
mercenary outsider. As with the blacks, it is also apparent that at
this time, not all white seamen acted on their own free will or were
firm in their political convictions. As noted, some on naval vessels
had been pressed. Most telling is the fact that when given the opportunity, seven of the ten white crewmen on the Lady Susan opted to join
the rebels. While perhaps some made this decision to avoid imprison-

ment, it would appear there was a mercenary tendency or considerable
indecision among Billie's sailors as well. Dale certainly had some
trouble making up his mind.
Other Tory seamen, however, were clearly strong supporters of
the King. Of the eleven men comprising Bartlet's crew at the time of
seizure, only one protested his captivity, and was allowed to go
free.114 Gilchrist, though unhappy with the state of affairs in general
and his own situation in particular, was nevertheless resigned and
stalwart in his convictions. After a two month cruise on the Fincastle, he
-

wrote:

I assure you I am heartily wearied of this Life of amphibious War
fare, & could I find out where to be more at ease I shou'd not be
long in making my Choise But alas! all the Continent is in the
same ruinous Condition & as for great Britain I cannot think of
going there - Every thing save the Book debts which canny2 be collected, is lost - But I hope yet to live to see the Day.

-

Marmaduke Mister was another loyalist mariner whose political opinions
and solid stance are known. Mister was one of Wayland's crewmen at the
time Moses Yell was briefly held captive. Yell recounted a conversation he had with this seaman.
Mister ask'd this Deponant who he was for, whether King or Country
this Deponant answer'd he was Friend to every person who behav'd
well the afsd Mr then commanded in the King's Name to tell him the
Truth this Deponant then told him he was born in this Country and
had a Right to defend his Liberty, Mister then said what these
damnld Rf12els call Liberty I call Slavery, h so the people will
find it.
While many of these loyalist tars seem to have acted in a volunteer capacity, thus reflecting their sincere political stance, those
mariners signing articles on vessels which Dunmore had officially
taken into government service received pay. 117 While the amount for the
ratings is unknown, Captain John Forsyth received t 0 . 4 . 6 per day. 118 It
seems unlikely, however, that the prospect of wages was a serious incentive overriding personal ideologies. On the contrary, the opposite
must have been true. In essence, it is doubtful the pay for common

seamen amounted to much, and if money was a consideration, a mariner
could make an equivalent sum elsewhere with less hardship and risk.
The tenders known to have been commanded and manned by loyalists
suffered relatively heavy losses. Ten were captured or destroyed in
action with the rebels. The circumstances, however, of the loss of
seven are known and of interest. Only one was taken in a ship-to-ship
action. The other six were all seized because they had become trapped
(two were aground) in waterways or harbors, in which they were taken
by parties from shore. An eleventh was wrecked and her crew captured
after making it to Land. In other words, the known situations of
losses do not reflect an inability or unwillingness to fight. Rather,
it seems these men had the common sense to realize that discretion was
the better part of valor. 119
These losses were, however, more than balanced by the effect the
tenders had on the rebels. One effect was to force Virginia and Maryland to spend considerable time, effort, and money to create their own
navies to meet the threat and protect commerce and coastlines.120 In
turn, these efforts diverted manpower and materials that might have
been better used elsewhere. In November, 1775, with matters heating up
in Virginia, Richard Henry Lee emphasized the need for a rebel naval
force in the Bay. 121 By December, although not constituting a formal
navy, militia under Richard and James Baron were sailing armed vessels
out of Hampton, Virginia. 122

At

the same time, the Convention consid-

ered a proposal to establish a regular naval force to protect shipping
and repulse enemy raids. On January 11, 1776, the resolution passed.123
While Virginia considered its proposal in December, Maryland
purchased a merchantman to convert into a man-of-war. Named the

De-

fence, she would be ready for sea by March, in time to help ward off
Squire's attempted attack on Baltimore. 124 In the interim, while the
two colonies prepared their nascent seagoing forces, the rebels in-

tended that vessels of the Continental Navy, authorized by Congress
in October, would fill in. 125 A Continental squadron was, in fact, ordered to the Bay to confront Dunmore, but, having sailed in February,
it never reached there, opting instead to raid New Providence in the
Bahamas.126 Virginia and Maryland were on their own. Of course, building a navy takes time, and neither state was in full swing by the time
Dunmore gave up his hold on the region, and Dunmore's fleet certainly
maintained naval superiority throughout the period of its presence.
Yet, the gradual build-up and very presence of the rebel warships was

a deterrent to Dunmore's movements and activities. Late in the campaign, Dunmore, himself, said the rebels "have actually drove all our
Tenders up to the Fleet", and Captain Hammond did "not think it safe
to trust one of His Majesty's Sloops alone in the ~a~."'~'
Given their propensity for raiding ashore, the tenders occupied
the attention of Virginia and Maryland rebels in another way. Untold
numbers of men in militia and colonial military units were required to
focus their energies on attempts to foil loyalist aggression. Of
course, this expended even more manpower, funds, and materials.
Most importantly though, for roughly a year, British and loyalist craft thoroughly disrupted the trade of the two colonies and at
times, brought it to a complete standstill.128 In general, the loyalist
and naval tenders1 effectiveness was confirmed by Dunmore's reports.
As early as January 9, 1776, he reported that the blockade was working
well enough to drive up prices in Virginia.129 On February 15, he commented that the tenders brought in prizes from New England daily. 130
These vessels had come for cargoes of flour and grain for the rebel
army. Their loss prevented them from supplying that force with needed
provisions.131 As of early March, the Governor reported tenders had
taken or destroyed nearly thirty prizes.132 The tenders' success impressed Hamond as

Even the rebels admitted, "there were so

many tenders crusing upon the coast

...that

it is almost impossible for

any vessel to escape them.
As with the numbers of tenders and crewmen, it is impossible to
assess the total number of prizes taken by loyalist associated vessels, but again some respectable minimum figures can be determined.

A

total of twenty-five prizes can be credited to specific loyalist commanded and manned tenders acting either independently or in consort
with naval vessels. 135 In conjunction, the Samuel and Edward (the latter being Goodrich owned with loyalist crewmen) seized four or five
additional prizes at the mouth of the Patapsco on the Baltimore expedition, but they were quickly retaken.136 One of these was the ship
Molly, later captured again by William Goodrich and included in the
count of twenty-five. The Edward also seized at least one prize on her
own. 137 Also, the -castle

with loyalist crewmen took three more.138 A

rebel newspaper account lists eight additional prizes which do not
match any of those already mentioned or any known to have been taken
by the navy. 139 Then, the Goodrich owned Lord Howe while under naval
command captured six more either by herself or while in consort with
other naval vessels. 1 4 0 Also, a list of prizes condemned and sold under
the authority of Dunmore's admiralty court includes five vessels whose
captors are not listed or known.141 As mentioned earlier, this is a
problematic document requiring some care when using. Still, it is
fairly good (though not infallible) in denoting those prizes taken by
naval vessels or their tenders. Consequently, it is possible these
five were taken by loyalists craft as well. A problem, however, remains with including these in the count. Some might represent duplicates of others already factored in. Finally, unidentified tenders
seized at least four more rebel vessels.142 In any case, tenders with
loyalist affiliations took at least forty-six enemy bottoms and possibly as many as fifty-five. To put this in perspective, by comparison,

the navy can be firmly credited with another fifty-two.143 In addition,
there is a reference to another prize sloop taken by the navy, but it
is possible she is a duplicate of one included in the fifty-two.14' A
final prize was run aground by the navy during the course of the
chase, could not be got off, and so, only her cargo was seized.145When
totaled, at least 102 prizes are known to have been take by Dunmore's
forces. If the six treated as possible duplicates were not, and the
vessel that ran aground is included, then the total rises to 109. Of
the loyalist associated prizes, only six or seven, inclusive of the
three or four on the Patapsco, are known to have been recaptured by
the rebels.146 Of the loyalist tenders' forty-six prizes, the type is
known for thirty-four. These included one brigantine, two brigs, two
ships, twelve schooners, and seventeen sloops.147 Two of these were
French.14'

The possible additional five on Dunmore's list consisted of

one brig and four sloops.149 The only prize for which a value is known
is the sloop Libert~taken by Forsyth. Dunmore, himself, purchased her
at auction for £295. In terms of the number of vessels taken, loyalist
mariners under Dunmore took their toll of enemy shipping.150
These men also made their mark seizing important cargoes of provisions, textiles, medicines, munitions, and arms, necessary for the
rebel war effort. In turn, there can be little doubt these commodities
were put to good use by their captors. Of the forty-six prizes, the
cargoes are reported for twenty-two (exclusive of the recaptures). Two
were in ballast. 151 Four more carried shipments which, although probably valuable as prize goods (one was loaded with tobacco, another,
logwood and mahogany, and a third, molasses and coffee), do not fall
within the category discussed, and at this point their loss could not
have had much effect on the rebel economy.152 As to the remaining sixteen, five carried provisions consisting of Indian corn, corn, flour,
wheat, bread, cider, cheese, potatoes, and pork.153 By one account, the

cargo of one of these, the ship moll^, consisted of 1,900 barrels of
flour and bread and 5,000 bushels of wheat. 154 By another, her lading
was 838 barrels of flour and 15,000 bushels of wheat. 155 Either figure
represents a considerable loss. One of these same vessels also transported barrel staves, necessary for the proper storage of food and
supplies.156 Another prize was in the process of running in a large
shipment of medicines when taken, and yet another had a small quantity
of the same.15' The latter of these and two more carried textiles. 158
These same three also transported gunpowder as did four others.159 Two
of these last four carried arms as well, and one shipped saltpeter and
su1f~r.l~~
All told, loyalists were involved in seizing at least 535
barrels and seventy-four half barrels of gunpowder on these prizes as
well as 315 stands of arms.16' The rebel press reported the loss of
three additional vessels bringing in munitions and weapons whose seizure is attributed to loyalists.162 While failing to state the amount
of gunpowder, the account does offer the remarkable figure of 5,000
stands of arms being taken. 163 Losses of this nature indicate loyalist
mariners put a serious crimp in the rebel war effort. These, however,
could not compare with the damage loyalist privateers would do later.
Perhaps of more significance is the fact that Loyalist mariners
had begun to prove their value in a conflict involving a querre de

course. While the Royal Navy, then and later, would often hold a dim
and skeptical view of loyalist potential at sea, at least some naval
officers who served with provincial mariners at this time came to esteem their worth. Some strong loyalist/navy bonds were established,
especially with Squire and Hamond, that would last in the years to
come.
During 1775 and 1776, a significant number of loyalist mariners
showed their support of government by coming forth to serve on a relatively large number of tenders. For their efforts, they lost a large

proportion of vessels and crews. At the same, however, they seriously
disrupted rebel trade by seizing a larger number of their merchantmen.
Furthermore, some of the prizes shipped materials specifically needed
by rebel military forces. Through this and forcing the Virginians and
Marylanders to take measures to counter their operations, the loyalists negatively affected rebel war aims.

----
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CHAPTER 6

"ZEALOUS TO BECOME USEFUL:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS
OF THE NEW ENGLAND MARITIME REGIONS'

It is not surprising that New England, given its strong maritime
culture, produced a number of loyalists who would become privateers.
The area can be neatly subdivided into two distinct maritime regions.
Massachusetts Bay and the Gulf of Maine, with Boston as the key port,
constituted the upper New England region. Long Island Sound and Narragansett Bay (inclusive of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard) with Newport, Rhode Island as the main port, comprised the lower portion.
The men of both New England areas fit the broader composite view
of loyalists, but exhibit regional variation with the Chesapeake loyalists and even among themselves. The New England loyalist primarily
came from coastal, urban environments, and demographically, there was
a correlation between open support and a British presence. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the merchants and mariners dominated over a
smattering of individuals from other backgrounds. In Connecticut, however, there was a higher percentage of men from other walks of life.
Among the men of both the upper and lower regions, there was a high
percentage of native born and a minimal amount of ethnic and racial
representation. Despite the fact some of these men supported pre-war
anti-British protest, there is no evidence of equivocalness among
them. At the same time, there is evidence indicating neutral behavior
by some. Motivational factors were typically varied, and a large number suffered some form of abuse at the hands of the rebels. Signifi-
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Figure 3: The Upper New England Maritime Region.

cantly, a many of these men acted in a variety of capacities other
than as privateers to support the British, which reflects their serious level of commitment. It should be noted that research has failed
to identify any loyalist privateers from New Hampshire. It would be
very surprising, however, to find that colony produced none, especially from Portsmouth.
The upper New England merchants and mariners who would become
privateers were primarily from coastal urban areas. From the Boston
merchant class came Frederick William Geyer, Joseph Taylor, Samuel
Rogers, George Leonard, James Anderson, Alexander Brymer, Nathaniel
Coffin, Philip Dumaresque, and Francis Green. Sandwich produced merchant Samuel Perry. Brymer was agent for Robert Grant of London, contractor for provisions for the British fleet in American waters. Leonard dealt in grain. Some of these Bostonians, Geyer for instance, were
exceedingly wealthy. Others were well educated. Green and Taylor were
Harvard graduates.2
On the Maine coast, Falmouth (Portland) produced merchants Robert Pagan and his brothers, William and Thomas, partners in Pagan

&

Co. Robert Pagan was a popular young immigrant from Scotland who maintained business ties there. In addition, he operated a large store,
traded in lumber, and built vessels for sale in Europe.3
As noted, a number of loyal skippers hailed from the region as
well. Those from Massachusetts, though still from within the Boston
area, were more demographically dispersed than the merchants. William
Gallop, master of a vessel making runs to North Carolina and the West
Indies, was the only identifiable mariner from Boston proper. Antill
Gallop, however, was from Cambridge and Jacob Rogers resided in Charlestown. In addition, William Lewis came from Lynn, Issacher Woodbury
hailed from Salem, and Ebenezer Hathaway was from Freetown. Perry, of
Sandwich, was a mariner as well as a merchant. The maritime expertise

of Antill Gallop, Lewis, Woodbury, Hathaway, and Perry is deduced from
the fact that all five later commanded privateers. That merchant
George Leonard later commanded a squadron of privateers indicates he
possessed a very strong maritime background too. 4
On the Maine coast, a small concentration of loyalist mariners
existed in Pownalborough (Wiscasset). These included Charles Callahan
(sometimes Callaghan), Edmund Doharty, and Nathaniel Gardiner. That
these men were qualified seamen is apparent from their later roles as
pilots and privateer captains. Also, mariners Thomas Wyer and Thomas
Ross of Falmouth supported the royal cause, as did Richard Pomeroy of
Medumcock (Friendship). In light of the later services he performed at
sea as a pilot and prize master, it is apparent that Zebedee Linnekin
of St. Georges was an experienced mariner as well.5
A

few men from upper New England destined to become privateers

were public officials. Joseph Goldthwaite held what must have been the
exceedingly popular post of Barracks' Master in Boston. In the same
city, Coffin served in another enviable position as the last ReceiverGeneral and Cashier of his Majesty's Customs. Gardiner had been a magistrate in Rhode Island prior to moving to Maine. Wyer was a customs
officer at Falmouth. Finally, Antill Gallop acted as High Sheriff of
Middlesex County.6
Other occupations were represented. In addition to being

sea-

farers, Callahan and Linnekin were farmers. Jacob Rogers possessed
3,000 acres in New Hampshire. Henry Cowe owned and operated a onehundred acre "plantation" at Wexton, sixteen miles from Boston. His
later role as a prize agent, indicates Brymer may have possessed some
legal training.7
Four of these men had at least some prior military or naval experience. Green had served in the French and Indian conflict, and
Goldthwaite went by the title "Major," indicating a military or, at

least, militia association. Jacob Rogers spent time as a lieutenant in
the Royal Navy until court-martialed and forced to resign in 1773.
Then, there was Dumaresque who may well have been the same Philip Dumaresque who commanded a privateer out of Boston during King George's
War. If not, he was undoubtedly a close relative, and therefore, had
some association with the activity. The Dumaresque family was associated with naval affairs in another manner. The son, Philip Jr., was a
Royal Navy officer.8
Between a number of these men there were family or business ties
that may have affected their decision to remain loyal. Taylor and Samuel Rogers were business partners as were Coffin and Anderson. Anderson had strong entrepreneurial ties with a Scottish firm, and as
shown, both he and Coffin did business with Jamieson in Virginia. The
Pagan brothers had strong business affiliations with Scotland as well,
and Brymer was agent for a London contractor. Their wives being sisters, Robert Pagan and Wyer were related by marriage. The Geyer and
Coffin families, too, were linked in the same manner. Finally, it
would seem likely there was some blood relationship between William
and Antill Gallop. As will be seen, if these upper New England men
were not known to each other at this point, many would soon become so.9
Conforming to the established loyalist profile, but in contrast
to loyalists of some other regions is the fact that a higher percentage of upper New England privateers were native born. Of the thirteen
whose place of birth is known, six were colonials. In fact, some, such
as Geyer, Leonard, and Coffin, emanated from well established families.10 Seven men, Cowe, Callaghan, Anderson, Brymer, and the Pagans,
were immigrants. Cowe was from St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. Callaghan
hailed from Ireland. The others were Scots, conforming to the established view that this ethnic group dominated the loyalist immigrant

element in the region. This immigrant figure is, however, skewed upward by the fact that three of the men represent a single family.11
Apart from a handful of Scots, minorities, both ethnic and racial, were minimally represented. With few exceptions, the surnames of
most of these individuals suggest that they were of English extraction. Dumaresque, however, suggests the strong possibility of some
French ancestry. Callahan indicates an Irish background. Known racial
minorities were represented only by Henry Cowe who described himself
as a mulatto. Although he did not specifically say so, all indications
such as property ownership support that he was a free man. 12
It need be noted that in the pre-war era, at least a couple of
these men were sympathetic to the rebel cause and even supported it.
Green was "an avowed enemy to the pretended unlimited power of Parliamentary taxation," who lived in "hope of an honorable compromise,
without recourse to arms. w13 In 1774, Robert Pagan backed the nonimportation of tea.14
Of course, the Boston area constituted the very apex of revolu-

tionary activity during the opening months of the conflict. This, in
conjunction with the strong, countering, British military presence,
either forced people to declare for the King or made them feel safe
about doing so. For the most part, the Boston area merchants and mariners for whom there is relevant information made their position known
early, joining the British. 15 Taylor, however, initially displayed conduct indicating a desire to maintain a passive loyalist stance. Almost
immediately after the opening shots, he departed for ~ n ~ 1 a n d .Geyer
l~
did the same.17 Cowe also must have adopted a passive or neutral position, and he must have been adept at it. He did not leave his home until 1778.18

An established and accepted historical pattern for loyalist activity indicates the further away one was from the action and a Brit-

ish military or naval presence, the need, desire, and/or urgency to
declare decreased, and neutral loyalists were more in evidence. This
trend is evident among the future privateersmen of upper New England.
Though all in question would become very active, there was an increase
in the number of neutral or passive loyalists proportionate to the
further away one was from Boston. Perry, of Sandwich, Massachusetts,
did not leave until September, 1777." At Falmouth, Wyer seems to have
managed an unobtrusive, if tenuous, existence until the town was
burned in October, 1775. The Pagans did the same, though Robert's and
Thomas's support of the King was evident as early as May, 1775. Still,
the brothers initially did not wish to become embroiled and did their
best to avoid matters. Stating that he wanted no part of being in a
country destined to be in a state of rebellion, Robert applied for
permission to pack up everything, and leave with his family. His request was denied."
Further afield on the Maine coast, there is evidence of even
greater neutral behavior. While decidedly loyal at heart, there were
those who were not overly eager to take up arms, and seemingly content
to passively sit out the war if not provoked. Callahan was such a person. He only became actively involved with the British after being repeatedly "drafted" by the rebels.21 Linnekin, on the other hand, bought
his way out of rebel service, paying a fee of £30. Even though he also
refused to take the rebel oath, this seems to have bought him some
time as well, because he did not join the British until after their
occupation of the Penobscot region in June, 1179.~'
As elsewhere, a high percentage of these men suffered various
forms of abuse for their opinions. Interestingly, despite his political leanings, Green was the victim of mob violence. Wyer was repeatedly fined and then ultimately suffered a lengthy imprisonment for not
subscribing to the rebels. Anderson lost two vessels to the rebels

while carrying supplies to the British at Boston. The majority lost
heavily in terms of real estate, fixed capital, personal property,
shipping, and merchandise.23
A

particularly personal manner in which the conflict affected

these loyalists was the disruption of their families. In fact, amongst
privateersmen, indications are that there was a higher rate of this
form of incident in upper New England than in most places. Wyer, Ross,
and Linnekin were forced to leave their families behind for a time,
and in the case of Linnekin, after he left, the rebels took possession
of his farm and turned his family out.24 Ultimately, Robert Pagan was
able to send his to Barbados. 25 Goldthwaite's wife was arrested and
kept under guard despite ill-health. Even after her poor physical condition was acknowledged and measures were taken to accommodate her,
she remained under the control and watchful eye of a committee of correspondence.26 Finally, although seemingly well cared for, Leonard's
infant son was held in Boston for at least a large part of the war. 27
Of note, and reflecting the degree of their loyalty to the
crown, is the fact that several of these men, William Gallop, the Pagans, and Wyer, suffered significantly at the hands of the British,
yet their beliefs remained unshaken. On a voyage to St. Croix early in
the conflict, Gallop "was obliged to take Bills on Philadelphia for
his Wages and Adventure." To receive payment, he was required to go to
that city. There, he bought 2/3rds of a vessel and while carrying a
load of provisions in her to the British at New York, he was taken by
H.M.S. Roebuck. The cargo was confiscated and distributed through the
fleet. Shortly after, adding insult to injury, Gallop's vessel was
wrecked and lost as a result of his having been detained.*'
As a resident of Falmouth in October, 1775, Wyer lost a house,
merchandise, and a vessel in which he had interest when that place was
burned by the ~ritish." The Pagans, one of whom attempted to keep

British naval Lieutenant Henry Mowat from firing on the town, lost
heavily as well. A house and a store, the largest in town, went up in
flames. The Pagans' misfortunes did not, however, end here. Robert's
experiences serve as a good example of the ill-effects the Prohibatory
Act could have on a loyalist merchant. One of his vessels had sailed
for the West Indies prior to receipt of news about the Act. When word
did arrive, fearing the vessel would be seized, resulting in a total
loss, Pagan forwarded instructions that she be sold for considerably
less than her actual value in an effort to salvage something of the
venture. Then, finally managing to extricate themselves, the family
sailed for Barbados on a second vessel, where, upon arrival, it, too,
was seized by the British under the Act's authority.30
While the Massachusetts Bay/Gulf of Maine Region produced a number of privateersmen (undoubtedly far more than are discussed here),
and a fair number declared themselves for the King at an early date,
with the exception of Pomeroy, there is no indication any of the men
mentioned actually took up arms at sea until much later in the conflict.31 In fact, very little is known about aggressive loyalist activity at sea in the region up to the evacuation of Boston. Given the
fact there was a decent Royal Navy presence in the area, it is possible that not too much reliance was placed on local talent. Yet, loyalist armed vessels did exist. This is evident from one of the most intriguing yet frustrating statements encountered in the course of doing
research for this study. On January 26, 1776, Lt. Governor Thomas
Oliver notified Lord Dartmouth that after receiving the approval of
Major General William Howe and despite the fact he did not have the
authorization to do so, he had been issuing letters of marque to merchantmen sailing to the West Indies. Howe was of the opinion these
vessels would not only serve to distress the rebels, but might also

help supply the garrison. Exactly how many and to whom these were issued remains a mystery.32
Only one loyalist, George Sibbles, can be identified as being at
sea in the service of the Crown at this time, in this area. Unfortunately, little is known about his background. Still, circumstantial
evidence points to his having had a New England affiliation. He first
appears in that area, and his early activities are centered there.
Furthermore, the owners of a privateer he later commanded were all
Boston men. In any case, as of November, 1775, he commanded the sloop
General Gage. Armed with eight carriage guns and swivels, she has been

*
-

variously described as a dispatch vessel, armed vessel, and tender. In
fact, she was purchased at Boston in 1775 by the army's Quarter Master
Department with the initial intention of using her as an armed transport and convoy escort. As will be seen, her role expanded over time.
As her skipper, Sibbles holds the distinction of being the first loyalist known to command an armed vessel in ship-to-ship action against
the rebels.33
On January 25, 1776, off Boston harbor, Captain John Manly, commanding the Continental Schooner Hannah with six four-pounders and ten
swivels, seized two merchantmen carrying supplies and provisions to
the British. Having finished putting a prize crew on the second capture, Manly saw three additional vessels come into view. These proved
to be the Genera1 G s s and two provision transports she was escorting
from Halifax. The two captains and their vessels squared off. Sibbles,
undoubtedly intent on protecting his two charges and perhaps with an
eye to retaking Manly's second prize aggressively approached. Manly,
clearly intent on maintaining his prize and possibly hoping to snap up
yet another, moved to meet him. A brusque little action ensued lasting
about half an hour, and ending in what can best be described as a
draw. The engagement ceased when the Hannah ran low on cartridges and

the General Ga*

turned for Boston. Both vessels had succeeded in

their primary goal of covering the vessels in their care or possession
while failing to acquire any additional ones. Regardless of the outcome, Sibbles's status as an aggressive fighter rises in light of the
fact that Manly had conducted his operation within a relatively short
distance and in plain view of a number af British warships, not one of
which made an effort to assist the beleaguered transports. Sibbles
would soon be heard from again.34

The Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound coastal areas of
Rhode Island and Connecticut produced a significant number of loyalists privateersmen, too. In Rhode Island, all such individuals for
whom there is relevant information emanated from the merchant and
mariner classes. The former group included Joseph Durfee, Ezekiel
Lewis, Thomas Wickham, a Mr. Pain, Samuel Whitehorne, Mathew Cozzens
(variously spelled Cozens or Cozzins), Samuel Pearce, Thomas Hazard,
Nicholas Lechmere, and the Wanton brothers, Joseph Jr. and William.35
Stanton Hazard, master of a vessel in the African trade, Francis I'annes (often anglicized as fans), and a Captain Crendall represented the
seafaring element.36 Finally, there was a Mr. Whipple about whom relatively little is known. He was, however, a shipowner.37 Because of
their later activities at sea, Durfee as a pilot, and Thomas Hazard
and Cozzens as privateer captains, it is evident these men possessed
considerable maritime experience in addition to their other skills.
Finally, young Jacob Eckstein, though referring to himself as a landowner, must have been an adept seaman as well to become the naval
lieutenant that he did.38

Figure 4: The Lower New England Maritime Region.

Lechmere is the only one in the group who held a public office.
He had the dubious honor of being Officer of the Customs in 1765 during the Stamp Act crisis. Though not office holders themselves, the
Wanton brothers possessed serious political connections. Their father,
Joseph, was Governor elect for the colony.39
Existing data points to a very high percentage having been native born, urban dwellers, which conforms to the established view of
Rhode Island and New England loyalists in general. Of the eight for
whom place of birth is known, Eckstein, Whitehorne, Durfee, Pearce,
the Wantons, and both Hazards, all were colonials. Of the eight for
whom place of residence can be established, six, Cozzens, Durfee,
Lechmere, Whitehorne and the Wantons came from Newport, while Eckstein
and Whipple were from Providence.40
For Connecticut, data exists concerning the occupation of fourteen individuals, and typically, the merchants and mariners constitute
a majority. James Hayt Jr., Fitch and Samuel Rogers, Nathaniel Hubbard, and John Taylor all identified themselves as merchant/mariners.4 I
John Ketchum was master of a vessel in the West Indian trade, Jesse
Hoyt, a shipowner, was in the merchant service, and Bemsley Peters and
Neil McNeil referred to themselves as merchants. Peters owned at least
one vessel as well, and the fact McNeil and Hoyt later commanded privateers supports the notion that they, too, were mariners of some
skill.4 2 Charles Thomas later stated he spent the war involved in maritime operations. This in conjunction with his command of a privateer
indicates he was a mariner also.4 3 Finally, although his exact occupation is not stated and he lived inland, Thomas Smith's later post as
an officer on a privateer marks him as a man used to the sea, too.4 4
Despite their majority, the merchants and mariners did not dominate as fully as elsewhere in New England. Accepting the small sample
as representative, there is evidence of a sizable proportion of lands-

men emanating from Connecticut. James Hait, Joseph Hait, and Samuel
Miles were landowners, and Hubbard and Peters described themselves as
landowners in addition to being merchants. Philo Sandford was a
farmer. Finally, the professional ranks were represented by surgeon
Joseph Clarke. No references have been found to public office holders
from Connecticut becoming privateers.4 5
Connecticut privateers fit the image of loyalists in general
from the colony and from New England with regards to place of birth.
Information on the seven who stated where they were born indicates a
commanding percentage were natives. Six were born in the colony. Taylor was a Scot who had arrived as recently as 1768.4 6
As to place of residence, in a broad sense, Connecticut privateers conform to the general view of loyalists in that they were predominantly coastal and urban. At the same time, they conform to the
accepted perception of Connecticut loyalist in particular, which is,
in fact, a departure from demographic patterns elsewhere. This is to
say that although there were small enclaves of the King's supporters
in Norwalk and Stamford, no specific urban locale can be defined as a
hub of regional activity. Then again, taking matters of residence a
step further, the Connecticut privateers also diverge to a degree from
the pattern for Connecticut loyalists in general. In the colony, loyalists as a whole were scattered along the entire coastal area with a
somewhat greater density in the southwestern corner. This increase
might be proportional to the nearness of New York, the ultimate center
of loyalist activity and the base of a large British military and naval force. In any case, with one marginal exception, all Connecticut
privateers for whom place of residence is known emanated from the
rather limited span of southwestern coastal area between the Stamford
and New Haven areas. Within this zone, density increased the further
west one went. Hubbard and both Haits lived in Stamford. Hayt, Hoyt,

the Rogers, and Ketchum hailed from Norwalk. Thomas Smith was from
Ridgefield. Clarke came from Stratford. Sandford dwelt near New Haven,
as did Taylor who lived in Branford. The only individual to depart
from this pattern was Miles who came from New Milford, further north,
but still in the very western part of the colony.4 7
There is no direct evidence of business affiliations between the
men of either Rhode Island or Connecticut. In the case of Rhode Island, despite this, given that a fair number of these men resided in
Newport and were in the same occupations as merchants and mariners, it
seems likely that at least some of these individuals were at least familiar with each other. The fact that William Wanton, Lewis, Wickham,
Lechmere and Pain later invested in a privateer together while still
residing in Newport suggests the possibility of long-standing acquaintance.48 Having been transported together after arrest, there can be
little doubt Joseph Wanton, Jr. and Lechmere knew each other. Family
ties were in evidence. Of course, the Wantons were brothers. In addition, it would seem likely that Thomas and Stanton Hazard were linked
to the prominent Rhode Island family of that name and so, were related
in some manner.
In Connecticut, the demographically scattered nature of the men
discussed precludes concluding that there may have been business and
social ties between most. There were, however, family groups. Fitch
and Samuel Rogers were, of course, brothers. In addition, it would
seem likely that James and Joseph Hait bore some family relationship
with each other.4 9
Of all the individuals from this region, only three can be discerned as having had prior martial experience. Clark had served as a
surgeon in a provincial regiment during the French and Indian War.
More specifically, Joseph Wanton, Jr. had been interested in privateers during the same conflict, and Hayt had actually commanded one. 50

No racial minorities have been detected among the region's

pri-

vateers. The very English surnames of the majority supports that ethnic minorities from the region were minimal as well. Only Eckstein and
I'annes bear names reflecting ancestry other than British. I'annes is
of note in that he is likely a representative of the Portuguese community in Rhode Island.
As to religious minorities, it is somewhat surprising that no
firm evidence has been found linking the Hart family, especially
Isaac, to the activity. The Harts were leading merchants in Newport's
Jewish community, and family members had been seriously involved in
privateering during the French and Indian War. At that time, Isaac was
a partner with Joseph Wanton, Jr. in at least one such venture. During
the Revolution, the family (in particular, Isaac) was decidedly loyalist. Yet, no substantial evidence has associated this group with privateering during that time. Additional research might prove otherwise. 51
With regards to abuse at the hands of the rebels, the situation
was somewhat unique for the denizens of both Rhode Island and Connecticut. In the former colony, specifically in Newport, this was due
to the fact that during 1775 and 1776, while the rebels controlled the
inland areas, a relatively strong British naval presence, dominating
at sea, kept Newport under its guns.52 This put Newport in the position
of being somewhat of a no-man's land in which people of opposing political leanings were able to co-exist, however uncomfortably, until
that port was occupied by the British Army in December, 1776. Troops
would remain until October, 1779. Their presence may account for the
comparatively fewer and less severe examples of persecution there.
Still, these were instances.
The Wanton family was the focal point of considerable harassment. Though the brothers' father, Joseph, was Governor elect, the re-

be1 dominated assembly refused to swear him in. In turn, Joseph, Jr.
was arrested and sent under guard to Providence when he refused to
take the rebel oath.53 Lechmere accompanied Wanton for the same reason.5 4 Whitehorne's stance was strong enough that he was forced to flee
with his family and go into hiding in the country until the arrival of
British troops at Newport. 55
Perhaps one of the most interesting examples of persecution concerned Stanton Hazard. As far away as Point Petre, Guadeloupe, while
on a voyage, he was forced to endure the indignity of an extra-legal
drumhead interrogation at the hands of a group of ten New England captains who felt he had broken the Articles of Association. This group
of captains went so far as to convey their suspicions and findings to
the Rhode Island General Assembly. Hazard would have something to commiserate about with his future employers, Sheddon and Goodrich. Later,
in October, 1777, the rebels seized Hazard's sloop.56
As elsewhere, the privateersmen of Rhode Island initially reflected various levels of commitment. Despite Joseph Wanton Jr.'s
treatment by the rebels, initially, he was actually quite sympathetic
towards them and attempted to maintain a middle-of-the-road position. 57
His brother, William, when pressured had fewer scruples about taking
the oath when tendered. This submission resulted in post-war censorship when the Claims Commissioners viewed his action as the "Speck in
that Loyalty which destroys all its

lustre.^'^

Quite the opposite of

Joseph, Jr. was Lechmere. As Officer of the Customs during the Stamp
Act problems, fearing for his life, he was forced to seek refuge on a
naval vessel. Since that time, Lechmere had made his unswerving support of government well known.59 That Whitehorne was actually forced
into hiding at an early date when others were still managing to coexist says he must have been very open in his support of the King as
well. 60 The fact that Pearce left the colony relatively early, as did

Whipple, foregoing Newport in the process, indicates their strong support of royal government also.61 On the other hand, while the Royal
Navy's presence undoubtedly helped in allowing them to remain, it
would seem likely that at least some Newport loyalists were initially
passive, thus further accounting for their ability to remain in their
homes until the British Army's occupation.
In Connecticut, the treatment of loyalists was markedly different in terms of both volume and severity. Several of the men in question, McNeil, Thomas Smith, Joseph Hait, and Sandford were forced to
flee the colony. Sandford was in trouble for aiding a British officer.
Smith was declared an enemy of the state. Hait must have clearly endeared himself to the rebels in that he was forced to flee as early as
January, 1775. McNeil was mobbed, abused, and insulted several times,
then jailed, tried, and acquitted for treason before departing in fear
of his life. 62
In fact, there was a high rate of incarcerations among Connecticut loyalist privateers. Peters was imprisoned for treason as well.
Hayt, Fitch Rogers, and Hubbard were jailed too, Rogers several times.
Hayt had also been jailed earlier on suspicion of smuggling tea, and
adding insult to injury, in conjunction with his last confinement, the
mob seized his vessel and plundered his trade goods and personal belongings. Joseph Hait's imprisonment was made all the worse by the
fact he successfully managed to reach the refuge of Governor Tryon's
ship at New York only to be turned out due to a lack of room and told
he would have to fend for himself. After being mobbed and abused, Hait
was jailed for thirteen months. He and Peters ultimately escaped. Hubbard posted bond and subsequently gave leg-bail. How exactly the others achieved their freedom is unknown.63
Ketchurn's experience with the rebels is noteworthy. In his case,
in addition to mobbings and insults, the rebels kept him from doing

business. Consequently, he finally decided to pack up and leave.
Ironically, even though it would seem the rebels had achieved their
intent, Ketchum found himself in even greater trouble for his efforts.
His vessel and her contents were confiscated. It was evidently a nowin situation for John Ketchum. 64
In light of the treatment received from the rebels, it is evident that in general, the men from Connecticut were firmly committed
in their political stance from an early date. Charles Thomas would
later boast that whe never wavered in his attachment to his King."
This, in turn, reflects a break in the established historical view of
loyalist actions in that in an area that was relatively calm and remote from a protective British presence, individuals were far less
passive than elsewhere. Certainly, the nearness of New York may account for some of this confident behavior, but New York was not that
close, a secure British influence did not extend into Connecticut, and
the British did not even begin to establish a firm grip on the city
until the summer of 1776. In fact the only passive exception was Samuel Miles who admitted attempting to keep a low profile. In his efforts to avoid involvement, like Linnekin in Maine, he too, hired a
substitute to serve in his stead with the rebels. Regardless, he could
not put off the inevitable for long. He left for New York in the Fall
of 1 7 7 6 . ~ ~
Almost all of these men, both from Rhode Island and Connecticut,
suffered in another way. They, too, lost heavily in terms of real estate, personal property, shipping, trade goods, and livestock. There
are, however, indications that the people of Newport suffered somewhat
less, incurring losses primarily in real estate only, having time to
ship off other goods and possessions, because of the British occupation. 66

Furthermore, several suffered affronts from the British as well.
British troops destroyed a distillery on which Whitehorne held the
mortgage. The Wantons lost a vessel to the British. With Eckstein,
whatever crops and livestock the rebels failed to take from his estate
the British seized.
As with their possessions, the Newport loyalists had time to extricate their families when they left. This, unfortunately, was not
always possible for Connecticut loyalists. Rivaling upper New England
in numbers, McNeil, Joseph Hait, John Taylor, and Ketchum were all
forced to leave their families behind and remain separated from them
for some time.68
For the Long Island Sound and Narragansett Bay region, there is
even less evidence of early loyalist activity at sea. Only one tantalizing reference has been found, and it is questionable. On October 6,
1775, a rebel report mentioned a privateer brig being with the British

squadron off Newport. The log books of the naval vessels that were
present, however, make no reference to such being in company. The only
reference to a brig is to the naval vessel Bolton. At the same time,
however, the logs do refer to the presence of several tenders which
remain unidentified in terms of both name and type. So, the possibility exists that a privately owned and manned vessel was acting as a
tender to a British man-of-war. Of course, if such a craft existed,
she could not have been a true privateer, because no one was issuing
even extra-legal letters of marque at that time. Then again, it is
just as possible the recorder was mistaken in his identification altogether.69

From this point, discussion of individuals from the Upper and
Lower New England regions will be merged for the sake of clarity and

convenience. Most of the men from the Boston area remained in that
city until the British evacuated it in March, 1776. At that time, they
began their refugee odyssey that would take many at New York. Coffin,
Dumaresque, Green, and Rogers departed for Halifax and then went to
New ~ork.~'Geyer, who actually departed in 1775, left for Halifax,
too, and then spent some time in England before returning to the colonies to also take up residence in New ~ork.~'From that port, Samuel
Rogers left for England, while partner Joseph Taylor relocated yet
again to take his place in that city.72 Leonard turned up in New York,
too, following a spell in Halifax and then Newport. 73 Other Massachusetts loyalists who found their way to New York were William Gallop,
Lewis, Cowe, Anderson, and Goldthwaite. Also, Hathaway at least operated in the New York area74
Several Boston area men relocated elsewhere. Woodbury went to
Halifax and remained.75 Brymer left for Halifax as well, and though he
would later sometimes refer to himself as based in London, and there
are hints he may have spent some time in New York, all indications are
that he was predominantly associated with the Nova Scotia port for the
remainder of the war. 76 Perry moved to Newport where we lose track of
him.77
Among the loyalists on the Maine coast, those further south at
Falmouth, Wyer, ROSS, and Robert and William Pagan, made their way to
New York. Wyer, however, upon escaping from jail went first to Annapolis, Nova ~cotia.~'Thomas Pagan ended up in Bermuda. 79 Those residing
further north, Callahan and Doharty, opted to relocate to Halifax, and
there are indications Pomeroy turned up there as well. 8 0 After his
stint in New York, Ross, too, went to Halifax. 81 With the British occupation of the Penobscot region, in 1779, a number of upper New England
Loyalists decided to move yet again and take up residence there. This
group included Robert Pagan, William Gallop, Wyer, Pomeroy, and Do-

harty. Late comer Linnekin also sought refuge there. Gardiner at least
operated in the region although there is evidence he may have later
been based in New ~ o r k . ~ ~
In lower New England, the situation differed, mainly because of
the unique situation of Newport. Evidence indicates most Rhode Island
loyalists, the Wantons, Whitehorne, both Hazards, Durfee, Cozzens,
Lechmere, Pain, Ezekiel Lewis, Wickham, I'annes, and Crendall, remained in that port during the British occupation. Of this group, the
Wantons, Whitehorne, the Hazards, Durfee (after a spell in England),
and Cozzens are known to have arrived in New York. Having left earlier, Pearce was already there. Eckstein went there as well. 83
New York was also the destination of choice for Connecticut loyalists. Of the fourteen individuals whose place of refuge is known,
James Hayt, Jr., the Rogers brothers, James Hait, Hubbard, Clarke,
Ketchum, Joseph Hait, McNeil, Thomas, HOyt, and Miles went there.
Sandford also spent time in that port before leaving for England and
joining the crew of a privateer there. John Taylor also spent time in
New York as well as in Canada and the West Indies. Thomas Smith served
on a privateer operating in New York waters. In fact, only two men
from the whole lower New England region are known not to have gone to
New York. Lechmere departed for England and Whipple went to Antigua.84
Upon reaching their various destinations, a large percentage of
these men from both upper and lower New England involved themselves in
activities other than privateering, reflecting a desire to aid the war
effort. A fair number served in a military capacity in loyalist militia or provincial units, generally holding commissions as officers.
This group included Joseph Taylor, Anderson, Hayt, Fitch Rogers,
Clarke, William Wanton, Joseph Taylor, McNeil, Durfee, Pearce, and
Hathaway.85 Others served in a naval capacity. Ketchum commanded an
government vessel, Eckstein served as a lieutenant on a naval galley,

Joseph Hait was a lieutenant in the Armed Boatmen, and John Taylor was
a naval volunteer. 86 William Gallop, Linnekin, Callahan, Durfee and
Hoyt all served as pilots for the navy.87 Wyer was in the transport
service.88 Linnekin also served on a tender.89 Cowe spent time on a
armed government vessel.g0 There was involvement in other activities as
well. Miles and Leonard were employed by the commissary department and
Doharty did government work of some nature. 91 Hayt was a cashier to the
Barracks' Master and a clerk in the Travel Department.92 Joseph Hait
carried dispatches and did intelligence work for Governor Tryon, and
was captured and imprisoned twice more for his efforts.93 Finally, a
few of these men held public office. At Halifax, Coffin was appointed
a magistrate and Brymer ultimately attained a seat on the council. 94
While at Newport, Joseph Wanton, Jr. was Superintendent General of Police.95 At New York, Durfee held the post of Superintendent of Small
Craft while William Wanton acted as Purveyor to the H~spital.'~
As to the privateering activities of these men, Coffin, Geyer,

Green, Goldthwaite, all three Pagans, Anderson, Lechmere, the Wantons,
Durfee, Dumaresque, Ezekiel Lewis, Wickham, Pain, Pearce, Whitehorne,
Joseph Taylor, Samuel Rogers (Massachusetts), John Taylor, Brymer, and
Whipple became owners. 97 Involved in no less than twenty cruisers,
Pearce was a major figure in the activity. 98 Stanton Hazard, I1annes,
Hayt

Fitch and Samuel Rogers, Wyer, Crendall, Jacob Rogers, Antill

Gallop, William Lewis, Ketchum, Hoyt, Thomas, Callahan, Doharty, Gardiner, Woodbury, Ross, Pomeroy, Cozzens, and McNeil, became captains.
Thomasls, Gardiner's and Hoyt's craft operated with the Associated
Loyalists.99 Perry, Thomas Hazard, and Hathaway each owned and skippered privateers, and Eckstein owned and served on such.100 Leonard
owned and commanded a small squadron comprising seven privateers, plus
auxiliary craft.101 Sandford acted as a purser, and Thomas Smith was an
officer on a cruiser.102 Peters was Captain of Marines on a private

man-of-war. 103 William Gallop, Cowe, and Hubbard are known to have
spent time on privateers, but the capacity in which they served in unknown.104 Linnekin served as prize master on such a vessel. 105 Finally,
Joseph Hait, James Hait, Miles, Clark, and again, Hubbard, were members of the Associated Loyalists, and Leonard served on the Board of
that organization.106
Having established the identities and backgrounds of these individuals and examined their experiences, motivations, and levels of
commitment, an assessment can be made of them as a group. In both regions, they were primarily comprised of native-born men of English
heritage. While the merchant and mariner classes made up the largest
proportion, these men still reflected a cross-section of established,
respectable colonial society in terms of occupational and socio-economic background. Their motivations and experiences, with regards to
persecution, can be viewed as typical for men who became privateers.
Their general lack of equivocalness combined with their other efforts
in support of the war show these men to have been highly dedicated to
their course of action.
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CHAPTER 7

"IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNHAPPY DISSENSIONS:" THE
LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE DELAWARE BAY
AND NEW JERSEY MARITIME REGION

The mid-Atlantic coastal area of New Jersey and Delaware Bay,
with Philadelphia as the region's key port, also produced its share of
loyalist privateersmen. Background information exists for forty-nine
of these individuals from the three colonies comprising the region,
New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. While data concerning some of
these men is limited and sketchy, it is sufficient to show that while
the mid-Atlantic loyalist privateers conform to the broader image of
loyalists in general in terms of diversity, they nevertheless exhibit
some significant regional variation in relation to privateers elsewhere. Most noticeable is the fact that while there were a considerable number of mariners from the area, the number of merchants who
would become involved in privateering was proportionately smaller in
comparison with other regional groups. At the same time, there was
also an increased ratio of men representing other occupational backgrounds. Although a strong urban element existed, and the majority
could claim coastal status (though marginal in some instances), there
was also a high proportion of men from rural environments. There is no
evidence of racial involvement, and ethnic presence was minimal. Information on place of birth shows a mix of native and foreign born for
the region as a whole, but significant variations between the colonies
comprising it. Another notable aspect of these men that departs from
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Figure 5: The Delaware Bay and New Jersey Maritime Region.

the norm elsewhere, is that there was a high instance of not only neutral behavior, but equivocal as well. Also, although there are examples of rebel affronts, they were not as widespread as in other areas.
One characteristic of the region's privateers in which deviation
from other regions is apparent is occupation. With fifteen individuals
representing all three colonies, the merchant element which would become involved in privateering, while still substantial in number, nevertheless constituted a comparatively smaller proportion of the known
whole and was not as significant a factor as in other areas. The men
of this group included William Luce and John Stites of Elizabethtown,
New Jersey, William Burton of New Brunswick New Jersey, Edmund Seaman
of Hackensack, New Jersey, Thomas Crowell of Monmouth County, New Jersey, Joseph Shoemaker (brother of noted loyalist Samuel Shoemaker),
Benjamin Booth, and David Sproat of Philadelphia, William Caldwell of
Union Township, Pennsylvania, James Rankin of York Township, Pennsylvania, Nehemiah Field, Samuel Edwards, and Levin Turner of Sussex
County, Delaware, and Jacob Caulk of Newcastle County, Delaware.2 Merchant Thomas Skelton hailed from New Jersey as well, but his exact
place of residence is unknown. 3
The already comparatively diminished presence of the region's
mercantile faction should probably be lowered even more. There are indications that Burton's, Rankin's, Field's, and Edwards' involvement
in trade was either a secondary occupation or one they moved into after being deprived of their usual sources of income due to the war.

A

document pertaining to their later privateering activities clearly refers to them as merchants, but in materials referencing their pre- and
early war existences, there is no mention of such activities, and as
will be seen, at that time, their efforts were directed elsewhere.4
While a proportionately smaller number of merchants is in keeping with the general, established loyalist profiles for New Jersey and

Delaware, it is at odds with that for ~enns~lvania.~
There, mostly associated with the urban center of Philadelphia, the commercial elements held a dominant place in the loyalists ranks. 6 Yet, in contrast
with other locales this group seemingly produced proportionately fewer
privateers. This discrepancy may be accounted for by the fact that
many of the merchants were Quakers, as such, were loath become involved in anything warlike.7
Another deviation is evident with the place of residence of
these merchants. While the majority of men from New Jersey and Pennsylvania were typically urban dwellers, a noticeable rural element existed as well. This factor was even more in evidence in Delaware where
all concerned were from such an environment. These rural merchants
were in contrast with the merchant groups elsewhere who entered into
privateering.
On the other hand, and more in keeping with the scheme of
things, evidence points to the region having produced a significant
number of experienced seamen. Logically, the majority of Pennsylvania
mariners were associated with the port and urban center of Philadelphia. This group included William Austin, John Henderson (previously
of Georgia), Jacob Getsheus (sometimes Gatcheus), William Raddon, John
Papley, and Robert White. Gideon Vernon came from Providence Township,
Chester County. Merchants Shoemaker and Caldwell were mariners as
well. Finally, seafarer Samuel Saunders, if not from the colony, was
undoubtedly from the region. He joined the British at Philadelphia.
With regards to all but Getsheus, Henderson, Raddon, and White, marine
skills are surmised on the basis that all later served as pilots or
captains of privateers.8
With the mariners of New Jersey and Delaware, a unique situation
is also encountered in terms of their environs. While still coastal,
as one might expect, here, too, there was a strong rural element. This

is actually in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general within
both colonies, but it is atypical for privateersmen.9 A significant majority of New Jersey mariners was concentrated in Monmouth County.
Morford Taylor, Conrad Hendricks of Monmouth Township, and Philip
White, Clayton Tilton, and Richard Lippincott of Shrewsbury, resided
within its boundaries, as did Crowell who was a master mariner as well
as a merchant. Luce, who was also a seafarer, and John Cox of Woolwich
Township, Gloucester County, were the exceptions. Apart from Cox,
Crowell, Luce, and Tilton the seafaring abilities of these men is
again based on their later service as pilots, privateer captains, or
ship's officers.10
Nine individuals constitute Delaware's identifiable contribution
to the loyalist privateering community. Of these, at least six were
skilled mariners. Little is known of the background of Joseph Hewes
Burton other than that he was from the colony and clearly possessed
seafaring experience given his later command of a privateer. As to the
other men, Levin Turner, William Milby, Edwards, and Field were all
from Sussex County, and the last three were pilots. Milby also owned
and skippered a merchantman, and Field was master of a trading vessel
as well. There was also Jesse Turner. His place of residence is unknown, but he is often mentioned in association with Levin Turner,
suggesting some family relationship between the two, and they were
therefore, probably from the same locale. Both Jesse's and Levin's expertise as seamen is derived from the fact both later commanded privateers. Finally, there are indications that Jacob Caulk either owned or
was master of a vessel. 11
The rural background of these men is further emphasized by the
fact that no less than six of the New Jersey and Delaware mariners,
Field, Milby, Edwards, Taylor, Cox and Hendricks, and two of the merchants, Stites and Burton, referred to themselves as being farmers or

substantial landowners. In fact, in the case of all but Cox and Stite,
working the land is emphasized as the primary occupation. Cox is of
note for the fact that while distinctly referring to himself as a professional seaman, he also mentions having cleared seventy-four of his
one-hundred and eighty-three plus acres, indicating he was at least
contemplating a career change to the more staid existence of a farmer.
Three additional N e w Jersey privateers were specifically tied to the
land. Northurp Marple of Gloucester Township possessed several estates
one of which was comprised of three-hundred acres of undeveloped land.
Joseph Williams of Shrewsbury, Monmouth County, possessed a modest estate. Elijah Groom of Middlesex County raised livestock on his father's farm. In Pennsylvania, Gideon Vernon was a landowner, too. In
fact, the data available on him indicates his estate was his primary
concern.12
Taking this a step further, various levels of rural wealth were
represented by this group. Taylor, with four-thousand acres, and Marple clearly were men of substance. Burton described his eighty-four
acres as fit for the life-style of a gentleman. Representative of more
middle-class, yeoman farmers were Field, Edwards and Milby. Groom, it
would seem, represented the lower end of the economic spectrum.13
The high rate of agrarian occupation is, in turn, reflective of
another unique aspect of the region's privateers. There was a comparatively high rate of non-mercantile and non-maritime oriented individuals. White, clearly qualified as a seaman, was actually a carpenter by
profession. Jacob Bostwick of Newcastle County, Delaware, was also a
carpenter, and there are indications Caulk, too, could add that skill
to his growing list of occupations. In the same vein, Daniel McDonald
was a joiner from Philadelphia. John Connel of Chester County, Pennsylvania, was a school master, and Daniel Coxe of New Jersey was both
a barrister and an attorney. Princeton graduate Jonathan Odell, resi-

dent of Burlington County, New Jersey, was the rector of churches at
Burlington and Mount Holly. He was also a missionary for the Society
of the Propagation of the Gospel. 14
Four men from the region held public office. William Morris was
High Constable at Philadelphia. Rankin served as a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly. Robert White acted as a Warden of the Port of
Philadelphia. William Franklin was Governor of New Jersey.15
Several additional men can be linked to these colonies but additional pertinent, background information is limited. Aaron White,
Philip's brother, was probably from Monmouth County, New Jersey as
well. Charles McClain, Charles McBride, William Ryan, and James Thompson came from Pennsylvania. Indications are that John McDonald came
from that colony as well. If not, the fact he joined the British at
Philadelphia supports he was probably from the region. Finally, there
was William Caulk of Newcastle County, Delaware.16
Demographic concentrations can be ascertained. In New Jersey, a
pattern similar to that in Connecticut can be discerned. The majority
of individuals were concentrated in the coastal areas of the four
counties closest to New York City, Monmouth, Middlesex, Essex, and
Bergen. A few more were scattered in Gloucester and Burlington Counties across the Delaware River from Philadelphia. In other words, concentrations exist close to spheres of British influence. In Pennsylvania, the vast majority of the men in question hailed from Philadelphia. These patterns are in keeping with those for Loyalists in genera1 from both colonies.17 Delaware is of note because of the relatively large number of mariners from Sussex County. In addition, several additional men came from Newcastle county.
Data on place of birth is best for New Jersey. There, Luce, Williams, Philip and Aaron White, Cox, Tilton, Stite, Hendricks, Groom,
Lippincott, and W e l l were natives, while Burton had only recently ar-

rived from England in 1772, and Skelton had come from Jamaica in
1771." This dominance of natives over immigrants is in line with the
view of the colony's loyalists in general. 19 Similar information for
Pennsylvania is extremely limited. Rankin was the only identifiable
native. Caldwell was from England, and Henderson, Sproat, and Robert
White were Scots. Sproat had arrived in 1760.20 Though hardly a representative figure, the fact four out of five men were immigrants does
comply with the established view of Pennsylvania loyalists.2 1 Nothing
is known about the birth places of any of the Delaware men.
As elsewhere, there existed family and professional ties between
some of these men. The Caulks were brothers, as were Philip and Aaron
White, and if the Turners were not, they were, in all likelihood, related. Lippincott and the Whites were brothers-in-law. Having joined
the British together, it is evident Sussex County pilots Field and Edwards maintained at least a professional relationship, and it would be
surprising to find they were not associated with Milby. 22
Somewhat surprisingly, especially in light of Philadelphia's
cosmopolitan order, among the region's loyalist privateers, no evidence of racial minorities has been discerned, and apart from a few
Scots, that for ethnic minorities is very minimal. With the exception
of Getsheus, the majority of surnames suggest English ancestries.
The region does, however, offer a rare glimpse of the religious
affiliations of three men. Ode11 was Anglican. Williams and Shoemaker
were Quakers. 23
Only one individual, Crowell, has been identified as having
prior experience with privateering. During the Seven Years War, he
commanded a cruiser out of New ~ o r k . ~ ~
The region is unique in that no other area produced as many
identifiable privateers who were initially passive or neutral. This is
very much in keeping with the established view of the nature of loy-

alism in general in at least New Jersey and Pennsylvania where such
trends have been ascertained. One historian has attributed the number
of passive loyalists, and as will be seen, equivocal ones as well, to
the fact the people were, by nature, generally peaceful or politically
moderate.25 In conjunction, the region exemplifies the effect a British
military presence could have fostering a sense of security that allowed individuals to confidently and openly declare their loyalty.26
Of the forty men for whom it is known when they declared for the
British, only five, Caldwell and Morris of Pennsylvania, and Odell,
Burton, and Luce, of New Jersey did so in 1775. In fact, Luce is reported to have been the first man in New Jersey to oppose the rebellion. Burton, reflecting an impulse to avoid the developing situation,
left for England upon hearing news of the fight at Lexington. While
this act clearly defined Burton's loyalist sentiments it also marked
his initial desire to avoid trouble and maintain a state of neutrality.27
Of those remaining, based on what is known of them, twenty-four
can be classified as initially passive or neutral. In New Jersey, six
men, all from eastern counties, did not declare themselves until 1776,
and in all but one instance in which a more specific date is known, it
coincides with the establishment of British control over nearby New
York or their consequent occupation of the colony. Hendricks made his
position clear earlier in the year.28 Williams and Coxe did not join
the British until 1777, and Cox did not join them until 1778. Coxe's
response to affairs is of interest. Despite the fact he was not in the
rebel's good graces, rather than join the British when they arrived in
1776, he opted to remove to rebel-held Philadelphia instead.29 In Pennsylvania, the men in question were even slower to make their position
known. It was not until at least 1777 that another nine men joined the
British at Philadelphia.30 Papley did not declare until December, 1778,

long after the British had evacuated the region, and it was 1780 when
Daniel McDonald sided with the King. 31 In Delaware, Milby did not confirm his position until May, 1776, and Bostwick and the Caulk brothers
were not open loyalists until 1781.32
In addition to having the highest rate of initially passive privateers, the region is also noteworthy for having the most equivocal.
Again, this is in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general for
the area.33 All of the eleven remaining men began the war openly supporting the rebels in one way or another. In turn, the majority came
from Pennsylvania. Rankin's situation is of note and also somewhat
confusing. Initially, he must have maintained a degree of support for
the British in light of the fact that at some point in 1776 he was in
trouble with rebel powers for speaking his mind. At that time he formally confessed "that he had publicly misrepresented and personally
insulted the Whig Committee of York." Asking to be forgiven, Rankin
promised "on the faith and honor of an honest man, to respect the Continental Congress and behave as a good citizen." That same year, he
both served in the Pennsylvania Assembly and held the rank of colonel
of rebel militia. There is, however, some contradiction between his
activities in that by one account he resigned his colonelcy after
hearing of the Declaration for Independence, indicating a break with
the rebels at that time, but by another, he maintained his seat in the
assembly until October of the same year.34 Whatever the exact sequence
of events, it is apparent Rankin suffered a degree of equivocalness.
Robert White was a member of the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety.35 In
Philadelphia, as late as January, 1777, Sproat was acting as a business agent

- for rebel naval vessels. He joined the British at New

York shortly after.36
Stites, Lippincott, and Shoemaker also served in rebel military
units. Stites took the rebel oath of association and both he and Lip-

pincott trained with the New Jersey militia. To Stites' credit, when
push came to shove, he refused to actually present a musket at British
troops. Lippincott joined the British in October, 1776. Shoemaker actually held a commission as an officer in the rebel army. The Declaration of Independence evidently gave some of these men reason to reconsider their position and marked a turning point in their dissidence.
The account of Rankin having resigned his commission over the matter
has already been noted. Shoemaker did the same upon hearing of the
colonies' intention. Obviously for such men, a complete break from
England was going too far.37
Two men, McBride and Edwards were in the Pennsylvania State
Navy. McBride served on a galley. Edwards commanded a small patrol
vessel, but perhaps to his credit, he was dismissed, because the rebels thought little of his zeal and attention to duty. He joined the
British in August, 1777, and McBride deserted and changed his allegiance at some point during the occupation of Philadelphia.38
Getsheus, Field, Raddon, and Robert White each commanded merchantmen in rebel service. Of interest is the fact that like the Goodrichs, Getsheus and Field were contracted to procure and transport
arms and munitions for the rebels. In the course of this undertaking,
Getsheus was captured and confined in the Whitby prison ship. Those
who worked for his exchange deemed him a "very honestw master. Raddon
and White, too, were captured and lost vessels to the British. After
escaping, Raddon took command of a rebel letter of marque, and later,
he was captured again in a third vessel. Field adopted his pro-British
stance in August, 1777, and Getsheus did the same at some point during
that year. White joined the British at Philadelphia in 1778. When Raddon went over is unknown, but it was no earlier than April, 1777.39
Of interest is the trio of Milby, Field, and Edwards. All were
yeoman farmers and pilots from Sussex County Delaware, and all joined

the British. In fact, after serving the rebels, Field and Edwards
crossed over together. The unanswerable question is whether or not
these men also shared some common motive for joining the British. One
possible hint is that early in the war, Edwards was among a group of
pilots who presented a petition of grievances to the Continental Congress. They maintained that existing rules governing pilotage were unfair. To the detriment of the pilots at the mouth of the Delaware Bay,
Philadelphia pilots legally received preferential treatment having
priority to operate on the bay and river. This and his lack of enthusiasm for commanding a rebel vessel indicates that Edwards was not
happy.

40

Generally, because of the moderate nature of the people in combination with the area's initial remoteness from the scene of action,
it appears the denizens of the region were able to co-exist until the
arrival of the British brought the focus of activity to their doorsteps and coaxed or forced a show of hands. This is supported by the
fact that unlike other areas, in the early stages, the persecution of
loyalists was comparatively minimal. Nevertheless, there were instances of avowed loyalists being persecuted, and when they occurred,
they were serious.
For his early defense of the loyalist position, Luce awoke one
morning to find the mob had erected a gallows in front of his door.
Sensibly intimidated, he fled to the West Indies.4 1 In October, 1775,
an incriminating letter penned by Ode11 was intercepted and resulted
in his arrest. Considered an enemy, he was arrested again in 1776 and
confined to the limits of his parish. Then, on December 12 of that
year, the crew of a rebel galley came ashore with the intent of securing him dead or alive. In the ensuing house to house search, W e l l
managed to elude his pursuers until his parishioners were unable to
hide him any longer. At that point, he sought refuge within the Brit-

ish lines.42 In Pennsylvania, in 1775, Caldwell was tried by the Committee of Safety, perhaps facing Robert White while doing so. This resulted in his store's merchandise being confiscated. Worse, he was the
recipient of a coat of tar and feathers.43
Persecution escalated when the arrival of the British drew people out. Several individuals were arrested, including Governor William
Franklin. Hendricks was seized and tried several times, but he could
not be convicted. Lippincott and Cox were apprehended for aiding the
British, and then escaped. Milby was imprisoned twice, first for aiding the British and then when his vessel was taken by a rebel privateer. Although not actually jailed, Coxe, the recipient of abundant
insults, thought the potentiality of incarceration real enough that he
decided to flee. Crowell, Skelton (for associating with the British),
and Sproat were also forced to depart their respective colonies.4 4
As in all areas, the stance these men took resulted in at least
the majority losing considerably in terms of real estate, personal
property, business, merchandise, livestock, and shipping.4 5 Also as
elsewhere, families were split. Caldwell, Skelton, Philip White, and
possibly Papley were forced to leave wives and children behind. In
fact, as a result of a nocturnal visit to the Jersey shore, possibly
to visit his family, White would be captured and brutally executed. In
the case of Governor Franklin, his lengthy imprisonment effectively
separated him from his wife. Distraught over the situation, she passed
away, it is said, from a broken heart. 46
Again at least a couple of these men suffered losses to the
British. After Coxe fled his home, the British arrived and billeted a
Hessian contingent in it. Apparently the structure did not fare well
during their tenancy.4 7 With Milby, the ill-effects of the Prohibitory
Act on loyalist merchants can again be seen. He, too, lost a vessel to
the Royal Navy under the Act's authority. Adding insult to injury,

when Milby put in a post-war claim for his loss, the British government rejected it on the grounds that he had not followed proper procedure. 4 8
The destination of forty-six of these men is known. While a number first spent time in Philadelphia during the British occupation,
ultimately, after departing their respective colonies, all but two
turned up in New York. This figure includes Luce who returned from the
West Indies, and Burton who came back from England. The three remaining men were Bostwick, Jacob Caulk, and Daniel McDonald. The first two
intended for New York, but the former was taken prisoner before arriving, and Caulk decided rather quickly that privateering was not for
him. Whether or not McDonald had actually been to New York before
joining a privateer and being captured is unknown.4 9
At both Philadelphia and New York, a number of these individuals
were involved in activities, other than privateering, that reflected
their high level of personal commitment. In a naval capacity, Milby
and Henderson acted as pilots, while Austin, as a master's mate, and
Cox served on naval vessels. 50 Sproat, Odell, as a chaplain, Williams,
Groom, Lippincott, Tilton, Crowell, Luce, Hendricks, Connel, and
Thompson all served with provincial commands or the British Army. 51
Coxe was influential in raising the New Jersey Volunteers.52 Marple,
Vernon, and Caldwell acted as guides for the British, and Caldwell and
Groom conducted espionage activities. In fact, Caldwell was caught at
one point and sentenced to be executed, but escaped.53
Others acted behind the scenes conducting essential functions
and performing public duties. In addition to their naval service, both
Milby and Cox were involved supplying provisions to the British
forces.54 At Philadelphia, Coxe was appointed Magistrate of Police,
Morris was Coroner and a constable, Odell was Superintendent of the
Printing Office, and Henderson was made Warden of the Port.55 At New

York, Crowell became Warden of the Port, Burton and Sproat, successively, held the post of Commissary General of Naval Prisoners, and
Sproat also filled in as Commissary of Prisoners for the Army. 56 Also,
Odell acted as General Sir Guy Carleton's French and Spanish translator while Coxe served as a peace commissioner.57
Then, there was the privateering activity of these men. Nine of
these men invested in cruisers or letters of marque as owners. This
group included Stites, Skelton, Seaman, Edwards, Field, Burton,
Sproat, Booth, and Rankin. 58 Fourteen, Cox, Philip White, Hewes Burton,
Shoemaker, Getsheus, Raddon, Papley, Henderson, Jesse Turner, Robert
White, Austin, Taylor, Vernon, and Lippincott commanded vessels. The
.~~
Crowell,
last two did so with the Associated ~ o ~ a l i s t sCaldwell,
Milby, and Levin Turner were both owners and skippers.60 Lesser officers were represented by Hendricks who served as a Lieutenant, Ryan
who acted as a Captain of Marines, and Saunders who was a pilot. 61
Groom, Bostwick, the Caulk brothers, Connel, McBride, McClain, both
McDonalds, Thompson, and Aaron White were crew members. 62 New Jersey,
like Connecticut, produced a number of men who would become Associated
Loyalists. Two have been mentioned. Others were Williams, Marple,
Luce, Morris, and Tilton. Coxe was on the Board of that organization
and Odell served as Assistant Secretary. Franklin was President.63
As in the New England regions, indications are that the Delaware
Bay and New Jersey privateers were primarily of British heritage and a
large proportion were native born. Their varied occupational background shows that at least many these men were established and respected. The high level of neutral behavior conveys that they were
initially quite moderate in their political views. The high rate of
equivocalness indicates that others were quite confused. Once they became active loyalists, however, their level of commitment, as exempli-

fied not only by their privateering, but also the other roles many
performed, was unquestionable.
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service, with the former being far more likely. Privateering would un-

doubtedly have been the occupation of choice at a time when comparatively fewer naval vessels were captured.
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Evidence on the Claim of Williams, PRO, A012/16/374; Evidence
on the Claim of Marple, PRO, A012/16/362; Evidence on the Claim of
Tilton, PRO, A012/16/119; Jones, Loyalists of New Jersey, p. 134; Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181; Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296;
and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 509, 586, 627, 653, 892, 934.

CHAPTER 8

"EVERYMAN WHO KNOWS THE VALUE OF FREEDOM AND THE BLESSINGS OF
A BRITISH SUBJECT:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE
SOUTHERN MARITIME REGION'

The Outer Banks and Barrier Islands of North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia constituted the maritime region of the southern
colonies. There, Charlestown was the key port with Savannah having potential as a significant runner-up. Background information is available for only twenty-four individuals from the entire area, and much
of what exists is sketchy and even tenuous. Furthermore, three of the
men in question never actually sailed on a true privateer. With such a
limited data base, it is sometimes difficult to say anything concrete
about certain aspects of the southern coastal loyalist privateers. In
other instances, enough information exists to be able to at least make
suggestions, if not statements of fact, concerning the nature of these
men relative to privateers elsewhere, and loyalists in general. The
largest percentage of identified men were mariners. Merchants were
present in a smaller ratio. In association there was a smattering of
individuals from other occupations. Typically, these men were from urban, coastal environments, but there is some evidence of a small back
country element among them. There was a high percentage of foreign
born and evidence of ethnic and racial involvement. Examples of neutral and equivocal behavior were minimal, and a number of these men
individuals endured ill-treatment from the rebels. Finally, as did men
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in most other locales, some of these southerners were active in roles
other than privateering.
This limited number of men is interesting in that at the same
time, it is both non-reflective and reflective of loyalist privateering in the region. The figure does not exemplify the state of affairs
in that as in all the maritime regions discussed so far, clearly many
more people were involved in the activity. At one specific point in
1779, according to The Gazetteof the State,of South-Carolina, there
were at least six privateers fitted out in Georgia.2 Unfortunately,
there is simply no information identifying the personnel or even the
vessels. In fact, no privateer or commander specifically associated
with Savannah is known by name. On the other hand, the minimal figure
is clearly indicative of the fact that although Charlestown and Savannah were prime privateering ports, the activity was just not conducted
there on anything like the same level as elsewhere, nor were men of
the southern region as involved as those from the Chesapeake Bay, midAtlantic region, or New England. The region simply produced comparatively fewer privateersmen. This is further supported by the fact that
so far, in terms of actually being fitted out, commissioned, or based
there, only seven privateers have been identified as being associated
with Charlestown during the British occupation.3
To some degree, this lack of activity can be explained by the
fact that once Savannah and Charlestown were occupied by the British,
the reason for privateering in the area was largely eliminated. In essence, prior to the arrival of the British, loyalist privateers sailed
from St. Augustine, just down the coast in East Florida, against the
rebels operating out of the two ports in question. When those ports
fell, the main cruising ground was greatly reduced, and the reasons
for privateering in the immediate area diminished. Certainly, working
the North Carolina Outer Banks was still an option, but it was a lim-

ited one. Vessels could also operate from Charlestown or Savannah and
cruise in more remote areas, but not with the same convenience offered
by other ports. For instance, New York's proximity was better suited
for operations against the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, while St.
Augustine, the Bahamas, and Bermuda remained better ports for cruising
the West Indies or intercepting vessels arriving from outside North
America. In the case of Georgia, limited activity might also be explained by the fact that the relatively young colony had yet to establish a significant maritime presence. As of October, 1773, only
thirty-five vessels were registered there. 4
Regarding occupation, again, in general, the diverse background
of the loyalist spectrum is evident despite the small sample. At the
same time, the presence of the merchant class is even less apparent
here than in the Delaware Bay region. Only five individuals, William
Lowther and John Boggs of Edenton, North Carolina, John Hamilton of
Halifax, North Carolina, John Cruden of Wilmington, North Carolina,
and Thomas Stringer of Savannah, Georgia, state that they were traders.5 The higher number from North Carolina is in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general in that colony. There, the merchants
formed a significant element in the loyalist composition. Yet, despite
their number, only a comparatively small minority seem to have become
involved in privateering. Of fourteen merchants from the colony examined while preparing this study, only the above five can be linked to
the activity.6
Although the merchant class was weakly represented, this was not
true of the mariners. A total of nine have been identified: Daniel
Manson and John Macklin of Charlestown, Peter Bachop, William Finley
(a local coaster whose name is spelled variously as Finlay and
Findlay), Robert Schaw, Duncan MacLean, and William Giekie of South
Carolina, John Lightenstone of Savannah, and John Dunlop, also from

the Edenton area, North Carolina. Giekie and Lightenstone were both
Royal Navy veterans and the latter had commanded a colonial privateer
during the French and Indian War. Despite this, it need be noted that
while both are important to the story, neither ever commanded an actual privateer during the revolution.7
Qualifying comments concerning some of the others are also in
order. Bachop is identified specifically with South Carolina on the
basis of his seemingly close relationship with Henry Laurens for whom
he commanded a merchant vessel.' In the case of Daniel Manson, there is
reference only to a Captain Manson operating out of Charlestown. Daniel Manson was a shipbuilder and occasional shipmaster from Charlestown whose return there during the British occupation coincides
with the appearance of Captain Manson. 9 In the cases of MacLean and
Schaw as well as Manson, these three privateer captains are only mentioned in relationship to Charlestown during the British presence
there. Therefore, it seems likely they were, in fact, from at least
the colony if not the port. As with others, the assessment of some of
these men's seafaring abilities is primarily based on their later command of privateers. This group includes Macklin, Schaw, Manson, MacLean, and Bachop. 10
Trading and seafaring were not, however, the sole, or even the
primary occupation of some of these men. As noted, Manson was a shipbuilder. Macklin was the proprietor of a tavern and the London Coffee
House in Charlestown, and Giekie owned a substantial plantation outside the city. In North Carolina, Dunlop had tried his hand at tilling
the land, but gave it up to return to the sea. Lowther was a justice
of the peace. Though he was descended from a merchant/mariner family,
Thomas Brown of Augusta, Georgia, was a planter and magistrate. The as
yet unmentioned Josiah Martin, a relative of Samuel Martin of Virginia, was the Governor of North Carolina.11

Another loyalist of note was John Collet (not the same John
Collett encountered with Dunmore) from the Cape Fear region of North
Carolina. There, he commanded Fort Johnston. Like Giekie and Lightenstone, Collet would not be involved with true privateering. He was,
however, a somewhat significant and certainly interesting character
who was associated with loyalist mariners during the opening phases of
the war. 12
A final occupation of sorts is found among these southerners.
Three slaves, representing a minority element, have been identified.
Prior to his running away to join the British, Henry Brown had been
owned by Samuel Thorpe of Blueford, South Carolina. Two other slaves,
both named Ned, were owned by Hamilton, Hamilton put the two Neds on a
privateer he had invested in, but apparently neither was overly
thrilled about going to sea on a cruiser. Both jumped ship at an early
date.13
There were also several men whose occupations are unknown.
Mathew Varnum hailed from near Orangeburgh, South Carolina. A Mr. Malcom, a Mr. M'Guire, and a Mr. Johnson were also from that colony. Sabert Oglesby was from Stoll Island, somewhere along the South Carolina
or Georgia coast.14
For those whose place of residence is known, in the majority of
cases, it was coastal and/or urban. There were, however exceptions.
Orangeburgh, where Varnum lived, was about seventy-five miles inland.
Coming from Augusta, Georgia, Thomas Brown qualifies as a back country
denizen. In the case of the North Carolinians, there was a small concentration in the Albemarle region which coincides with the established demographic pattern for the colony's loyalists in general. 15
In keeping with the nature of southern loyalists in general and
in contrast with the New England regions, there was a high percentage
of foreign born, of which a commanding number were British including a

heavy leavening of Scots.16 Of the ten individuals for whom place of
birth is known, all'were foreign and nine were from Great Britain.
Lowther and Macklin simply stated they were British. Manson and Thomas
Brown were from England. Lightenstone was born in Russia of English
parents. Stringer hailed from Ireland. Hamilton and Giekie were Scots.
Dunlop is simply referred to as British as well. When he returned to
Britain, however, he specifically went to Scotland, which in association with his name, supports the probability that he was from there
originally. In addition, there can be little doubt that MacLean and
MIGuire were of Scots or Scots/Irish lineage. Lowther had, by far, the
longest tenure in the colonies, having arrived in the early 1750s.
Dunlop, Lightenstone, and Giekie came between 1759 and 1763 during the
latter part of the French and Indian conflict. The remaining three
Britons for whom dates of immigration are known were very recent colonists. Stringer came in 1772, and both Macklin and Brown arrived as
late as 1774.17
Non-British ethnic minorities were also present among these men.
Collet was a Swiss, and there are indications of others. The spelling
of Schaw's name tends to indicate a Germanic ancestry. Bachop has a
French quality to it. Perhaps he was a member of the South Carolina
Huguenot community.18
The sample is entirely too small and scattered to discern much
in the way influential family or business ties. Having the same unusual last name, it would seem likely that Peter Bachop was related to
Adam Bachop of St. Augustine, another loyalist privateer captain to be
discussed in a following chapter. At Edenton, North Carolina, it is
apparent that if Lowther and Boggs were not business associates, they
were certainly familiar with each other. Finally, Hamilton was
strongly associated with the Scottish firm of John Hamilton and Co.,
Glasgow.19

Evidence of neutral or passive behavior is limited and restricted to North Carolina. There, the fact that Boggs did not depart
for New York until 1777 indicates he was able to co-exist with the rebels to a degree.20 Lowther's activities are of interest, reflecting a
sincere initial desire to remain detached from affairs. In 1771, due
to the regulator disturbances, Lowther thought it prudent to leave the
colony and reestablish himself in New York. He dwelt there until 1776
when increasing troubles again pressured him into questioning the wisdom of his place of residence. Believing affairs had resumed a more
stable character in North Carolina, Lowther removed his family and
possessions to reside in that colony once again. He arrived only to
find that his assessment of the political atmosphere was greatly in
error. In September, 1776, deciding that perhaps New York was not so
bad after all, especially since the British had secured their possession of the city, Lowther again packed up his family and chattels,
loaded them on a small, five ton decked boat, and set off on what must
have been quite an odyssey. He did not arrive at his destination until
June, 1777, and in the interim, had faced "many dangers." Unfortunately, this is all that is known about what must have been an adventurous sojourn.21
More evidence exists for equivocal behavior, and every example
of this form of conduct occurred in South Carolina where such conduct
is considered to have been fairly common.22 Malcom, MIGuire, and Johnson all served in the rebel 1st South Carolina Regiment before deserting and joining a loyalist privateer. Macklin held the rank of sergeant in the Charlestown militia as late as 1778. To his credit, he
somehow managed to avoid subscribing to the rebel oath during that
time, and his forced departure from the colony was a direct result of
his refusing to take it.23

As far as is known, the remaining individuals were committed to
their support of the British relatively early in 1775 and 1776. Thomas
Brown, Finley, and Cruden had cast their lot with the King by the end
of the first year. Manson, Giekie, and Stringer had established their
positions by the summer of 1 7 7 6 . ~ ~
A number of these men underwent abuse in one form or another at
the hands of the rebels. As elsewhere, a fair number lost considerably
in terms of such things as real estate, personal property, and business.25 Because Cruden refused to subscribe to the Articles of Association, the rebels refused him the Rights of Free Men and boycotted him.
Giekie was banned from returning ashore in Charlestown after carrying
supplies to British vessels in the harbor. Manson was kicked out of
South Carolina after a lengthy imprisonment and threats of execution
as a felon, and Macklin was forced to flee the same colony. Accused of
illegal trading, Finlay was hauled before the South Carolina Committee
of Safety. We can only imagine the conversations of shared experiences
he had with his future employers, Sheddon

&

~oodrich.*~

Excellent accounts exist of the even greater trials undergone by
Thomas Brown. Sabine agreed with a Mr. Simms in viewing Brown's experience as a classic example of how a single act of persecution could
radically transform a personality while serving no useful purpose
other than to promote and buttress loyalist sentiments. By July, 1775,
there was considerable agitation over the Articles of Association in
upcountry Georgia. Brown had just been made a magistrate and so felt a
logical obligation to do his duty and enforce the law in the name of
his King. He viewed the Association as illegal, and in response, he
was integral in establishing a counter-association. In the process, he
emerged as a leading backcountry loyalist. Still, to this point, indications are that while politically active he was not militant.27

On August 2, roughly one-hundred Sons of Liberty converged on
New Richmond, South Carolina, a plantation where Brown was staying at
the time, to force him to take the oath. Stepping out onto the porch
to confront the mob, Brown, without giving offense, argued his passive
position, diplomatically offering reasons why he could not take the
oath. For instance, he maintained that submitting to the rebel oath
would be an act contradictory to his oath as magistrate. The crowd
grew impatient and declared that Brown simply could not remain neutral. He was either for them or against them, to which Brown replied
that they could not deprive him of the privilege of his thoughts. He
then went inside. Following this, the agitated mob began to call for
the destruction of Brown's property.28
Clearly sensing that rational discussion was about to cease, if
it was not already at an end, Brown prepared for the worst. He put a
brace of pistols in his pockets and returned to the porch. Having supplemented his persuasiveness and obviously feeling a bit more authoritative and in control, he demanded to know just what the rebels intended to do. They responded that they would physically drag him to
Augusta and force him to sign the Articles. To this, Brown commented
that if the mob felt so strongly about public liberty, then they
should feel the same about private liberty and leave him alone. This
retort had some effect. About half saw the logic in Brown's reply and
departed. Unfortunately, the remaining half grew even more aggressive,
threatening Brown as they did so. In turn, Brown gave them fair warning of the consequences, and at that, perhaps as many as eight men
drew their swords and lunged. Brown resorted to his pistols and fired.
The first shot was a misfire. The second struck home, hitting the rebel ringleader in the foot. Pressing their attack, the assailants
wrested the pistols from Brown, but Brown was not done. Gamely drawing
his sword, he proceeded to offer clear evidence that he was quite

adept with a blade, keeping multiple attackers at bay for a time. The
set-to ended when Brown was struck from behind with a musket butt
which fractured his skull and knocked him senseless.29
The ordeal was far from over. Good for their word, the Sons of
Liberty proceeded to trundle the seriously injured Brown to Augusta.
There, they tied him to a tree and placed burning splints of wood beneath his feet, and his hair was stripped off with a knife resulting
in his actually being scalped in three or four places. Finally, he was
tarred and feathered. By one account, Brown was made to recant and denounce his loyalist association. If so, it need be noted that he was
insensible, due to the blow to the head, for the two days during which
this supposedly occurred. It took Brown several months to be able to
walk again, and the incident cost him two toes and a lifetime of severe headaches. All the Sons of Liberty seem to have accomplished for
their efforts was the transformation of a man into one of the most
feared and militantly resolute loyalists in the southern theater.30
At least a couple of these men also suffered at the hands of the
British. When Lowther finally arrived back in New York, he found British troops quartered in his relatively new warehouse. They would remain there for the duration. 31
Manson's story is more pertinent, reflecting further the trials
suffered by loyalist mariners and shipowners under the mandates of the
Prohibitory Act. Following the unsuccessful British attack on Charlestown in June, 1776, Manson and his partner, William Begbie, decided
to load their possessions and a cargo of rice on a schooner in which
Manson then sailed for the West Indies. En route, the vessel was
seized by the Royal Navy, carried into Jamaica, and condemned as lawful prize. Manson returned to South Carolina, and in 1778, following a
stint of imprisonment, he and Begbie sold off their holdings at a loss
and purchased the ship Providence and brig Speedwell, with the intent

of going to England. A passenger on the Providence?, Louisa Susannah
Wells, left an excellent account conveying the concerns and tensions
that arose at sea during efforts to avoid the rebels and French on one
hand and the Royal Navy on the other. Despite the fact a special
course was laid to avoid the British, the Providence had the misfortune to be seized not just by the Royal Navy, but by Captain James
Reid, a man who even his fellow officers considered over-zealous in
the pursuit of his duty seizing American vessels. 32
Taken into New York, Manson began the long process of filing Answer and Claim against Libel. Only "after a tedious and expensive
suitn was the Providence restored to him, but it did him little good.
Because of the trade restrictions, he could not depart with vessel or
cargo and was forced to sell both at a loss.33
The Speedwell, perhaps misnamed, fared no better. She was taken
by William Chambers (about whom we shall hear more) and the privateer
Gavton. Chambers sent his prize into Kingston, Jamaica for libeling.
During the court proceedings it came out that the Speedwell was, in
fact, a recapture, having been seized earlier from British subjects by

a rebel privateer. The court decreed she should be returned to her
original owners. Some consolation may have been found in the fact Begbie and Manson were allowed to retain the seedwell's cargo even
though they did have to undergo the ordeal of transshipping it.34
The destinations of these men were more varied than elsewhere.
Cruden, Lowther, Boggs, and Hamilton went to New ~ o r k .
Manson
~ ~ went
there too although his intent had been to go to England. Thomas Brown,
Varnum, Bachop, MacLean, MIGuire, Johnson, and Macklin removed to St.
Augustine. 36 Giekie went there as well before going to Britain.37 Henry
Brown also went to Britain. 38 Dunlop was so fed up with the rebels that
he went to Scotland with the express intention of fitting out a privateer with which to harass them.39 Stringer's odyssey took him first to

Halifax and then the West Indies before he ultimately arrived in England.40 Finley seems to have gone to Bermuda first and then New yorkS4'
Ultimately, Cruden and Manson returned to Charlestown.4 2
Upon reaching their destinations, some of these men were involved in activities other than privateering. Macklin, Bachop, and
Henry Brown served with the Royal Navy, and the former also spent time
commanding a vessel in the provincial East Florida maritime force.43
Stringer acted with a military unit of some nature, Cruden was a provincial colonel, and Thomas Brown commanded and Varnum served in the
East Florida Rangers. 4 4 Cruden also held the post of Commissioner of
Sequestered Estates in South ~ a r o l i n a .Hamilton
~~
was truly an active
loyalist. Enlisting as mere private, he rose to the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel commanding the North Carolina Volunteers. In this capacity, he
led his battalion through the various campaigns in the south. Seeing
action at Savannah, Charlestown, Yorktown, and during Cornwallis's advance through the Carolinas, Hamilton was wounded three times and captured twice.46
As to their privateering activities, Lowther, Hamilton, Cruden,
Thomas Brown, and Stringer became owners. 47 Bachop, Macklin, Finlay,
Schaw, Manson, and MacLean all commanded privateers. 4 8 Dunlop seems to
have been both owner and captain.4 9 Boggs was a captain of marines and
Oglesby acted as a guide. 50 Henry Brown, Malcom, M'Guire, Johnson, and
Varnum served before the mast. 51 Martin became a board member of the
Associated Loyalists. 52 Also, late in the war, Cruden suggested the
founding of a group that appears to have been intended as a southern
equivalent to Franklin's Associated Loyalists at New York. All indications are that the proposal was rejected.53

In each of the three rebellious southern colonies, a scenario
played out that bore similarities to events in Virginia, although in
no instance did affairs transpire on the same level. Governors Josiah
Martin, William Campbell, and James Wright of North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia, respectively, each realized the need for a substantial naval presence and desired that vessels be sent to assist in
bolstering royal authority and maintaining control over the colonies.
Like Dunmore, all three were eventually forced to take refuge on naval
vessels, establishing floating pockets of resistance from which they
directed operations. While a few loyalists commanded armed vessels under them, none of the three governors promoted the concept of a loyalist naval force.
In North Carolina, as early as April 7, 1775, Governor Martin
declared the Royal Government to be in a state of collapse. At the beginning of June, he fled the capital at New Bern and went to Fort
Johnston on the Cape Fear River. There, he went aboard H.M. Sloop
Cruizer, seeking safety and the assistance of the navy.54
The Outer Banks form a coastal barrier to mainland North Carolina. Key to this navigational obstruction was Ocracoke Inlet. At the
time, it was the only passage through the Outer Banks that could be
negotiated by anything but the smallest vessels. Thus, the inlet, like
the Virginia Capes, acted as a funnel for all of North Carolina's
maritime trade. It also served much of Virginia's, and it was particularly crucial to that colony as the only alternative passage at times
when the capes were blockaded. Vessels entering through Ocracoke could
sail through Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds to the Chowan River. Further

up on this water course the Blackwater River branched off and led to
South Quay, Virginia, where goods were unloaded, sent overland to Suffolk, and reshipped on the Nansemond River. From there, cargoes could
be carried into the James River for a variety of more distant destina-

tions as far away as Maryland and Pennsylvania when necessary. Of
course, when used in reverse, the same route allowed goods to be
shipped from the interior as we11 ."
Martin was clearly aware of the importance of Ocracoke Inlet,
and it was, in part, to stop the influx of rebel war materials that he
desired a substantial naval presence. In July, he stated the necessity
of having at least three, preferably four, more warships to patrol the
coast. These would certainly help bolster royal authority as well. Of
course, the Royal Navy had no craft to spare at the time, and Admiral
Graves communicated this fact to Martin in August.56
As July progressed, rebel forces threatened Fort Johnston. Because the installation and garrison were deemed too weak to withstand
an attack, all removed to H.M.S. Cruizer. Then, the rebels sacked the
fort and burned the personal dwelling and other structures belonging
to the commandant, Captain John Collet. With Collet we get a rare
glimpse of a rather reprehensible loyalist. The rebels described him
as "A pert audacious little scoundrel." Even his loyalist peers were
uneasy about his over-zealous nature which he displayed in conjunction
with an almost complete lack of tact. Accordingly, if not actually embarrassed, other loyalists were duly concerned about his conduct. By
one account, when the rebels served him with writs for debts, he
treated them "with the shameful contempt of wiping his backside with
them. "''
As early as October, Martin was noting the potential problems
that would arise through an accumulation of prizes seized under the
Restraining Acts in conjunction with the lack of a vice admiralty
court. In particular, he pointed out that if prizes could not be rapidly condemned, then, the officers responsible for seizing them might
well be open to law suits.58

Martin's flotilla increased in size when, on November 12, H.M.
Sloop Scorpion arrived, followed on January 2, 1776, by H.M.S.

Syren.

The Log of the latter mentions that in addition to the three naval
vessels there were three other ships and two sloops present. On January 10, Martin issued his proclamation calling on all loyal subjects
to rally to the royal standard he was raising and assist in the restoration of government. In response, although their numbers were never
anything like those in Virginia, over time, a number of loyalists
joined the governor on vessels in the river. If during this time, Martin caused any loyalist vessels to be fitted out, their identity has
been lost to us.59
William Campbell only arrived to take up his post as Governor of
South Carolina in June, 1775. By the end of that month, he was already
pointing out the value of additional naval forces for his coast and
suggesting such should be sent. Throughout the summer, he bemoaned his
lack of warships until late August or early September when word arrived that rather than receive additional naval support, he would actually lose H.M. Sloop Tamaq, his only naval vessel. As it turned out,
the Tamar stayed on station, and on September 7, she was joined by
H.M. Armed Ship Cherokee. On September 15, 1775, with the political
climate clearly turning against him, Campbell departed the city to
seek safe refuge on the Tamar in the harbor. 60
On January 5, 1776, William Giekie undertook to supply the Brit-

ish in the harbor with provisions. In doing so, he incurred the displeasure of the rebellious citizenry who refused to let him return
ashore. Having no alternative, Giekie remained with Campbell's meager
forces.61
The following day, Campbell, accompanied by his small flotilla,
departed Charlestown Harbor. The governor first sailed for Savannah.
Then, leaving the Tamar and Cherokee_ behind, he left to join Martin on

the Cape Fear River where he arrived on February 6. At some point during the voyage, Campbell acquired a schooner which he named the Lady
Willie and personally fitted her out as an armed vessel. In all probability she was commanded at this time by Giekie. Later, in August, he
is known to have been her skipper, and there is no evidence to suggest
he was not at this earlier time as
Although the Royal Navy vessels operating off North Carolina had
taken prizes earlier, there was clearly a jump in activity beginning
in January and increasing in February as additional vessels began to
arrive to augment the force. By March 1, eight prizes were reported
with the British on the Cape Fear River. By March 20, the number had
increased to "many prizes." During this period, the Lady Wil&l.m, referred to as a tender, was active as a naval auxiliary vessel, and at
least on one occasion, she took an active part in capturing an armed
pilot schooner.63
The increasing number of prizes became problematic. For a time,
rather than being able to utilize badly needed cargoes of captured
provisions, Martin was forced to secure them under lock and key, because there was no means to proceed legally against them. Finally,
however, with no practical alternatives, Martin exceeded his authority
and established a vice admiralty court to deal with the situation. In
addition to the arguments that the existing court system was simply
inconvenient and would hurt the navy's efficiency by draining off manpower, Martin offered a battery of shaky legal arguments to justify
his actions, and even implied that he had received General Sir Henry
Clinton's approval. In any case, the court was operational by the beginning of April. 64

In mid-February, the naval force at Cape Fear was augmented with
the arrival of George Sibbles and the Genegal gas from Boston. By
this time, the rebels were referring to the General Gaue as a priva-

teer, although she was operated by army's Quarter Master Department.
In any case, on her passage south, Sibbles snapped up two prizes, the
sloop Joseph, which with her cargo was valued at 51,295.3.7

(Pennsyl-

vania currency), and the sloop charm in^ Sally, with a valuable mixed
cargo of salt, dry goods, wine, spirits, sundries, and a small quantity of munitions. Of interest is the fact that the Joseph was skippered by none other than William Raddon. 65
Collet, who had earlier gone to Boston, was returning to North
Carolina as a passenger on Sibbles' sloop. During the voyage he further endeared himself to the rebels and undoubtedly embarrassed his
British and loyalist associates even more by tactlessly declaring to a
prisoner that concerning the rebels "he would kill man, woman, and
child, reserving all the young ladies for his private pleasures.w66
During March, Sibbles, with Collet aboard, raided the North
Carolina coast. Their activities, which included burning the houses of
two rebel leaders plus the dwellings of two pilots, were described by
the rebels as piratical and larcenous. As in Virginia, loyalists were
beginning to respond to ill-treatment in kind and affairs were taking

a nasty turn. On April 29, after assisting a transport in distress,
Sibbles set out on the more mundane mission of carrying dispatches to
Halifax for Clinton.67
A month later, on May 31, Martin gave up his grip on North Carolina. Upon his departure, he and the naval vessels under his direction
joined the ill-fated expedition against Charleston. Of note during
that operation were the services performed by the Lady William. At
Long Island, to the north of the city, she participated in the landing
of British troops and was then stationed to cover their movements. On
June 21, the

William was engaged by rebel troops and field bat-

teries on Sullivan's Island. The following day, during the main Brit-

ish attack on the harbor defenses, she gave cover fire during the intended British amphibious attacks6'
Georgia is generally accepted as having been the most loyal of
all the rebellious colonies, and this would seem to be reflected in
the fact that Governor James Wright was able to remain ashore longer
than his colleagues to the north.=' During this time, he, too, fretted
over the lack of a naval presence in his colony. For a long while, the
only vessel he had to rely on was a "scout boatn commanded by John
Lightenstone. One of Lightenstone's duties involved acting as a communications liaison between Wright and the Navy when they finally arrived in the Savannah River. The scouting vessel was captured in January, 1776. Of interest is the fact that despite a lack of naval vessels, Wright still took it upon himself to set up a vice admiralty
court which was in operation as early as November, 1775. Not until
February 11, did Wright go aboard a naval vessel, H.M.S. Scarborowhich had only recently arrived, joining the vessels that had just
come with Campbell. On March 30, 1776, Wright released his grasp on
his colony, and with Lightenstone, sailed from the Georgia coast for
Halifax.70
As has been shown, early loyalist maritime activity in the three
rebellious southern colonies was minimal, and consequently, its effect
on the British war effort during the opening phases of the conflict
was limited. In actuality, it was only on the North Carolina coast
that loyalist mariners asserted any influence on affairs, and even
there, the vessels were from other locales, inclusive of those sent
there from Virginia under Dunmore's authority and discussed earlier.
Furthermore, the vessels patrolling the coast were unsuccessful in
halting rebel trade. Nevertheless, efforts to blockade the Outer Banks
did involve loyalist vessels, and so, their presence was a factor in
provoking a response from the rebels. That response involved the ex-

penditure of time, money, and energy, and tied up materials and manpower in the defense of the coastline. In December, 1775, the Provincial Council of North Carolina authorized the purchase and fitting out
of three armed vessels for the express purpose of protecting the colony's trade. Then, North Carolina and Virginia entered into a partnership to build two armed galleys at South Quay for the same purpose.
Finally, in the spring of 1776, the North Carolina rebel government
voted to raise five independent companies of troops to garrison the
Outer Banks.71
In South Carolina and Georgia, early Rebel naval efforts were
almost exclusively a response to Royal Navy activity. With the abandonment of the three colonies by their governors and supporting naval
contingents, the coastline and ports of the region were secure from
any immediate internal threat. It would not be long, however, before
St. Augustine would emerge as an important British base from which
privateering operations could be mounted against Georgia and the Carolinas.
As

in other regions, these southerners appear to have been mod-

erate, established, respectable individuals. The combined merchant/
mariner element dominated occupationally. In association with the men
of Virginia and Maryland, they indicate that southern privateers in
general were more likely to be foreign born and incorporate racial and
ethnic elements. There was a limited amount of neutral and equivocal
behavior in combination with a fair number of instances of abuse. On
the other-hand, minimal numbers, limited involvement in early naval
operations, and the relatively small number of privateers that would
later be associated with the region, indicates that these southern
loyalists were less enthusiastic about privateering than their brethren to the north.
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